Månedsarkiv: oktober 2006

Sikkerhed, ulighed og vækst

Tilbage igen efter nogle ugers sløjhed som kulminerede i en virulent betændelse og mit første hospitalsophold i 48 år får jeg lyst til at henvise til en meget interessant, men derfor ikke nødvendigvis 100 pct. sand, analyse af hvad forfatteren selv kalder "det største samfundspolitiske emne i vor tid".  Forfatteren er politologen Jacob Hacker fra Yale, som i mange år har leveret interessante analyser af samfundsudviklingen.  Nu har han i The Great Risk Shift hævdet at det største samfundspolitiske problem idag er den usikkerhed, som hussstande oplever; at udsving i indkomst er større end før, og at folk med ansvar er mindre risikovillige og mere tryghedsefterspørgende end en forenklet liberalistisk ideologi hævder.

Her kan læses (hvis den ikke allerede er dukket op) Hackers resume af sit argument.

Mine spørgsmål til det er dels om den situation, Hacker beskriver, er relevant for andre samfund end det amerikanske.  Svar ja, i nogen grad.  Og dels at vi liberale må tage Hackers analyse alvorligt.  Jeg ser nemlig en risiko for at den danske forherligelse af den angivelige tryghed, som velfærdssamfundet leverer, og som bl.a. i arbejdsmarkedssammenhæng kaldes "flexicurity-modellen", passer fint med en overfladisk læsning af Hacker, altså at man vil kunne sige, at hvis blot USA eksempelvis gjorde mere som Danmark, ville denne middelklasse-utryghed forsvinde.

Problemet er, at man kan give Hacker ret i sin konklusion om, at middelklassen faktisk efterspørger tryghed, og at der ikke sidder titusinder af uerkendte iværksættere derude, som er rede til at belåne hus og hjem for at kaste sig ud i eventyr, uden dermed at købe propagandaen, som nu også Fogh R. støtter, om, at den danske model er enestående velegnet til at fjerne utryghed og give folk psykisk energi til at møde globaliseringen.

For sagen er jo, at velfærdssamfundet i dets danske indretning ikke reelt giver tryghed, trods talen om det modsatte.  Føler I jer trygge?  Jeg gør ikke.  Men jeg kan samtidig sagtens følge Hackers analyse og tvivler ikke på, at hans dataserier er forfalskede eller upålidelige.

Hacker skriver i en blogdebat om sin bog flg.

The premise of The Great Risk Shift is that risk — more precisely, the growing economic insecurity faced by middle-class Americans — is the defining domestic issue of our time, one that increasingly lies at the heart of our nation's polarized politics. It provides a powerful opportunity for Democrats to reclaim the political high ground as bold protectors of middle-class interests.

The big question is whether Democrats will seize the opportunity. President Bush gambled that Americans increasingly imbued with the ethos of self-reliance would embrace private Social Security accounts — and lost. He's since placed individualized and market-based Health Savings Accounts at the center of his domestic agenda. Democrats know they're against the Republican agenda. Yet they don't really know what they're for. Nor have they developed their own vision of the role of government. Instead, they're mostly clinging to the programs of the past. Their rhetoric has often suggested, moreover, that they want to protect only those who've fallen on hard times, not those who are striving to get ahead. They've appealed to our hearts, not our heads — and many middle-class Americans aren't on board.

The cornerstone of a powerful alternative vision is the simple idea that security is not at odds with helping people get ahead in a market economy; it is the key to doing so. Just as corporations enjoy limited liability and bankruptcy protection to encourage entrepreneurs to take risk, families need basic financial security to be encouraged to invest in good education, better jobs, strong parenting, and valuable assets like homes and retirement accounts—in short, in all the things that make upward mobility possible. Indeed, there's a wealth of evidence that opportunity and security go hand in hand, that people with a basic safety net feel more confident and capable in stepping out on the shaky tightrope that our economy has increasingly become.

Understanding this argument requires grasping how much our economy has changed. We all know instinctively that health insurance, pensions, jobs, and family finances have become less secure. But often we look at these issues in isolation, failing to see the big picture: a massive transfer of economic risk from the broad structures of insurance, both corporate and governmental, onto the fragile balance sheets of American families.

Using a unique dataset, I have discovered that the up-and-down swings of working-age Americans' family incomes are now two to three times more violent than they were in the early 1970s. This "volatility" of income has risen far faster than inequality, and it means that Americans are plunging down the economic ladder much more often than in the past. In the early 1970s, the chance that a person with average demographic characteristics would experience a 50 percent or greater drop in income was around one in fourteen. In 2002, it was more than one in seven.

Of course, people are also rising up the economic ladder, so isn't it a wash? And can't people protect themselves against economic losses solely on their own? The answer to both questions is (mostly) no, and for a simple reason: people don't think like the homo economicus of neoclassical economics. We have serious psychological blinders when it comes to estimating risk and acting on what we know. Most of all, we have a deeply embedded abhorrence of insecurity, based on what behavioral economists call "loss aversion." Loss aversion means that we dislike losing things we have far more than we like gaining things we don't. Ask people how much of a risk of loss they'd be willing to take to get a chance to double their current income and the answer, according to careful studies, is not much. Indeed, a recent poll found that even the most opportunity-loving Americans prefer, by a two-to-one margin, the security of having their current income protected to the chance to make more money.

But such protection is elusive — for everyone. My research shows that insecurity is now reaching even people who made all the right choices: who gained a good education and married before having kids. People with high levels of education now experience as much income volatility as people who dropped out of high school did in the 1970s. The long-term unemployed are disproportionately educated and professional. And there's almost as much inequality among people with good educations as between those with a good education and those without it, suggesting that while the benefits of education have increased, they've also become harder to count on.

Some might say that it's only natural that people who make bold choices will face more risk — that's what makes an entrepreneurial economy work. In fact, when you look at the evidence, there's almost no relationship between people's own willingness to tolerate risk and their income volatility, which suggests much more than choice is at work. Indeed, married couples with kids — a naturally cautious lot — are now the family type most likely to go bankrupt. Almost everyone — educated or unskilled, prudent or foolish — is riding the economic roller coaster created by the transformation of work, family, and national policy.

Which is why the risk shift is such a resonant issue for the Democrats. Fairly o
r not, the party has been
portrayed as enthralled with the have-nots and dismissive of the haves, bent on redistribution and taxes and liberal do-good projects. But when it comes to risk, nearly all of us are have-nots. The persistently poor exist, to be sure, but they're a smaller group than often assumed. Most of us experience economic hardship for a short time due to specific risks. Indeed, roughly half of Americans will spend at least a year in poverty between the ages of 25 and 75, and the chance of falling into poverty has been rising dramatically in every age group.

So what should Democrats do? They need to recognize that the shift of risk onto workers and their families is the dominant trend of the day, and a source of pervasive anxiety. And they need to recast their economic message to make it not just about inequality or hardship, but about security and opportunity — which are inextricably linked. Good skills and stable families are crucial. But the risks facing those who invest in their skills and families are inexorably rising. Providing basic protection against the most severe of these risks wouldn't just help those who falter; it would also encourage Americans to invest in their futures.

The solutions aren't simple or easy, and some of them defy simple ideological characterization: new forms of insurance, new markets to allow ordinary Americans to hedge against risk, and new ways of building broadly distributed wealth and ensuring low-cost credit when necessary. But the path for the Democratic Party is clear. If they want to regain the allegiance of middle-class Americans who reluctantly embrace the low-tax, self-reliance mantra of the GOP, they need a resonant alternative: providing security to expand opportunity in the risky new world of work and family.

Og han konkluderer:

there are some for whom insecurity is a thing of the past — and, unfortunately, these insulated denizens of our economy's highest ranks have been running our country and driving our politics.

I am tempted to simply say thanks, and resolve to treat these issues in more depth down the road. (I'm actually working on a book about inequality and American politics right now with my friend and frequent coauthor, Paul Pierson — which we're tentatively calling Winner-Take-All Politics.) And yet I think that neither Matt nor Ezra do justice to the ways in which The Great Risk Shift demonstrates that Americans' rising economic insecurity is tied up precisely with the trends they describe and deplore. Why are Americans facing increased economic instability, rising health costs and growing gaps in insurance, the demise of guaranteed pension plans, increased job insecurity, and skyrocketing bankruptcy and consumer debt? Not because there are no solutions out there to these problems, as Matt and Ezra both know well. But because America's corporate and political leaders have given up on the idea that economic security is a basic foundation of opportunity, and indeed have actively tried to shift more risks onto workers and their families — through, for example, defined-contribution pension plans (extravagantly subsidized through the tax code) and Health Savings Accounts and the proposed privatization of Medicare and Social Security. This, as Ezra suggests, is as much a political story as an economic one, and it's the story I tell in my book.

