Forleden stillede jeg – på baggrund af ét studie fra Norge – spørgsmålet “Ødelægger kvindekvoter virksomhedernes evne til at skabe værdi?“. Ét studie er sjældent nok til at besvare et spørgsmål, men heldigvis har Yu & Madison (2021) lavet et review af litteraturen. De konkluderer:

Several countries have mandated sex quotas on corporate boards of directors. We systematically reviewed empirical studies that compared company profitability and financial performance before and after introducing legislated quotas. The search yielded 348 unique hits and nine studies were retained, including 20 effects. Four were null, 11 were negative, and five were positive, all of the latter for Italian and French companies. We conclude that quotas for women on corporate boards have mainly decreased company performance and that several moderating factors must be taken into account when assessing causal effects of quotas on company performance.

Så blev vi så meget klogere.

Og det er egentlig ikke synderligt overraskende. Virksomheder forsøger som regel at tjene penge. Og gerne flest muligt. Når Regelstaten regulerer virksomhederne, er det for at få dem til at gøre noget anderledes. Altså noget, der ikke bidrager til at tjene mest muligt.