Tag-arkiv: obamacare

Hvem er uansvarlige i USA?

Af Christian Bjørnskov, den 13. oktober 2013. Skriv et svar

Læser man de almindelige, danske medier, virker svaret på dagens spørgsmål helt oplagt: Det er republikanerne, der har tvunget den amerikanske administration i stå. Giver de sig ikke snart og holder de ikke snart op med at obstruere præsident Obama, risikerer man ifølge medierne en økonomisk nedsmeltning i USA, når de om få dage ikke overholder deres gældsforpligtelser. Men som så ofte før er sandheden mere broget, og man må undre sig over det journalistiske arbejde i de danske medier, når det gælder amerikansk politik. I princippet er begge partier uansvarlige, blot på to forskellige måder.

Man kan med rette påstå, at republikanerne opfører sig uansvarligt, når de risikerer en nedlukning af den amerikanske offentlige sektor. Flere 100.000 offentligt ansatte er sendt hjem uden løn, og kun mere centrale opgaver bliver varetaget. Når man ikke en aftale i løbet af en uges tid – og i skrivende stund har partiet rakt en hånd ud mod præsidenten – risikerer man også, at USA ikke overholder sine internationale forpligtelser. Det er indlysende nok en strategi, der skaber markant politisk usikkerhed i det amerikanske samfund, og som kan skabe en kortsigtskrise.

Men man kan lige så vel pege på, at Obama er uansvarlig og spiller højt spil med USA’s økonomi. Disse problemer overser danske medier desværre, med få undtagelser. Sundhedsreformen (Obamacare) som mange danske journalister har hyldet, er en bastard af et lovkompleks, som først nu er begyndt at blive implementeret. Det er også et lovkompleks, som er alt for dyrt og som USA – på trods af landets størrelse – sandsynligvis aldrig kommer til at have råd til! Ved nærmere gennemgang har det for eksempel vist sig, at indtægter er talt dobbelt i lovkomplekset, og at den officielle vurdering har indeholdt en lang række helt usandsynlige antagelser om, f.eks., Kongressens evne til at stoppe stigninger i medicinpriser osv. Et godt bud er, at den amerikanske gennemsnitsskat – dvs. skatten på alle amerikanere, inklusive middelklassen – skulle stige 5-7 procentpoint for at man kunne finansiere Obamacare. En så stor skattestigning vil være kvælende for den økonomiske udvikling.

Så spørgsmålet bliver, hvem der er mest uansvarlig: Republikanerne, der af gode og dårlige grunde har interesse i at rulle Obamacare tilbage og skære i det offentlige udgifter, eller Demokraterne, der i form af Obamacare og andre programmer smider benzin på et allerede voldsomt økonomisk bål? Uanset min almindelige afsky for det republikanske parti, er min egen holdning, at præsidenten er den mest uansvarlige. Præsidenter bliver bedømt af historien, og Obama har sat kurs mod at blive en af USA’s værste af slagsen. Lige nu ser han kun relativt godt ud, fordi den republikanske opposition er så indlysende ueffen.

Om at tabe og vinde på samme tid – og noget helt andet

Af Nikolaj Stenberg, den 18. juli 2012. 2 svar

På denne blog holder vi som bekendt meget af at videreformidle Randy E. Barnett‘s skriverier m.v. om amerikanske statsretsspørgsmål. Ligeså med Reason, som har talt med ham for kamera under overskriften: “Losing Obamacare While Preserving the Constitution“:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghk7mmSR1Jo[/youtube]

For så vidt angår USA’s højesteret, har jeg været på en sviptur gennem det omfattende punditokrat-blogindlægsarkiv og dér fundet et interessant indlæg fra 2005, som spekulerer i, hvem der ville komme til at indtage retspræsidentens sæde, når Rehnquist måtte forlade det. (Bemærk i øvrigt Jacob Mchangamas kommentar og Peter Kurrild-Klitgaards svar derpå — som begge (på hver deres måde) indeholder megen sandhed)

