Strobe Talbott i Washington Post:

The obituaries are filled with words not always associated with eulogies: brash, aggressive, unyielding, exhausting. But put those together with effective, pragmatic, purpose-driven, indefatigable and idealistic, and they’re redolent of our national character. Not the Ugly American, and certainly not the Quiet American, but the Can-Do, Must-Do, Get-the-Hell-Out-of-My-Way American.

Fouad Ajami i Wall Street Journal:

American patriotism and American liberalism were still tethered together as Holbrooke made his way. There may have been hubris in that outlook. Our country would be bloodied in distant places, it would learn that the world wouldn’t always bend to our will. But the lodestar remained that essential belief that American power could be a force for the good in the world beyond our shores.

Ahmed Rashid i New York Daily News:

No American has tried as hard to ease the fears, apprehensions, doubts, conspiracy theories and ill-informed views of Pakistanis toward the U.S. as has Richard Holbrooke. His death is a tragedy for American diplomacy – but much more so for Pakistan, because whether you liked him or disliked him, there is no denying that in the last two years, he constantly battled for Pakistan.

The image of Holbrooke wading through floodwater, distributing relief goods to this year’s 20 million flood victims – not once but repeatedly at the ripe age of 69 – is an indelible one, that our own much younger leaders barely ever replicated. He pushed for U.S. helicopters to be deployed in Pakistan for the flood victims. He pushed for more aid money for Pakistan from a reluctant Congress.

Leder i Wall Street Journal:

Military force, as he saw it, was often the indispensable ally of diplomacy, not merely its alternative. That’s a lesson Holbrooke took to his final assignment in Pakistan and Afghanistan as a proponent of President Obama’s surge. In August, he wrote us personally about the task ahead. His counsel is worth sharing: ’We face an extraordinary challenge – and our greatest enemy is time. Americans are by nature impatient and driven by election cycles and screaming cable guys; Afghans see time differently and everything moves more slowly than we expect. If [the mission] is as important as we say it is, we must give it time.’

Holbrooke’s energy and intellect made him America’s best-known diplomat, but we’ll remember him in particular as a diplomat who never doubted America as a force for good in the world.

Foreign Affairs har samlet nogle af Richard Holbrookes bedste artikler gennem årene her.

Ære være Richard Holbrookes minde.

Problemet peger direkte på et standardspørgsmål i dansk politik: Hvem står for udenrigspolitikken? Diskussionen var specielt stærk i 1980erne, da en samlet og aggressiv opposition tvang en borgerlig regering til at føre den såkaldte ’fodnotepolitik’, som ikke mindst bød den daværende udenrigsminister Uffe Ellemann dybt imod. Dagens punditokratspørgsmål er derfor, om Potrafkes fund også gælder for Danmark, eller andre end regeringen bestemmer landets udenrigspolitik.

Det spørgsmål svarer vi på med lidt simple empiri. Vi bruger Erik Voetens data på afstemninger i FNs generalforsamling og ser på hvor ofte Danmark stemte sammen med USA i forhold til hvor ofte vi stemte med Sovjetunionen / Rusland. Der er en klar trend, som vi kontrollerer for i en multipel regression sammen med andre forhold. Dem smider vi ind sammen med et mål for, hvor højre- eller venstreorienteret regeringen var i hvert år siden 1948, og hvor højre- eller venstreorienteret oppositionens partier var i gennemsnit, eller hvor Folketinget som helhed placerede sig.

Resultatet af den øvelse er overraskende klart: Den model, der virkelig passer med Danmarks opførsel, viser at det er Folketingets samlede position, der har betydet noget. Regeringens politiske farve har ganske enkelt ikke betydet noget, og oppositionens ideologi heller ikke. Med andre ord har Danmarks opførsel i FN’s generalforsamling været kendetegnet af en konsensusposition i Folketinget. Der er dog ét men: Ideologi synes ikke at have betydet noget som helst, når USA havde en demokratisk regering. Helt på linje med Potrafke viser de simple tal, at Danmark kun har opført sig ideologisk i FN, når USA har haft en republikansk præsident.

Og det er ikke bare pjat. Alt andet lige viser øvelsen, at hvis ti sæder flyttede fra SF til de konservative, var det i gennemsnit 30 procent mere sandsynligt at Danmark stemte sammen med USA i stedet for Sovjet. Betyder det noget for den nuværende situation? Tja, den bold vil vi aflevere til læserne.