It's also the story of American inequality over the past generation. What's distinctive about the dramatic increase in inequality in the United States is that it largely hasn't happened because of a growth in America's perennial poverty problem (though deep poverty — defined as living below 50 percent of the federal poverty line — has grown.) Rather, it is driven by the enormous gains at the top — gains that have dwarfed the rise experienced even by the educated upper middle class. Indeed, you have to go all the way up to the 90th income percentile, according to a recent analysis, to reach the income strata that has received earnings gains over the last thirty-five years commensurate with the general growth of productivity in the economy. And even these fortunate folks at the 90th percentile have seen their income rise only modestly compared with those at the very top.

The thesis of The Great Risk Shift flows directly from this striking pattern of inequality. It is that over the last generation, problems once confined to the working poor — lack of health insurance and access to guaranteed pensions, job insecurity and staggering personal debt, bankruptcy and home foreclosure — have crept up the income ladder to become an increasingly normal part of middle-class life. Personal bankruptcies are more than five times as common as they were a quarter-century ago. Mortgage foreclosures are up 400 percent since the early 1970s. Working-age adults with modest annual incomes ($20,000-$40,000) are nearly half again as likely to be medically uninsured than they were in 2000, with a staggering 41 percent going without coverage for all or part of last year. It is families in the middle who frequently fall between public and private protections in our jerry-rigged structure of economic benefits. And upper-middle-class families are increasingly facing the same sorts of insecurities, too — their skills more fragile and their knowledge jobs more insecure than many of them ever expected.

I see the problem this way not because it's a politically prudent frame, but because it's the truth. But I do think that insecurity is more likely than inequality to spur Americans and their leaders to action. Larry Bartels at Princeton and others have shown that Americans are aware of rising inequality and are concerned about it, but that they don't connect it to their everyday life. (Paul and I have argued that Larry overstates public support for top-heavy tax cuts, but his broader argument strikes me as absolutely correct.) Americans, moreover, are highly aspirational — they believe in upward mobility and think they will experience it, even as they express broader economic views that are highly populist and increasingly pessimistic.

This faith in opportunity can undercut concerns about inequality, but it shouldn't undermine concerns about economic security — not just because security and opportunity go hand in hand in practice, but also because they go hand in hand in most people's minds. Ever since Loyd Free and Hadley Cantril argued in the late 1960s that Americans are "philosophical conservatives" and "operational liberals" (a point updated by the political scientists John Zaller and Stanley Feldman), it's been clear that Americans believe simultaneously that people should make it on their own and that they deserve basic protections, so long as those protections are seen as available to people "like them."

Mark, Ezra, and Matt are absolutely right, however, that this message needs to have a populist tone, not just a technocratic one. Some Americans are ridiculously secure — they get golden parachutes and second and third chances, while most Americans don't. Corporations get limited liability. American families don't. Why didn't the 2003 prescription drug bill provide a strong foundation of security for elderly Americans drowning in prescription drug bills? Because it was a giveaway to drug companies and the insurance industry, and an expression of Repub

lican animus toward broad-based insurance, exemplified by the bill's insistence on private drug plans and Health Savings Accounts — costly choices that help account for the fact that "donut hole" has transformed from a tasty morsel into a major concern on the minds of the millions of elderly Americans who spend between $2,000 and $5,000 on prescription drugs (the window of costs in which drug-plan coverage disappears and for which senior citizens are forbidden by the 2003 law from buying supplemental protections).

In the long run, insecurity is bad for the economy, as I argue in the book. But the real problem is that it's bad for most Americans, who've faced increasingly turbulent economic seas on waterlogged dinghies even as the fortunate few sail off to calmer waters on yachts.

Matt, Ezra, and Mark do not say much about my prescriptions, but I think they're ideas that would unite us: reversing our top-down savings incentives, improving unemployment insurance and creating wage insurance, ensuring affordable health care for all, helping families balance work and child care, and thinking outside the box about how to provide new protections against catastrophic risks. It's no secret that all these programs provide disproportionate benefits to Americans at the bottom of the economic ladder, and unlike many programs that explicitly do this, they don't have huge gaps through which millions of Americans fall. We've expanded public health protections to every poor kid in America — a great success story, in many ways, and proof that the moral concerns that Mark calls on us to articulate still resonate. And yet the share of kids without insurance is basically the same today as it was in the 1970s, because employers continue their steady retreat from the benefit obligations they took on in the past.

Targeting the poor isn't going to deal with the growing gaps in our employment-based benefits, or spur a discussion of how we fix the American social contract, because these really are problems that directly affect the middle class, too. And if we can address the large share of the poor who are only intermittently poor — who fall into poverty for a limited time because of divorce or job loss or financial crises — then I think we will be better positioned to address the smaller but more desperate group who are truly stuck at the bottom. Reagan once said we fought a war on poverty and poverty won. Let's fight a war on insecurity. My firm belief is that poverty will begin to lose.

Do I think political power is the ultimate issue? Yes. But power flows from purpose. We need to think big and be bold, and bring Americans to a larger cause whose tangible effects on their lives is both transparent and transparently positive. We need to reinvigorate a faith in what Michael Tomasky calls the "common good," or what Alexis de Toqueville once evocatively termed "self-interest rightly understood." The goal isn't, at bottom, any more complicated than the simple longing expressed by a middle-class woman who wrote me a few days ago to share her views: "I am tired of working for the economy. I want an economy that works for me."

analysis, to reach the income strata that has received earnings gains over the last thirty-five years commensurate with the general growth of productivity in the economy. And even these fortunate folks at the 90th percentile have seen their income rise only modestly compared with those at the very top.

The thesis of The Great Risk Shift flows directly from this striking pattern of inequality. It is that over the last generation, problems once confined to the working poor — lack of health insurance and access to guaranteed pensions, job insecurity and staggering personal debt, bankruptcy and home foreclosure — have crept up the income ladder to become an increasingly normal part of middle-class life. Personal bankruptcies are more than five times as common as they were a quarter-century ago. Mortgage foreclosures are up 400 percent since the early 1970s. Working-age adults with modest annual incomes ($20,000-$40,000) are nearly half again as likely to be medically uninsured than they were in 2000, with a staggering 41 percent going without coverage for all or part of last year. It is families in the middle who frequently fall between public and private protections in our jerry-rigged structure of economic benefits. And upper-middle-class families are increasingly facing the same sorts of insecurities, too — their skills more fragile and their knowledge jobs more insecure than many of them ever expected.

I see the problem this way not because it's a politically prudent frame, but because it's the truth. But I do think that insecurity is more likely than inequality to spur Americans and their leaders to action. Larry Bartels at Princeton and others have shown that Americans are aware of rising inequality and are concerned about it, but that they don't connect it to their everyday life. (Paul and I have argued that Larry overstates public support for top-heavy tax cuts, but his broader argument strikes me as absolutely correct.) Americans, moreover, are highly aspirational — they believe in upward mobility and think they will experience it, even as they express broader economic views that are highly populist and increasingly pessimistic.

This faith in opportunity can undercut concerns about inequality, but it shouldn't undermine concerns about economic security — not just because security and opportunity go hand in hand in practice, but also because they go hand in hand in most people's minds. Ever since Loyd Free and Hadley Cantril argued in the late 1960s that Americans are "philosophical conservatives" and "operational liberals" (a point updated by the political scientists John Zaller and Stanley Feldman), it's been clear that Americans believe simultaneously that people should make it on their own and that they deserve basic protections, so long as those protections are seen as available to people "like them."

Mark, Ezra, and Matt are absolutely right, however, that this message needs to have a populist tone, not just a technocratic one. Some Americans are ridiculously secure — they get golden parachutes and second and third chances, while most Americans don't. Corporations get limited liability. American families don't. Why didn't the 2003 prescription drug bill provide a strong foundation of security for elderly Americans drowning in prescription drug bills? Because it was a giveaway to drug companies and the insurance industry, and an expression of Republican animus toward broad-based insurance, exemplified by the bill's insistence on private drug plans and Health Savings Accounts — costly choices that help account for the fact that "donut hole" has transformed from a tasty morsel into a major concern on the minds of the millions of elderly Americans who spend between $2,000 and $5,000 on prescription drugs (the window of costs in which drug-plan coverage disappears and for which senior citizens are forbidden by the 2003 law from buying supplemental protections).