Der er løbet meget vand under broen siden. Til trods for ikke-sejr-sejren i ACA-dommen, kan jeg ikke lade være med at tænke på hvad der mon ville være sket, hvis Clarence Thomas, som punditokraten i 2005 gættede på, var blevet retspræsident i stedet for Roberts… Særligt efter Thomas’  historisk korrekte, logisk stringente og (ikke at forglemme!) uimodsagte dissens i McDonald v. Chicago, hvori han holdt på, at 14. forfatningstillægs “Privileges or Immunities Clause” (No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States…) bør være en faktisk og aktiv del af forfatningen (igen):

I believe the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment offers a superior alternative [i forhold til retstilstanden efter Slaughter-House– og Cruikshank-dommene] and that a return to that meaning would allow this Court to enforce the rights the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect with greater clarity and predictability than the substantive due process framework has so far managed.

Opdateret:

For lige at fortsætte ud af min Clarence Thomas-tangent, er her en lille times samtale med selvsamme, for de (få?) interesserede:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8rCRLC30dw[/youtube]

Skriverier om ACA-dommen (opdateret)

Af Nikolaj Stenberg, den 28. juni 2012. Skriv et svar

USA’s højesteretspræsident John Roberts fik skrevet sig selv ind i historiebøgerne i dag, da han som forfatter til flertallets afgørelse i ACA-sagen, sendte dele af amerikansk forfatningsret ind i en ny tid. Dommen, der i vanlig stil er langt mere fyldig (192 sider) end en dansk ditto ville havde været, kan selvfølgelig hentes via domstolens hjemmeside.

Dommen har allerede fået meget omtale, også i danske medier, og den vil selvsagt blive mere indgående behandlet over det næste stykke tid.Sagt lidt meget sort-hvidt, er den individuelle forsikringspligt ikke forfatningsstridig, fordi pligten slet ikke er en pligt, men en skat. Hvilket i øvrigt var dét, som advokaterne for føderalregeringen mente ikke var tilfældet!

En umiddelbart rammende beskrivelse kommer fra Erick Ericksen på Red State-bloggen:

“It seems very, very clear to me in reviewing John Roberts’ decision that he is playing a much longer game than us and can afford to with a life tenure.”

Denne opfattelse – der også er at genfinde i Ezra Kleins blogindlæg, hvor dommen bliver kaldt for en 4-1-4-afgørelse – går ud på, at Roberts lod forsikringspligten så på grund af en juridisk teknikalitet, samtidig med, at han, sammen med den ”konservative” del af retten, fik afgrænset rækkevidden af reglen om samhandelsregulering i føderalforfatningen. Det er derfor, at Barnett (se nedenfor) kan sige, at dommen er et nederlag for dem, der er imod ACA, men en sejr for dem, der kæmper for at bevare en statsmagt, begrænset af forfatningen. Dommen er – i øvrigt – en gigantisk sejr for Barnett.

Indtil en af mine medbloggere, eller jeg selv, får skrevet noget mere dybdegående om dommen, er her nogle væsentlige kommentarer (IMHO) fra den amerikansk-juridiske blogosfære (mine redigeringer):

Jonathan H. Adler:

The primary dissent is a joint dissent by all four dissenting justices. This is unusual. Their dissent rejects both the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion. Because these two provisions are central to the act, the dissenters would invalidate the law in its entirety.

Chief Justice Roberts rejects the Commerce Clause and Necessary & Proper Clause rationales for the mandate even though doing so would not seem to be necessary for the result. If the mandate may be upheld on taxing power grounds, why reach these clauses? One possible answer is that the Chief Justice embraces a constitutional avoidance rationale for construing the mandate as a tax (similar to what he did with the Voting Rights Act in NAMUDNO). Showing the constitutional problems with the mandate is thus necessary to justify the construction the Chief offers of the Act.

This opinion reaffirms that the Chief Justice is, in many respects, a conservative minimalist. This opinion, combined with others we’ve seen this term, is revealing how the Chief Justice and Justice Alito differ. The Chief is more minimalist in his approach and more deferential to federal power (save on the First Amendment, where Justice Alito seems more deferential).

