(Amerikanske) politikere overvurderer, hvor store økonomiske problemer vælgerne har. Det er konklusionen i Thal (2023).

Her er abstract (mine fremhævninger).

Politicians often oppose economic policies benefiting low-income Americans. However, the mechanisms behind this political inequality are unclear. I ask whether politicians oppose these policies, in part, because they underestimate how many of those they govern are struggling financially. I test this theory with an original survey of 1,265 state legislative candidates. Contrary to my expectations, I find that politicians tend to overestimate how many of those they govern are struggling financially. At the same time, there are some instances in which politicians—and Republicans in particular—do underestimate the level of financial hardship among those they govern. In an experiment, I randomly assign politicians to have their misperceptions corrected. The results suggest that politicians’ policy preferences would be similar even if they had a more accurate understanding of reality. Overall, the findings suggest that politicians may frequently misperceive the state of reality in which those they govern live.

Særligt det sidste er interessant. Rent logisk skulle man tro, at en politiker ville være mere tilbøjelig til at gå ind for omfordeling, hvis politikeren tror, at der er mange fattige i samfundet. Men det er ikke det, Thal (2023) finder. I stedet finder han, at politikernes holdninger er fastlåste på deres politik, uanset at virkeligheden er anderledes, end de tror.

I randomly assign half of the politicians to receive accurate information about how many people experience these issues in the states they seek to govern. After receiving this information in the treatment or receiving no additional information in the control, politicians are asked their level of support for policies that could help to address each form of financial hardship. Overall, I find little evidence that politicians change their policy views when provided with accurate information. When I provide Democrats with accurate information, it has no effect on their preferences. This suggests that Democrats’ preferences might be similar if they were more accurately informed. By contrast, there is some evidence that the treatment shifted Republican politicians’ views. When provided with accurate information, Republicans appear to increase their support for such policies as spending more on cash assistance to low-income families (which addresses financial insecurity) and Medicaid (which addresses the unaffordability of healthcare). However, I only find evidence for these effects on a few of the policies I asked about, and these effects are no longer statistically significant once I adjust for multiple testing. This suggests Republicans’ preferences might also be similar if they were more accurately informed.

På en måde er jeg ikke super overrasket over dette. Det ville nok være lettere naivt, hvis man gik ud fra, at data påvirkede politikernes (og andre for den sags skyld) holdninger markant. Særligt for politikere – der gerne vil (gen)vælges – er realiteterne mindre vigtige, end hvordan deres vælgere opfatter virkeligheden. Man kan ikke som udgangspunkt forvente, at politikerne ændrer holdning på baggrund af fakta, hvis ikke vælgerne – der jo skal vælge politikerne – ændrer holdning. Så måske har Thal (2023) ganske enkelt serveret fakta til de forkerte, hvis han ønskede at se en effekt.

Hvem ved. Interessant er det i hvert fald.

PS: En working paper verison (fra 2020) af Thal (2023) kan findes her, men abstract afviger en del fra den publicerede version (jeg har ikke tjekket resten).