In the long run, insecurity is bad for the economy, as I argue in the book. But the real problem is that it's bad for most Americans, who've faced increasingly turbulent economic seas on waterlogged dinghies even as the fortunate few sail off to calmer waters on yachts.

Matt, Ezra, and Mark do not say much

about my prescriptions, but I think they're ideas that would unite us: reversing our top-down savings incentives, improving unemployment insurance and creating wage insurance, ensuring affordable health care for all, helping families balance work and child care, and thinking outside the box about how to provide new protections against catastrophic risks. It's no secret that all these programs provide disproportionate benefits to Americans at the bottom of the economic ladder, and unlike many programs that explicitly do this, they don't have huge gaps through which millions of Americans fall. We've expanded public health protections to every poor kid in America — a great success story, in many ways, and proof that the moral concerns that Mark calls on us to articulate still resonate. And yet the share of kids without insurance is basically the same today as it was in the 1970s, because employers continue their steady retreat from the benefit obligations they took on in the past.

Targeting the poor isn't going to deal with the growing gaps in our employment-based benefits, or spur a discussion of how we fix the American social contract, because these really are problems that directly affect the middle class, too. And if we can address the large share of the poor who are only intermittently poor — who fall into poverty for a limited time because of divorce or job loss or financial crises — then I think we will be better positioned to address the smaller but more desperate group who are truly stuck at the bottom. Reagan once said we fought a war on poverty and poverty won. Let's fight a war on insecurity. My firm belief is that poverty will begin to lose.

Do I think political power is the ultimate issue? Yes. But power flows from purpose. We need to think big and be bold, and bring Americans to a larger cause whose tangible effects on their lives is both transparent and transparently positive. We need to reinvigorate a faith in what Michael Tomasky calls the "common good," or what Alexis de Toqueville once evocatively termed "self-interest rightly understood." The goal isn't, at bottom, any more complicated than the simple longing expressed by a middle-class woman who wrote me a few days ago to share her views: "I am tired of working for the economy. I want an economy that works for me."

Se det er højst interessant og relevant også for Danmark.  Jeg er sikker på at the usual suspects på Information og Politiken snart vil trække Hacker frem og sige der kan I selv se, også kloge amerikanere forstår værdien af tryghed, hvilket bekræfter, at det danske system er overlegent.

Det gælder om at finde en mellemvej.  Svaret til de utrygge amerikanere er ikke dansk flexicurity, for den skaber en anden slags utryghed, som er systemernes uholdbarhed, ineffektivitet og dårlige kvalitet.  Frit valg må kombineres med basal tryghed, og det kan ske på et omkostningsniveau på det halve af det danske, hvilket overlader det til familier og husstande selv at arrangere sig.

Europas ubegavede presse

Berlingske Tidende har idag et glimrende interview med Bret Stephens fra WSJ, som Bent Blüdnikow står for. Bret Stephens er redaktør på den amerikanske avis Wall Street Journal. Han undrer sig over europæisk presses antiamerikanisme og beskylder samme presse for mangel på reel pluralisme. God fornøjelse!

Europa har ikke en begavet presse 

Berlingske Tidende 30.  oktober  2006, 2 sektion, magasin, side 10 

Af Bent Blüdnikow 

Bret Stephens var lidt af et drengegeni. Blot 28 år gammel blev han chefredaktør for den israelske avis Jerusalem Post. Nu som 32-årig er han med i ledelsesgruppen for en af de vigtigste aviser i verden, nemlig Wall Street Journal, hvor han også skriver sine kommentarer om verdens tilstand.

Han begyndte sit liv et helt andet sted på jordkloden, nemlig i Mexico, hvor hans far stammer fra, mens hans mor er italiensk jøde. Hans hustru er tysker, og deres børn har tysk statsborgerskab. Selv tilbragte han tre år i Bruxelles som Wall Street Journals udsendte mand til EU. Han følger godt med i europæisk presse, og han har som konservativ iagttager sine stærke synspunkter om europæisk presse:

»Den er ikke imponerende. Særlig når europæisk presse skriver om USA, kan man undre sig over det negative, fordomsfulde, lave niveau, der anlægges. Der er desuden en åbenlys mangel på egentlig pluralisme, idet meget af det, der står i europæiske aviser, minder besynderligt om hinanden i dets stereotype ensformighed.«
Hvad mener du med mindre pluralisme?

»Hvis vi tager artiklerne om USA i aviser som Le Monde, Der Spiegel og andre aviser, så er det den samme negative stereotype beskrivelse. En del af forklaringen skyldes selvfølgelig en århundred gammel antiamerikansk strømning i Europa, som vi kan spore tilbage til gamle politiske aktivister som f.eks. George Bernhard Shaw og venstreintelligentsiaen. Aversionen skyldtes til en vis grad misundelse over USAs succes. Men der er desuden en konformitet og en manglende mangfoldighed i europæisk presse.«

Er det bedre i USA?

»Ja absolut. Her har du reel pluralisme med vrede, aggressive, venstreorienterede aviser og tidsskrifter, der beskylder regeringen for hvad som helst. Men sandelig også den modsatte tendens, som vi kan se hos f.eks. Fox News og alle bloggerne, der er en reaktion på den venstreorienterede strømning i medierne og som repræsenterer mange borgere. Vi har det hele, og der foregår en dynamisk og seriøs debat, som europæerne burde være misundelige over.«

En undersøgelse har vist, at aviserne i Danmark bruger de »venstreorienterede« amerikanske aviser seks gange så ofte som »konservative« aviser, når de citerer.

Overrasker det dig?

»Jeg kender ikke danske forhold, men for Europa generelt svarer det til min erfaring. Ja, europæiske medier bruger ustandselig New York Times og Washington Post, som er oppositionsaviser, mens en avis som min egen Wall Street Journal kun bruges til økonomiske nyhedsartikler, men ikke til politik generelt. Det viser blot i en nøddeskal, at de europæiske mediers dækning er skæv og at den negative dækning af USA øser af regeringskritiske nyhedsmedier og kommentatorer, hvis stemmer derefter forstørres op i det europæiske rum.«

De fleste europæere vil næppe kunne se, at de har en indsnævret meningsdannelse?

»Nej, det skal man nok være fra et andet kontinent for at kunne se, men tro mig, herfra er det tydeligt.«

ENHVER KAN GÅ på internettet og under Wall Street Journals Opinions læse Stephens' indsigtsfulde udenrigspolitiske artikler. Wall Street Journal er med 2,6 millioner i oplag den næststørste avis i USA, kun overgået af US Today. Desuden udkommer Wall Street Journal i flere internationale udgaver.

Stephens følger med i europæiske aviser og magasiner som Le Monde, Figaro, Guardian, London Times, Der Spiegel og en række belgiske aviser. Han er forbløffet over, hvor ens journalistikken er, når det drejer sig om USA:

»Jeg forstår simpelthen ikke den foragt, som udstråler fra europæiske medier. Det er en foragt, der afslører en neurotisk og hyklerisk europæisk selvforståelse. Lad mig give et eksempel: Da præsident Bush besøgte Berlin, så var kansler Schröders modtagelse kold; Bush blev mødt af massive folkeprotester og negativ presse. Derimod fik Ruslands præsident Putin, som har stået for grove krænkelser af menneskerettigheder i bl.a. Tjetjenien og af pressefriheden, en venlig modtagelse i Berlin – også af medierne. Ja, Schröder kaldte endda Putin for en »upåklagelig demokrat«. Jeg kalder det hykleri.«

I Europa vil man sige, at pressen ikke er antiamerikansk, men blot Bush-kritisk?

»Bush' sydstatsstil irriterer selvfølgelig, men aversionen retter sig ikke kun mod Bush, men mod USA, ligesom under Den Kolde Krig og Reagan-tiden. Holdningen bliver forværret af de europæiske mediers flokmentalitet, hvor kritisk tænkning, der går imod strømmen, er et særsyn. Der er ikke nok intellektuelt mod i europæisk presse.«

Hvem styrer da europæisk presse?