Holding the mandate exceeds the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses poses no threat to any other existing federal program or law that was not already in jeopardy. That is, this holding does not narrow these powers. Rather it reaffirms their limits…

Adam Winkler konkluderer:

The Roberts Court has only just begun.

Gerard N. Magliocca mærker historiens (og den politiske proces’) vingesus:

Chief Justice Marshall famously found a way out of tough spot in 1803 by reading the Judiciary Act of 1789 in a peculiar way to deny William Marbury a remedy.  Following the law would have brought the Court into a terrible (and destructive) clash with President Jefferson. He lectured the President about not giving Marbury his commission, but did nothing to help…

Chief Justice Roberts did something similar today. Following the law and reading the Affordable Care Act in the most natural way (failing to buy health insurance leads to a penalty, not a tax) would have forced him to strike down the individual mandate.  So he didn’t do that.  Why? Because a 5-4 straight-line party decision invalidating part or all of the Act would have have brought the Court into a terrible clash with President Obama.  The Chief Justice gave a pretty speech about federalism, but ultimately he did nothing about it.  (Maybe I’m underestimating the importance of the Medicaid issue–I’m not sure.)

Orin Kerr:

The Chief Justice’s opinion finds an interesting middle ground in the battle of absolutes over the Affordable Care Act. Under the Chief Justice’s opinion, real economic mandates are beyond the power of Congress. Congress can’t force action where there was none. Congress can’t say you must act or else go to jail, for example. The individual mandate is constitutional because despite the name because it’s not really a mandate…  it’s really just a small tax. And the enforcement mechanism is pretty light. So you really don’t have to get health insurance: You just have to pay the smallish penalty if you decide you don’t want it. So Congress lacks the power to say that you go to jail if you don’t buy health insurance. But Congress does have the power to encourage you to get health insurance by imposing a tax if you don’t, as long as the tax isn’t so coercive that it’s really more than just a tax… In other words, the taxing power is a lesser form of regulation that has a lot more in the way of limits: It gives the federal government some power, but not the plenary power granted if the law falls within the Commerce Clause…

Samme forfatter bemærker andetsteds i øvrigt, at Randy Barnett’s sondring mellem aktivitet og inaktivitet indgår i Roberts argumentation, smh. med “det her er en gigantisk sejr for Barnett” i indledningen.

Og apropos Barnett:

Who would have thought that we could win while losing?…

Today, the Roberts Court reaffirmed the “first principle” announced by Chief Justice Rehnquist some 17 years ago in Lopez: the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. It accepted all of our arguments about why the individual insurance mandate exceeded the commerce power:  “The individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause,” wrote Chief Justice Roberts. “That Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order individuals to engage in it.”  Then the Court went farther to invalidate the withholding of existing Medicaid funding as coercive, thereby finding an enforceable limit on the Spending Power…

The New Federalism was attacked precisely because it offered a different vision of the so-called “New Deal Settlement”: although the Court acquiesced to the constitutionality of New Deal-style regulations, when Congress goes beyond this already expansive reading of its powers, the Court will meet any further expansion with skepticism. It will continue to insist onsome judicially- enforceable limit on federal power.  Congress cannot be the sole judge of the scope of its own powers.  Today a majority of the Roberts Court reaffirmed this vision.

Academics are sure to react to today’s decision by declaring the New Federalism dead, but they would be wrong to do so.  The Founder’s scheme of limited and enumerated powers has survived to fight another day.

David Bernstein spekulerer:

Scalia’s dissent, at least on first quick perusal, reads like it was originally written as a majority opinion… In particular, he consistently refers to Justice Ginsburg’s opinion as “The Dissent”.

