Er huslejeregulering den værst mulige politik til at omfordele indkomst?

Nedenstående er abstract fra Ahern & Giacoletti (2022), “Robbing Peter to Pay Paul? The Redistribution of Wealth Caused by Rent Control”.

We use the price effects caused by the passage of rent control in St. Paul, Minnesota in 2021, to study the transfer of wealth across income groups. First, we find that rent control caused property values to fall by 6-7%, for an aggregate loss of $1.6 billion. Both owner-occupied and rental properties lost value, but the losses were larger for rental properties, and in neighborhoods with a higher concentration of rentals. Second, leveraging administrative parcel-level data, we find that the tenants who gained the most from rent control had higher incomes and were more likely to be white, while the owners who lost the most had lower incomes and were more likely to be minorities. For properties with high-income owners and low-income tenants, the transfer of wealth was close to zero. Thus, to the extent that rent control is intended to transfer wealth from high-income to low-income households, the realized impact of the law was the opposite of its intention.

Det er bemærkelsesværdigt hvordan dette resultat – at huslejeregulering ikke er god politik i forhold til at omfordele indkomst – bliver gentaget gang på gang. Nedenstående slide bruger jeg af og til, når jeg holder oplæg om regulering. Figurerne er fra De Økonomiske Råd og DREAM og viser, hvor meget gavn forskellige indkomstgrupper får af huslejereguleringen (i kr.). D1 er de 10%, der tjener mindst, og D10 er de 10%, der tjener mest). Også i Danmark er det især de rigeste, der vinder på huslejeregulering.

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