»Der er ingen, der styrer. Det er ikke en konspiration, men hvad vi ser i europæisk presse er den uddannede elites holdninger. Det er den konventionelle offentlige sandhed, der dominerer både hos journalisterne, der er en del af denne elite, og hos den akademiske top af samfundet.«

Er den uddannede elites fordomme hele forklaringen?

»Ikke hele forklaringen, men en væsentlig del af den. Og det er i så tilfælde ikke sidste gang, at Europa er blevet vildført af denne elite. Faktisk er intelligentsiaens historie i Europa én stor begrædelig affære, når vi tænker på de vigtige opgør med totalitarismen i det 20 århundrede, hvor samme elite svigtede gang på gang. Antiamerikanismen er blevet elitens credo og den måde den identificerer sig på, efter dens store ideologiske forbilleder er endt i historiens skraldespand.«

STEPHENS ER DYBT i tvivl om Europas vilje til at kæmpe for sin egen overlevelse i mødet med globaliseringen og islamismen. Han mener, at der er god grund til at kritisere Bush-regeringens politik i f.eks. Irak, men han synes ikke, at det er seriøs kritik, man finder i europæiske medier, men en hånlig forvrængning af Amerika og dets intentioner. Opfatter han den europæiske presses holdning som udtryk for et generelt kultursammenstød?

»Nej, for almindelige mennesker sluger ameri
kansk kultur og rejser her
til i millionvis. De fleste europæere er ikke så fjollede antiamerikanske som redaktører og journalister, men det er dog alligevel bekymrende, at offentligheden ikke har en bedre presse.«

Har den europæiske presse ikke haft ret i, at Irak-krigen var en katastrofe?

»Både ja og nej. Før krigen advarede en stor del af europæisk presse mod krigen, fordi den mente, at man ikke kunne vinde den. Bagdad ville blive et nyt Stalingrad, advarede man om. Det blev det jo ikke, så den kritik var forkert. De massive anklager om, at krigen var til for at sikre USA olie – Spiegels forside lød »Blood for oil« – var også forkerte. Den mest seriøse del af kritikken er ikke denne løse konspiratoriske kampagne, som har præget europæiske medier, men den realistiske kritik, der har peget på, at Mellemøsten ikke lader sig demokratisere. Denne kritik af demokratiprojektets manglende realisme har hovedsagelig været et amerikansk fænomen.«

Er du enig i den kritik?

»Nej, men den er seriøs, og den finder sted her og nu i USA.«

Og hvad med de påståede masseødelæggelsesvåben, der blev brugt som krigsbegrundelse?

»Saddam Hussein narrede alle, også de europæiske efterretningstjenester. Det var ulykkeligt, men en række rapporter i både USA og England har vist, at regeringerne troede på disse våbens eksistens. At påstanden om bevidst løgnagtighed fra Bush og Blairs side i sagen om masseødelæggelsesvåben har vundet udbredelse i europæiske medier er udtryk for en ynkelig tilstand.«

Hvad skal der til, før de europæiske medier – i dine øjne – bliver bedre?

»Hør her, Europa er på vej ud i en alvorlig eksistenskrise. En krise der er forårsaget af dybtgående faktorer. Befolkningsudviklingen er negativ, bortset fra den muslimske minoritet. Økonomien er stagnerende. Den kulturelle identitet er vaklende, og det politiske mod til at stå sammen mod islamismen og terrorismen er svag. På et eller tidspunkt må nyhedsmedierne tage disse truende problemer alvorligt. USA er derimod et kontinent i fremdrift med høj befolkningstilvækst, god økonomi og en masse optimisme og vitalitet. Der er dog grænser også i et frit samfund for mediernes selvbedrag. Når den europæiske selvransagelse først indtræffer, så vil den skarpe antiamerikanisme også aftage. Men den selvkritik kræver en mere begavet presse, end I har nu.«

Har Europa en fremtid?

Blandt andre store emner er om Europa (i genkendelig forstand og defineret som noget værdifuldt) har en fremtid.  Vores allesammens Mark Steyn har netop udgivet en bog, der siger nej (europæere formerer sig ikke og er hastigt på vej til at erstattes af muslimer), som jeg vil vende tilbage til.

Her vil jeg lægge ud med at henvise til en diskussion fra tidlige iår på Cato Unbound, hvor Theodore Dalrymple (= Anthony Daniels) bl.a. havde dette at sige:

a pall of doom does currently overhang Europe. In retrospect, the Twentieth Century may be considered Europe's melancholy, long withdrawing roar (to adapt Matthew Arnold's description of the decline of religion) … Europe's loss of power, influence and importance continues to this day; and however much one's material circumstances may have improved (just take a look at photographs of daily life in France or Britain in the 1950s and compare them to daily life there today), it is always unpleasant, and creates a sense of deep existential unease, to live in a country perpetually in decline, even if that decline is merely relative.

Combined with this is the fact that most European populations experience a profound feeling of impotence in the face of their own immovable political elites … This feeling of impotence is not because of any lack of intelligence or astuteness on the part of the populations in question: if you wanted to know why there was so much youth unemployment in France, you would not ask the Prime Minister, M. Dominque de Villepin, but the vastly more honest and clear-headed village plumber or carpenter, who would give you many precise and convincing reasons why no employer in his right mind would readily take on a new and previously untried young employee. Indeed, it would take a certain kind of intelligence, available only to those who have undergone a lot of formal education, not to be able to work it out.

Så kommer han til sagens kerne som jeg fremhæver a propos mit tidligere indlæg idag om tryghed og risiko.  Altså, at Jacob Hacker kan have ret, men svaret er ikke "flexicurity" eller velfærdssamfundets illusion af tryghed kombineret med spild og dårlig, dårlig værdi for pengene:

The principal motor of Europe's current decline is, in my view, its obsession with social security, which has created rigid social and economic systems that are extremely resistant to change. And this obsession with social security is in turn connected with a fear of the future: for the future has now brought Europe catastrophe and relative decline for more than a century.

What exactly is it that Europeans fear, given that their decline has been accompanied by an unprecedented increase in absolute material well-being? An open economy holds out more threat to them than promise: they believe that the outside world will bring them not trade and wealth, but unemployment and a loss of comfort .. the more … other nations advance relative to themselves, the more necessary does protection seem to them. A vicious circle is thus set up.

In the process of course, the state is either granted or arrogates to itself (or, of course, both) ever-greater powers. A bureaucratic monster is created that takes on a life of its own, that is not only uneconomic but anti-economic, and that can be reformed only at the cost of social unrest that politicians naturally wish to avoid. Inertia intermittently punctuated by explosion is therefore the most likely outcome …

The dependent population does not like the state and its agents, indeed they hate them, but they soon come to fear the elimination of their good offices even more. They are like drug addicts who know that the drug that they take is not good for them, and hate the drug dealer from whom they obtain their drug, but cannot face the supposed pains of withdrawal. And what is true of Britain is true, with a few exceptions, everywhere else in Europe.

In the name of social justice, personal and sectional interest has become all-powerful, paralyzing all attempts to maximize collective endeavor … The goal of everyone is to parasitize everyone else, or to struggle for as large a slice of the economic cake as possible …

But there are other threats to Europe. The miserabilist view of the European past, in which achievement on a truly stupendous scale is disregarded in favor of massacre, oppression and injustice, deprives the population of any sense of pride or tradition to which it might contribute or which might be worth preserving …

This loss of cultural confidence is particularly important at a time of mass immigration from very alien cultures … If the host nation is so lacking in cultural confidence that it does not even make familiarity with the national language a condition of citizenship (as has been until recently the case in Great Britain), it is hardly surprising that integration does not proceed very far.

The problem is multiplied when a rigid labor market is capable of creating large castes of people who are unemployed and might well remain so for the whole of their adult lives. To the bitterness caused by economic uselessness will then be added, or rather be multiplied by, the bitterness of cultural separation. In the case of Islam this is particularly dangerous, because the mixture of an awareness of inferiority on the one hand, and superiority on the other, is historically a very combustible one.