Back in May, there were rumors floating around relevant legal circles that a key vote was taking place, and that Roberts was feeling tremendous pressure from unidentified circles to vote to uphold the mandate. Did Roberts originally vote to invalidate the mandate on commerce clause grounds, and to invalidate the Medicaid expansion, and then decide later to accept the tax argument and essentially rewrite the Medicaid expansion to preserve it? If so, was he responding to the heat from President Obama and others, preemptively threatening to delegitimize the Court if it invalidated the ACA? The dissent, along with the surprising way that Roberts chose to uphold both the mandate and the Medicaid expansion, will inevitably feed the rumor mill.

I Salon kan man læse om, hvor påfaldende flertalsagtig, det konservative mindretals dissens er. Det er temmelig interessant synspunkt, især når man tænker på, at afgørelsen har været klar et stykke tid og at mindretallet har haft både tid og lejlighed til at ændre mere substantielt i dissensen end (muligvis) sket.  Hvis der er nogen sandhed over konspirationen, har mindretallet i hvert fald gemt sit budskab i teksten, så fremtiden kan se med.

Bernstein har mere her.

Brad DeLond – i samme retning:

Nine times Scalia refers to Ginsburg’s opinion on the mandate not as a concurrence–agreeing with the result, but for different reasons–but as a “dissent”. An opinion that reaches the same result but by a different road is not a dissent. And there was not “a” dissent. There were three: Thomas’s, Ginsburg’s, and Scalia’s. When there are three dissents–two other dissents–to refer to one of them as “the” dissent is, at the least sloppy.

Is this deliberate–that Scalia wants us to know that his opinion was originally written to be the opinion of the Court? Or is this simply sloppy draftsmanship–chronic laziness at revision?

And what made Roberts peel off?

Inquiring minds want to know…

 

Højesteret og ObamaCare – aktivisme eller tilbageholdenhed?

Af Nikolaj Stenberg, den 22. maj 2012. 1 svar

Wall Street Journal har en glimrende leder om den udfordring det er, for den amerikanske højesteret, at skulle tage stilling til Affordable Care Act, alias ObamaCare. WSJ-lederen fokuserer på de offentlige ytringer rettet mod navngivne højesteretsdommere, som politiske aktører over den seneste tid er kommet med og bemærker særligt Pat Leahy’s kommentar om, at retspræsident Roberts, hvis retten når frem til, at ACA-loven (eller dele deraf) er forfatningsstridig, for al fremtid vil blive opfattet som en partisk aktivist: ”The conservative activism of recent years has not been good for the Court” osv.

The elite liberal press has followed with pointed warnings that Mr. Roberts has a choice—either uphold ObamaCare, or be portrayed a radical who wants to repeal the New Deal and a century of precedent. This attack is itself clearly partisan, but it’s worth rehearsing the arguments to show how truly flawed they are.

WSJ bemærker hertil (mine fremhævninger):

The first fallacy is defining judicial activism as overturning a Congressional law. Since Marbury v. Madison established judicial review in 1803, the High Court has overturned hundreds of laws in part or whole. The real measure of activism is whether the Court’s reasoning is rooted in Constitutional principle. If it is, the Court is not activist but is adhering to the highest legal principles.

Regarding the Affordable Care Act, we’d argue that upholding the individual mandate to buy health insurance requires far more judicial activism. That’s because if the Court finds this federal mandate to be Constitutional, it will have no principle on which to limit future purchase mandates.

Once health insurance can be mandated, Congress will inevitably find that other products or services are equally essential to national well-being. Future Courts will either have to find all such purchase mandates to be legal, in which case there is no limiting principle, or they will have to pick and choose, which means an endless exercise in policy-making.

Far better for judicial modesty—and the reputation of the Court—to draw the line that the Commerce Clause forbids Congress from mandating that individuals engage in commerce because such police powers are reserved for the states. This is the truly restrained judicial position.

The most dishonest argument is the liberal media chant that overturning the law means overturning the New Deal era’s Commerce Clause precedents. This is propaganda. None of the plaintiffs advocated that any precedents be overturned, even though in our view some of those cases deserve to be overturned. Paul Clement and Michael Carvin, who argued for the plaintiffs before the Court, explicitly denied any such desire.

HT: Randy Barnett.