http://borsen.dk/finans/nyhed/178164/

Efter de seneste begivenheder vil kun få vist ryste på hovedet af Professor Paul de Grauwes ord fra 2006:

“Now that nobody appears to want that political union, you can begin to wonder whether monetary union was such a good idea. I hardly dare predict that, in the longer term, the monetary union will collapse… not next year, but on a time frame of ten or twenty years. There is not a single monetary union which survived without political union. They have all collapsed. You invariably get big shocks. A monetary union becomes very fragile without a political framework.”

“Barroso’s economics advisor: “Euro will collapse without political union”

In an interview with Belgian daily De Morgen (18 March) Commission President Jose Barroso’s economic advisor Professor Paul de Grauwe has argued that the euro has damaged Italy’s economy, and that without “political union” in Europe, the euro will collapse in ten to twenty years. He also argued that the EU’s Lisbon process, which forms the backbone of the Commission’s efforts to make Europe more competitive, “is best buried.”

He said, “Sometimes I wonder: do we still need the European Union? I start to have doubts about that. It is sufficient that countries open up their economy. You don’t need to do that in the context of the European Union.” Asked whether Europe has added value he said, “I’m not sure about that. Probably the Union creates a framework to keep markets open in an organised way. In that respect it has added value.”

He went on to argue that “the euro is a bad thing for the Italian economy. I’m afraid that Spain is also evolving in the same direction. If that happens, we are stuck with a big problem.” He said that developing a “political union” is the only way to mitigate the problems created by the euro, saying “A political union is the logical end-point of a currency union. But if that political union fails to materialise, then in the long term the euro area cannot continue to exist.” He said, “Now that nobody appears to want that political union, you can begin to wonder whether monetary union was such a good idea. I hardly dare predict that, in the longer term, the monetary union will collapse… not next year, but on a time frame of ten or twenty years. There is not a single monetary union which survived without political union. They have all collapsed. You invariably get big shocks. A monetary union becomes very fragile without a political framework. With the exception of a Don Quixote like Guy Verhofstadt [Belgian Prime Minister and author of The United States of Europe], I see nobody who is pushing the case for a political union.” He said, “A large free trade zone remains the only feasible option for Europe. It’s an illusion that we can realise a political union in Europe in the near future. Political unification has failed. But that is a big problem for the currency union. That is in danger.”

He went on to say: “Lisbon was a political fiction. The Lisbon process is best buried. The whole process, for that matter, is based on the wrong diagnosis… We have built a system of social security that gives people too many incentives not to work. They can easily interrupt their career and leave the labour market early. For many people it is financially unattractive to work. So we shouldn’t be surprised that economic growth is subdued.” He went on to say that productivity per hour worked in the EU is the same as in the US, but that because Europeans take more time off, growth is slower in the US where people work more and consume more.”

http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/bulletin.aspx?bulletinid=33

Det kan godt være, at en møntunion kræver en politisk union for at virke; men lykkes projektet for disse travle politikere, så vil Europa for alvor sygne hen, økonomisk, politisk og kulturelt.

“Some economists believe that market discipline, as enforced by the decisions of rating agencies, would be sufficient to promote a behavior consistent with a necessary degree of fiscal coordination (see Goldstein and Woglom 1992, King 1992, and Tanzi 1992). In other words, they believe that policymakers are sensitive to changes, or to threatened changes, in credit ratings so that they adjust their behavior as needed [inkluderer disse økonomer mon Carsten?]. This conclusion assumes a highly responsible behavior on the part of policymakers and a capacity on their part to make needed policy changes. In reality, however, market discipline seems to become effective mainly when the fiscal situation of a country is so serious as to lead to drastic changes in ratings that effectively cut access to credit [tænk Grækenland]. For most situations, changes in fiscal conditions bring about only small changes in ratings and in interest rates as recent experiences in EU countries and in Japan indicate. The effects of these changes on interest rates are marginal and are not likely to change the fiscal behavior of governments.”

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go2835/is_1-2_24/ai_n29152754/

Men det er vel rigtigt, at “a country with a large fiscal deficit and public debt can access more easily the financial savings of other member countries to finance its own deficit and to service its own debt. This will raise the real rates of interest not only for the country but for all the members of the union—the deficit country can create negative externalities for other countries. Some member countries might be tempted to pursue more expansionary fiscal policies if part of the cost of servicing their public debt is borne by other countries.”