Anne Applebaum forsøgte i sit svar at finde nogle lyspunkter:

I'm going to .. list three factors which could, over the next decade, help reverse Europe's course …

The first, and probably most serious problem Europe faces is a dearth of political leaders who have not only identified the source of the economic problems—the regulation, the over-extended state, the absence of entrepreneurship—but also have ideas about how to fix them, and know how to sell those ideas to the public. To put it differently: Most of Europe is still waiting for its Margaret Thatcher. Most of Europe still doesn't have serious, economically liberal, center-right political leaders who win elections, and who present economic opportunity, economic choice, and economic freedom as positive, not terrifying.

This is not to say that there could never be such leaders. Portugal—not a country known for its libertarianism—did recently produce a free-market government (or freer-market government; these things are relative). So did Denmark.

(Pause.  Kynisk latter, som går over i frustreret gråd).

The second thing missing in "old" Europe is an acknowledgment of the possibilities presented by the new members of the European Union … But—as with everything else—the expansion of Europe has led not to a sense of victory, or a perception that Western ideals were vindicated, but more fear: The Polish plumbers will take our jobs, the Lithuanian construction workers will put ours out of business …

Maybe the rapid expansion of European markets for goods and labor will jump-start the flagging economies of the West. Or maybe—alas it's possible—Western Europe will bribe the best easterners with EU jobs and scholarships, and convert them into negative, fearful Euro-statists before anyone has even had a chance to notice that it's happening.

Finally, Europeans need to ditch their increasingly bizarre obsession with the evil United States. I realize that the current virulence of European anti-Americanism is in some senses an accident, the product of the election of G
eorge W. Bush (whom Europe
ans hated even before Iraq), the events of Sept. 11, the war, and truly terrible American diplomacy. But it's becoming a problem for Europe now too. Relatively mild free-market reforms—privatization, lower taxes, de-centralization—can be skewered, in Europe, if opponents simply refer to them as "too American." Without a sense of solidarity among Western countries—all of the Western countries—it's impossible to construct a coherent response to Islamic radicalism either.

Det er der sgutte megen trøst i.

Hvad mener I?  Er vi enige med Henryk Broder i Berlin, som ligeud siger, at "den der elsker friheden må forlade Europa"?   Hvad anbefaler vi vore børn?  Eller tror vi for alvor og dybt inde, at vi og de stadig har et nogenlunde fungerende rets- og velfærdssamfund (i ordentlig forstand, ikke i Foghs) om 20 år?  30?

Litteraturen om dette emne vokser eksplosivt, og jeg vil fra tid til anden bringe indlæg om den.  Intet forekommer mig faktisk vigtigere.

Klokkerne ringer … III

Lad os håbe, de taber ved midtvejsvalget.  Det er essensen af fredags-klummen fra Peggy Noonan, den Reagan-konservative klumme-skribent ved Wall Street Journal og tidligere taleskriver for Reagan, Bush Sr. og mange andre prominente Republikanske politikere.  Og det er vel at mærke Republikanerne, hun mener.

Her er nogle godbidder:

"A year ago I wrote a column called "A Separate Peace," in which I said America's leaders in all areas–government, business, journalism–were in some deep way checking out. They saw bad things coming in the world and for our country, didn't think they could do anything about it, and were instead building a new pool or buying good memories for their kids. Soon after I was invited to address a group of Capitol Hill staffers to talk about the piece. When the meeting was over a woman walked up to me. She spoke of what was going wrong in Washington–the preoccupation with money, a lack of focus on the essentials, and the relentless dynamic of politics: first thing you do when you get power is move to keep power. And after a while you don't have any move but that move.

I said I thought the Republicans would take it on the chin in 2006, and that would force the beginning of wisdom. She surprised me. She was after all a significant staffer giving all her energy to helping advance conservative ideas within the Congress. "Yes," she said, in a quiet, deadly way. As in: I can't wait. As in: We'll get progress only through loss.

That's a year ago, from the Hill.

This is two weeks ago, from a Bush appointee: "I hope they lose the House." And one week ago, from a veteran of two GOP White Houses: "I hope they lose Congress." Republicans this year don't say "we" so much."

Noonan er ingen opportunist, og hun er heller ikke den type som kunne finde på at stemme Demokraterne; nærmest er hun vel det, hun med en omskrivning af et begreb kunne kalde en en "Yellow Dog Republican", d.v.s., en, der hellere vil stemme på gul hund end på en Demokrat.  Så hvad tilskriver hun denne stemning hos mange konservative Republikanere?

"A lot of things, but here's a central one: They want to fire Congress because they can't fire President Bush.

Republican political veterans go easy on ideology, but they're tough on incompetence. They see Mr. Bush through the eyes of experience and maturity. They hate a lack of care. They see Mr. Bush as careless, and on more than Iraq–careless with old alliances, disrespectful of the opinion of mankind. "He never listens," an elected official who is a Bush supporter said with a shrug some months ago. Along the way the president's men and women confused the necessary and legitimate disciplining of a coalition with weird and excessive attempts to silence Republican critics. They have lived in a closed system. They now want to open it but don't know how. Listening is a habit; theirs has long been to suppress.

In the Republican base, that huge and amorphous thing, judgments are less tough, more forgiving. But there too things have changed.

There remains a broad, reflexive, and very Republican kind of loyalty to George Bush. He is a war president with troops in the field. You can see his heart. He led us in a very human way through 9/11, from the early missteps to the later surefootedness. He was literally surefooted on the rubble that day he threw his arm around the retired fireman and said the people who did this will hear from all of us soon.

Images like that fix themselves in the heart. They're why Mr. Bush's popularity is at 38%. Without them it wouldn't be so high."

Noonan hæfter sig særligt ved, at Bush har ændret meningen af "conservative" fra, hvad det var under Reagan til noget ganske andet, og at dette nærmest kan sidestilles med tyveri:

"But there's unease in the base too, again for many reasons. One is that it's clear now to everyone in the Republican Party that Mr. Bush has changed the modern governing definition of "conservative."

He did this without asking. He did it even without explaining. He didn't go to the people whose loyalty and support raised him high and say, "This is what I'm doing, this is why I'm changing things, here's my thinking, here are the implications." The cynics around him likely thought this a good thing. To explain is to make things clearer, or at least to try, and they probably didn't want it clear. They had the best of both worlds, a conservative reputation and a liberal reality.

… And so in the base today personal loyalty, and affection, bumps up against intellectual unease.

The administration tries to get around this, to quiet the unease, with things like the Republican National Committee ad in which Islamic terrorists plot to kill America.

They do want to kill America, and all the grownups know it. But this is a nation of sophisticates, and every Republican sipping a Bud at a bar in Chilicothe, Ill., who looks up and sees that ad thinks: They're trying to scare the base to increase turnout. Turnout's the key.

Here's a thing about American politics. Nobody sees himself as the base. They see themselves as individuals. And they're not dumb. They get it all. They know when you're trying to manipulate. They'll even tell you, with a lovely detachment, if you're doing a good job. (An unreported story this year is the lack of imagination, seriousness and respect in the work of political consultants on both sides. They have got to catch up with American brightness.)

The Republican establishment, the Republican elite, is quietly supporting those candidates and ideas they think should be encouraged. They are thinking about whom they will back in '08. But they're not thinking of this, most of them, with the old excitement. Because they sense, in their tough little guts, that the heroic age of the American presidency is, for now, over. No president is going to come along and save us, and Congress isn't going to save us. Events will cause a reckoning, and then we'll save ourselves. And in this we will refind our greatness.

The base probably thinks pretty much the same. They go through the motions, as patriots are sometimes called to do. As for the election, it reminds me not of 1994 but 1992. That year, at a bipartisan gathering, I was pressed for a prediction. I said it was a contest between depression (if Republicans win) and anxiety (if Democrats win). I said Americans will take anxiety over depression any day, because it's the more awake state.

Al Gore was later told of this, and used it on the campaign trail. Only he changed "anxiety" to "hope." Politicians kill me."

Ét emne, som Noonan ikke bringer op, men som jeg i konversationer har hørt andre Bush-kritiske, amerikanske konservative fremføre, er dette: Hvis Republikanerne ikke taber kongressen nu, så vil det være svært for en konservativ at vinde i 2008, fordi vedkommende så ikke kan løbe mod "the establishment", og det er, hvad amerikanske konservative gør bedst; en Republikansk kandidat vil skulle være loyal overfor både Bush og et Republikansk flertal i kongressen, og det vil i særdeleshed være umuligt for nogen kandidat at gøre andet, hvis han selv er medlem af kongressen.  Men hvis Republikanerne taber bare é
t kammer i denne omgang, v
il de–fra et konservativt synspunkt–få et bedre udgangspunkt.  Der vil være "betalt" for de problemer, man oplever p.t., og i stedet vil man få en synlig fjende: Gakkede, politisk korrekte Demokrater på top-poster til dagligt at minde midtervælgerne om, hvor galt det kan gå.  Og samtidigt en god gang "gridlock", hvor hverken Bush eller Demokraterne kan få deres respektive politikker igennem samtidigt, og hvor de mere frimarkeds-orienterede, konservative Republikanere omvendt igen kan få frie hænder til at skælde ud på deres "tax and spend"-politikker.

Så John McCain og flere andre sidder nok p.t. og håber på et nederlag, der er stort nok uden at være for stort …

To Europaer mødtes – og mødes igen

I dag for nøjagtigt 591 år siden stod to hære overfor hinanden på en bakket strækning af det nordøstlige Frankrig. Den ene bestod af veludrustede, friske mænd der havde sovet godt i ly af deres telte på trods af at regnen havde væltet ned hele natten og forvandlet markerne omkring dem til et mudret ælte. Den anden havde været på kampagne gennem Frankrig i ti uger, var trætte og syge – mange led af dysenteri – var blevet decimeret gennem tidligere slag og sygdom, og de fleste havde sovet ude og var derfor gennemblødte. Den veludrustede hær var fransk og talte ifølge de fleste troværdige historiske kilder mellem 24.000 og 30.000 mand, den anden var primært engelsk og kunne kun mønstre cirka 6000 mand. Det drabelige slag, de to hære udkæmpede den dag blev som traditionen bød opkaldt efter en nærliggende borg, og er blevet en af de mest berømte dele af europæisk historie: Slaget ved Agincourt. Det var ikke blot et slag mellem to konger og to lande, men på et vist plan også et slag mellem to systemer, der kan spores helt til vore dage og til vore dages politiske slag.

Hvis resultatet var blevet som al umiddelbar fornuft tilsagde, ville Agincourt blot have været et af mange blodige slag i Europas historie og en blandt mange fodnoter i historiebøgerne, men sådan skulle det ikke gå. Fire timer efter slaget var gået i gang var markerne dækket af flere tusinde faldne, hvilket i sig selv ikke var mærkeligt – middelalderens krige var lige så blodige som det 20. århundredes. Det særlige var blot, at modsat al fornuft og militær logik, bestod det, en samtidig engelsk kronikør beskrev som "masserne, dyngerne og stakkene af faldne" næsten udelukkende af franske soldater. Størstedelen dele af den franske krigeradel var dræbt i slaget og flere hundrede var blevet taget til fange af engelske styrker. På den anden side havde England kun mistet to adelige og nogle få hundrede almindelige soldater. Mens Agincourt var en katastrofe for Frankrig, kunne Englands kong Henry V kun beskrive slaget som et mirakel. På trods af kongens ydmyge karakteristik lå der dog mere bag sejren, ikke mindst en afgørende forskel på hvordan rigerne blev styret.

Agincourt skulle blive et af en række slag mellem Europas to stormagter gennem de næste århundreder, hvor England trak det længste strå. Næsten præcist 390 år senere – på nær fire dage – pulveriserede landets flåde en samlet fransk-spansk styrke i slaget ved Trafalgar, og ingen behøver vel at mindes om den slående forskel på de to landes succes i Anden Verdenskrig? Da verden var kommet så langt, var det relativt lille engelske rige også vokset til et imperium som solen aldrig gik ned over, englænderne var Europas rigeste befolkning og landet var kommet sig hurtigere over depressionen end næsten alle andre Europas økonomier. Mens man kan finde særlige forklaringer på hver enkelt sejr, er det store spørgsmål derimod, hvad der kendetegner et land med en så markant historisk succes. Hvordan kunne England vinde ved Agincourt, og hvad har et slag for 591 år siden at gøre med nutidens Europa?

Optakten til Agincourt var sigende i sig selv. Begge lande havde været gennem borgerkrigslignende tilstande, Frankrig var i stadig konflikt mellem Valois-kongerne og hertugerne i Burgund, og Henry den femtes far, Henry IV, havde kuppet sig til den engelske trone. Men samtidigt med at de franske konger førte en karakteristisk ødsel livsstil og indførte stadigt mere enevældige tilstande, blev Henry IV på et tidspunkt sat under administration af det engelske parlament, der ikke ønskede at finansiere en sammenlignelig ødselhed. Hans søn voksede derfor op med den særlige indsigt, at hvis han skulle bruge penge eller nogen som helst andet, måtte parlamentet som minimum være bag ham. På den anden side af kanalen kunne den franske regent, dauphinen som regerede idet kongen, Charles VI, var mentalt ustabil, bruge løs uden at frygte parlamentet. Der var nemlig ikke noget. Så mens den franske regent havde frie hænder, lærte englænderen Henry værdien i at opbygge et ry for finansiel stabilitet og troværdighed der gjorde, at adel, byer, kirke og endda enkeltpersoner var villige til at låne ham penge til den franske krig. På den anden side af kanalen måtte man tvinge pengene ud af folk.

Denne situation skulle, som Niall Ferguson argumenterer i sin forrygende The Cash Nexus, i de følgende århundreder være en vigtig faktor i at forklare, hvordan et relativt lille land som England kunne vinde krig efter krig mod Frankrig og andre kontinentale magter. De engelske regenter betalte nemlig tilbage, og lettede beskatningen når krigene var overstået! De kunne derfor finansiere større udgifter til krige end det væsentligt større franske rige. Den samme tilbageholdenhed blev aldrig et fransk kendetegn, og er det bestemt heller ikke i dag. Når institutionelle økonomer derfor taler om path dependency – at samfund i høj grad er formet og stadig formes af deres historie – kan Agincourt således minde os om, hvor dybe de historiske rødder er. På helt centrale punkter opfører Frankrig sig i dag påfaldende meget som landet gjorde i 1415.

Et af disse punkter er, hvordan de respektive regenter opførte sig. Den franske dauphin sad hundrede kilometer væk i sikker luksus og overlod slaget til Charles d'Albret, den franske øverstkommanderende. Henry V var med i frontlinjen i slaget, og havde opført sig markant anderledes end den franske regent eller hans officerer, der som traditionen bød, igen holdt markant afstand til fodfolket. Både på dagen og aftenen før var den engelske konge gået rundt i lejren for at tale med folk om deres angst, deres familier, og havde i det hele taget givet sin hær det, som Shakespeare i sin skildring af ham så præcist kaldte "a little touch of Harry in the night". Denne forskel i indstilling kan genfindes i vore dage (kunne man forestille sig Chirac mænge sig med almindelige mennesker?), hvor England nok har en mere ulige indkomstfordeling – forskellen er cirka fire point på Gini-koefficienten – men i det store og hele har langt lettere ved at håndtere ulighed end Frankrig, hvor strejker og voldelige optøjer har været en del af den politiske dagsorden i flere hundrede år.

Et andet punkt, der er værd at bemærke er, at det var to elitestyrker, men to meget forskellige eliter, der mødtes på slagmarken. Den franske elite var også samfundets top – adelens stolte sønner der red ud i fuldt, skinnende udstyr fast overbevist om deres overlegenhed – mens den engelske elite kom fra alle dele af samfundet. Det var bueskytterne, der uden ret meget andet udstyr end deres langbue, pile i stakkevis, og deres egne, imponerende, individuelle evner gjorde forskellen, først ved at fælde de franske riddere, derefter ved at gøre arbejdet så grundigt færdigt med deres simple blyhamre, at flere hundrede franske adelige aldrig blev identificeret. Igen er håndteringen af ulighed og elite værd at bemærke: den synlige elite med dens bannere og højrøstet skinnende rustninger måtte vige for de objektive evners elite.