Med andre ord, så bærer et Euro-land ikke alle omkostningerne ved en for løs finanspolitik men kan vælte dem over på Euro-zonen som helhed. Det er vel også derfor Grækenland kun lige indtil de var sikkert inde i Euroen opretholdt en finanspolitisk disciplin.

“The Greek crisis only confirms the folly of binding a group of disparate countries together in a currency zone with no mechanism, such as a central fiscal authority, to address its internal imbalances. The north-south divide in the euro area looks more marked than ever. The north, exemplified by Germany, relies on exports to power its growth, saves hard and runs trade surpluses. The southern economies, such as Greece, have leant too heavily on consumer spending, have weak public finances and rely on foreign capital to supplement their low savings.”

http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15452594

Economists argumenter er selvfølgelig uimodståelige – lidt som Carstens argumenter for at tage det sidste skridt ind i Eurozonen. Har man sagt A, kan man lige så godt også sige B.

Jeg vil nu med Grundtvigsk trodsighed sige, at vi gør klogt i at bevare så meget selvstændighed som muligt. Og det gælder ikke kun muligheden af at lade kronen falde overfor Euroen. Der kan sagtens komme en tid, hvor det vil være økonomisk fordelagtigt at lade kronen stige i værdi overfor en svagelig Euro.

Grundtvig:
“Frygt ej for, hvad verden kalder.
sin nødvendighed af stål!!”

EU’s stadigt større magt og de politiske bestræbelser på at harmonisere, standardisere, lade Europa tale med een stemme etc vil gøre det vanskeligere at eksperimentere med politiske (gerne liberale) idéer i de enkelte lande og det vil fremme en politisk apati i befolkningerne (Vi kan alligevel ikke ændre noget).

Carsten: “Det er en udbredt misforståelse i mange af indlæggene at store offentlige underskud er det samme som ”at stjæle af den fælles kasse”. Kan Grækenland ikke finansiere sig går de i default. Det vil sige at obligationsejerne taber penge. Ikke ECB.
”

Det er nu da ellers begrundelsen for at indføre restriktionerne på budgetunderskud, at det enkelte lands ekspansive finanspolitik betales af Eurozonen som helhed og ikke det enkelte land i form af højere rente. Hvorfor ellers stabilitetspagt?? Når Grækenland nu betaler en pris (højere rente på obligationerne)for deres ekstreme underskud, så skyldes det jo i høj grad markedernes frygt for Euroens sammenbrud eller at Grækenland må _forlade_ Eurozonen. Det er presset som Grækenland ville opleve som _selvstændigt_ land, som vi har set, fordi Grækenlands budgetunderskud er kommet så langt ud af kontrol, som det er.

Jeg er sikker på, at Grækenland ville være langt bedre stillet, hvis landets valuta kunne have faldet i værdi og dermed hjulpet til med at lette trykket på en økonomi, som er i ekstrem ubalance. Ikke at reformer ikke skulle til derudover.

Når jeg peger på Hayeks modstand mod en fælleseurpæisk valuta, så vil jeg bare sige, at der findes gode, liberale argumenter for at beholde valutarisk fleksibilitet.

Jeg er bekendt med, at det både kan have positive og negative effekter. Men europæernes købekraft i forhold til udlandet falder, deres penge bliver mindre værd overfor fx USA, alt andet lige.

Man kan jo godt forestille sig, at tyskerne ikke er særlig begejstrede for de Sydeuropæiske landes negative virkning på euroen overfor dollaren. Også i forhold til vækst og stabilitet, som JR skriver.

Nu er jeg ikke økonom, men var baggrunden for Stabilitets- og vækstpagten ikke netop, at det ville have en negativ indvirkning på andre Eurolande hvis ikke den blev overholdt. Ellers må jeg da indrømme, at jeg har svært ved at se hvorfor den eksisterer.

Så vidt jeg husker var det bla. noget med at underskuddene skabte inflation hvilket igen skubber udgifter over på Euro-partnernes skuldre. Er det rigtigt?

Med den tredje pakke er grækerne nu oppe på en stramning af den offentlige balance på 6% af BNP i 2010. Så stor at Trichet i går roste den i klare vendinger på pressemødet. Det er væsentligt større end den pille DK slugte i 1987-8.

Kunne man have forestillet sig at det var sket i Grækenland udenfor en ØMU, hvor en devaluering var en mulighed?

Er krisen således ikke et paradigmeskift? Det var netop min pointe.

Hvad vil det præcis sige? I hvilken forstand er en depreciering af en valuta en “omkostning”? Og for hvem? For europæiske forbrugere… eller for udenlandske producenter?