Eliterne er de to lande er også i dag meget forskellige. Der er masser af 'gamle penge' i Storbritannien i dag, en synlig adel og en gammeldags 'klassebevidsthed', men landet er stadig grundlæggende meritokratisk. En universitetsgrad fra Oxford, Cambridge, London School of Economics eller f.eks. St. Andrews eller et andet godt, mindre universitet er naturligvis stadig et godt signal, men hvis man er særligt dygtig, kan man have læst i Bath eller Swansea og stadig ende på en toppost i det private eller centraladministrationen. Situationen er ganske anderledes i Frankrig. Hvis man ønsker at komme til tops i Paris – det eneste sted man kan komme til tops – er en eksamen fra én og kun én institution et must: l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration, i daglig tale ENA. Praktisk taget alle franske topem
bedsmænd har gået på EN
A, har fået den samme skoling og har det samme syn på verden. Det franske embedsværk har derfor en og kun en sandhed, faglig baggrund og ideologi – statens sandhed, faglig syn og ideologi, som også er ENAs. Magtfuldkommenhed er med andre ord noget, de franske embedsmænd har fået ind med deres universitære modermælk. Det britiske embedsværk er, dets mangler til trods, langt mere pluralistisk og derfor i en bedre position til at udvikle sig og lære af dets fejl. En af konsekvenserne er, at man stadig regulerer mere lempeligt i Storbritannien end i Frankrig, særligt efter Thatchers lille revolution først i 80'erne. En anden er, at mens briterne scorer mere end et helt point mere end Frankrig på den årlige korruptionsliste på trods af at landene er stort set lige rige. Også på dette punkt er England et mere fair samfund. Og hvis man endelig vil se det i et andet historisk lys, kan man jo sammenligne det to landes kolonihistorie.

Hvorfor er det vigtigt? Hvorfor skal vi bekymre os om historiske forskelle mellem Frankrig og Storbritannien? Mit svar vil være, at det skal vi, fordi slaget ved Agincourt genspilles i nutidens institutioner, helt specifikt i EU. Frankrig kæmper en kamp for at få en EU-forfatning, et sæt politisk bestemte spilleregler og en langt stærkere central kontrol med både unionen, dens virksomheder og individer, men også med de internationale valutamarkeder og 'globaliseringen'. Briterne, der heldigvis stadig holder sig udenfor euroen og visse dele af det europæiske samarbejde, trækker i den anden retning, mod mindre central indflydelse og i bund og grund et mere meritokratisk og mindre politisk Europa.

Danmark står lidt midt mellem de to, med en stærk præference for det godes side når det kommer til handelspolitik, men også som en af unionens duksedrenge når det handler om at implementere centrale beslutninger og styrke den politiske indflydelse. Historisk har vi holdningsmæssigt og institutionelt helt ubetinget hørt til i den britiske lejr, men politisk har vi siden Napoleon – og muligvis endda før – valgt den franske side. Dagens spørgsmål er derfor, hvilken side vi vil vælge i dag? Det er et svar, som en hvilken som helst af vores læsere må gøre op med sig selv, men for mit vedkommende er der ingen tvivl. Mit svar blev besluttet for 591 år siden i et nordøstligt hjørne af Frankrig da min side vandt.

Støtten til Ungdomshuset smuldrer – måske er det dét værd at brokke sig?

Politikken skriver i dag, at den politiske støtte til en plan, som R, SF, S og Enhedslisten ellers havde kogt sammen i Københavns Borgerrepræsentation, nu synes at smuldre. Dagen efter at Punditokraterne sammen med bl.a. professor i forvaltningsret Steen Rønsholdt fra Københavns Universitet kritiserede aftalen som grundlovsstridig og magtfordrejning, sprang de Radikale fra aftalen, da Manu Sareen overfor TV-Avisen afviste, at partiet ville indgå i en aftale der befandt sig i en juridisk 'gråzone'. Og nu springer Socialdemokraterne så sandsynligvis fra aftalen. Partiets gruppeformand på rådhuset, Jesper Christensen, har i hvert fald afvist man har forsøgt at omgå ejeren. Begrundelsen er dog ikke helt fin i kanten: "Vi har trukket os fra lokalplanen, fordi det nu viser sig, at husets ejere i så fald ville kunne kræve erstatning, og at vi skal købe ejendommen tilbage. Og det er vi ikke interesserede i."

 

 

Planen, som tydeligvis havde til formål at tvinge den retmæssige ejer (frikirken Faderhuset) til at sælge huset til en bestemt køber (en fond der efterfølgende ville overdrage huset til de 'unge'), har kulturborgmester Martin Geertsen fra Venstre karakteriseret meget rammende: "Det er nærmest et set-up til en Godfather-film, hvor partierne truer med, at hvis du ikke betaler dine dummebøder, skal vi sørge for, at straffen falder ned over dig. Det eneste, der mangler, er nærmest et hestehoved, der falder ned i Ruth Evensens seng."

Fra vores og andres side har det åbenbart givet pote at brokke sig højlydt. Herfra skal der lyde ros til de Radikale for at være bakket ud af aftalen af de rigtige grunde, nemlig at den er på kant med Grundlovens beskyttelse af ejendomsretten, og mere end på kant med almindelig anstændighed. På den anden side må man ryste på hovedet af Socialdemokraterne, hvis egentlige motiv åbenbart er at undgå, at kommunen kommer til at betale erstatning for dens brug af mafiametoder. Og venstrefløjen på rådhuset ryster stadig ikke på hånden når de gør vold på det, der nødvendigvis må – men bestemt ikke altid bliver – betegnes som en menneskeret, nemlig retten til retmæssigt ejendom. Hvis man nogensinde havde illusioner om politikeres moral…

 

Italiensk forretningskunst, paneuropæisk tænkning

Italien er på mange måder et sjovt land, eller i hvert fald et jeg med jævne mellemrum morer mig over. I dag var ingen undtagelse, da Berlingske Tidende igen skrev om landets nationale flyselskab, Alitalia, og dets genvordigheder. Som avisen pointerer, fik selskabet for et år siden et katastrofelån på 7½ milliarder kroner, som den italienske stat vel at mærke kautionerede for. Dengang lovede direktøren Giancarlo Cimoli, at netop dét lån ville sikre, at Alitalia fik sorte tal på bundlinien i år.

 

Og nu er den så gal igen på trods af, at den italienske stat – der i øvrigt ejer 49 % af aktierne – gennem de sidste ti år har givet erhvervsstøtte til selskabet på alt i alt cirka 35 milliarder. Staten var ifølge Berlingskes kilder også denne gang villig til at give 11 milliarder ekstra, indtil Europakommissionen advarede mod, at den slags støtte nok er i strid med EU-regler. Så nu gør man fra politisk hold hvad man kan, for på anden måde at redde nationens stolte selskab fra fallitten.

 

Og her er så dagens pointe: Man gør hvad man kan fra politisk hold. Alitalia er nemlig ikke blot halvvejs statsejet, men også gennempolitiseret. Til avisen udtaler en transportøkonom med særlig indsigt i sagen – Marco Ponti fra Politecnico di Milano – at selskabets problem er at "fagforeningerne og politikerne har i mange år lagt så stort pres på Alitalia, at omkostningerne er betydeligt højere, end de burde være". Er det et problem, man måske kan nikke genkendende til i SAS hvor alt skal deles broderligt mellem tre lande?

 

Hvis det blot var et italiensk problem, kunne man måske se bort fra det og blot hygge sig med, hvad idioterne nede sydpå nu har fundet på. Men tænk over situationen, som den i sin reneste form ser ud: 1) Et firma viser sig ikke at være konkurrencedygtig pga. politiske indgreb og stærke, traditionalistiske fagforeninger; 2) politikerne tager det op som en sag, hvor de kan vise deres 'sociale sindelag' og giver støtte til det skrantende firma; 3) firmaet og dets partnere såsom fagforeninger behøver ikke gøre det store for at rette op på situationen, for staten/EU har jo vist sig klar til at hjælpe.

 

Udskift nu ordet 'firma' med 'sydeuropæisk skotøjsindustri', 'værfter', eller 'landbrug', og min pointe bliver forhåbentlig klar: Italien er helt repræsentativ for hvordan men i EU fører erhvervspolitik. Og desværre bliver Alitalia nok også repræsentativ på lidt længere sigt for en del europæisk industri, som politikerne har fingrene i. I det øjeblik man rykker ind med en 'genopretningsplan' eller lignende, fjerner man industriens eget incitament til at gøre noget ved problemerne. Man skader også de konkurrenter, der reelt kan konkurrere på markedsvilkår, og giver dem incitament til at spille efter de politiske regler. Alt sammen betalt i eksorbitant dyre domme af skatteydere og forbrugere. Velkommen til det Europa, vi er så vilde efter at blive tættere integreret med.

Lord Harris of High Cross (1924-2006), R.I.P.

En af de helt store profiler i den britiske renæssance for den klassiske liberalisme, Lord Harris of High Cross, afgik i morges ved døden.  Man plejer i den slags situationer ofte at sige, at det var i en "alt for tidlig alder"; det kan ikke helt siges her, da Lord Harris trods alt var 82–men man kunne sagtens have undt ham, og brugt ham, en del årtier endnu.

Ralph Harris–som han var født–blev uddannet fra Cambridge og havde derefter en kort karriere som universitetsforsker i politisk økonomi.  Så slog han sig på en karriere som journalist.  Han opstillede også ved flere valg til det britiske Underhus som Tory-kandidat, men heldigt nok for både Harris og britisk politik (men knap så godt for toryerne) blev han aldrig valgt.  I stedet var han i årtier den ene af hovedmændene bag skabelsen, driften og udviklingen af en af den vestlige verdens mest indflydelsesrige tænketanke, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), hvis direktør og ydre ansigt han var i årtier (1957-87).  Den anden, Arthur Seldon, døde–som omtalt her på bloggen–sidste år.  Tilsammen var de i 1950erne Storbritanniens "last two economists who believed in free markets".

Harris' politiske karriere indskrænkede sig i stedet til en plads i Overhuset, da Margaret Thatcher (som han havde introduceret til F.A. Hayek) i 1979 placerede ham som nr. 1 på Dronningens "Honours List"–hvorefter han straks efter adlingen erklærede sig som "cross-bencher".

Men selv i dette ikke helt socialistiske forum, oplevede han hvor skarp modstanden var imod Thatcher frimarkeds-filosofi:

"I see chaps in the House of Lords whom I know, who were contemporaries of mine at university. They won't talk to me, and I'm not even Thatcher. I didn't like Harold Wilson as Prime Minister, but I never felt the hatred and animus towards him that they have towards her. Itching to kill."

I stedet for en politisk karriere blev den senere Lord Harris medlem af Mont Pelerin Society–og dettes præsident (1982-84).  Jeg havde selv fornøjelsen af, ved flere lejligheder, at møde Lord Harris, og jeg kan kun sige, at han var en klassisk gentleman, en skarp analytiker (selv i en høj alder), en stor og vittig humorist, og en idealistisk ven af friheden i alle dens former.  Han var, med andre ord, en mand, som denne blogs skytshelgen, H.L. Mencken (som figurerer prominent på bloggens sider), ville have haft svært ved at have noget imod–og det er de færreste, man kan sige dét om.  Han kunne have været en Punditokrat–og vi ville have været glade for at have ham iblandt os! For her er, hvad han sagde om frihed, Hayek og betydningen af ideer:

"Hayek set this down in a marvelous essay called "Socialism in Intellectuals," in which he paid enormous tribute to the socialist intellectuals. He said that the whole of the direction of policy in the end depended upon a battle of ideas in a stratospheric bank of high intellectuals, refining their concepts and engaging in argument, and the fallout of all that is among the voters and the politicians and journalists who will be guided by the outcome. He argued that the great strength of the socialists is that they had the courage to be idealistic, to have a theory, to have a project and a vision, and to go on working towards that, through thick and thin, and not to deviate, whereas the non-socialists, Conservatives and so on, were pragmatic people who were always involved in bits of compromise and what was practical and how to accommodate the existing opinion. Ignore existing opinion, Hayek said, because in the long run it's ideas. But Keynes said the same in The General Theory. Keynes said it's ideas that rule the world. And people, said Keynes, who think they're exempt from any intellectual interest are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. That was Keynes — who became in turn a defunct economist, incidentally. So this notion [was] that we were the high command, the military terms of high command and high strategy. Don't look for immediate successes, but keep on driving towards this vision of a free society, of individual responsibility, self-help as a foundation of an individual fulfillment, and then of wealth creation, innovation, investment, and all the great things that follow from it."

PS. Her er et par hurtige nekrologer/omtaler:

Løgne, forbandede løgne, og statistik

Der er som bekendt tre slags løgne: Løgne, forbandede løgne og statistik. Og jeg kan lige så godt sige det med det samme: Jeg aner intet om, hvordan man foretager "cluster interviews".  Blandt flere empirisk orienterede metoder indenfor samfundsvidenskaberne er det ikke en, jeg har spor praktisk erfaring med.  Jeg har heller aldrig lavet meningsmålinger e.l. i Irak eller andre krigszoner.

Så alt i alt jeg er ikke i en situation, hvor jeg kan tage sagligt og fagligt stilling til, hvorvidt den meget omtalte Johns Hopkins University rapport om antallet af døde i Irak er korrekt eller forkert–eller blot problematisk.  Om der er tale om løgne, forbandede løgne eller (god eller dårlig) statistik.

Men der er andre, der ved noget om begge dele: meningsmåleren Steven E. Moore har dd. en klumme i Wall Street Journal, som vi–grundet den opmærksomhed, som Johns Hopkins rapporten har fået–tillader os skamløst at cut'n paste.  Hvis dét han skriver er sandt, burde adskillige forskere og mange, mange flere journalister rødme noget–men det er der nok ingen grund til at tro, at vi får meget at høre om.

Here we go …:

655,000 War Dead?
A bogus study on Iraq casualties.

BY STEVEN E. MOORE
Wednesday, October 18, 2006 12:01 a.m. EDT

After doing survey research in Iraq for nearly two years, I was surprised to read that a study by a group from Johns Hopkins University claims that 655,000 Iraqis have died as a result of the war. Don't get me wrong, there have been far too many deaths in Iraq by anyone's measure; some of them have been friends of mine. But the Johns Hopkins tally is wildly at odds with any numbers I have seen in that country. Survey results frequently have a margin of error of plus or minus 3% or 5%–not 1200%.

The group–associated with the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health–employed cluster sampling for in-person interviews, which is the methodology that I and most researchers use in developing countries. Here, in the U.S., opinion surveys often use telephone polls, selecting individuals at random. But for a country lacking in telephone penetration, door-to-door interviews are required: Neighborhoods are selected at random, and then individuals are selected at random in "clusters" within each neighborhood for door-to-door interviews. Without cluster sampling, the expense and time associated with travel would make in-person interviewing virtually impossible.

However, the key to the validity of cluster sampling is to use enough cluster points. In their 2006 report, "Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional sample survey," the Johns Hopkins team says it used 47 cluster points for their sample of 1,849 interviews. This is astonishing: I wouldn't survey a junior high school, no less an entire country, using only 47 cluster points.

Neither would anyone else. For its 2004 survey of Iraq, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) used 2,200 cluster points of 10 interviews each for a total sample of 21,688. True, interviews are expensive and not everyone has the U.N.'s bank account. However, even for a similarly sized sample, that is an extraordinarily small number of cluster points. A 2005 survey conducted by ABC News, Time magazine, the BBC, NHK and Der Spiegel used 135 cluster points with a sample size of 1,711–almost three times that of the Johns Hopkins team for 93% of the sample size.

What happens when you don't use enough cluster points in a survey? You get crazy results when compared to a known quantity, or a survey with more cluster points. There was a perfect example of this two years ago. The UNDP's survey, in April and May 2004, estimated between 18,000 and 29,000 Iraqi civilian deaths due to the war. This survey was conducted four months prior to another, earlier study by the Johns Hopkins team, which used 33 cluster points and estimated between 69,000 and 155,000 civilian deaths–four to five times as high as the UNDP survey, which used 66 times the cluster points.

The 2004 survey by the Johns Hopkins group was itself methodologically suspect–and the one they just published even more so.

Curious about the kind of people who would have the chutzpah to claim to a national audience that this kind of research was methodologically sound, I contacted Johns Hopkins University and was referred to Les Roberts, one of the primary authors of the study. Dr. Roberts defended his 47 cluster points, saying that this was standard. I'm not sure whose standards these are.

Appendix A of the Johns Hopkins survey, for example, cites several other studies of mortality in war zones, and uses the citations to validate the group's use of cluster sampling. One study is by the International Rescue Committee in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which used 750 cluster points. Harvard's School of Public Health, in a 1992 survey of Iraq, used 271 cluster points. Another study in Kosovo cites the use of 50 cluster points, but this was for a population of just 1.6 million, compared to Iraq's 27 million.

When I pointed out these numbers to Dr. Roberts, he said that the appendices were written by a student and should be ignored. Which led me to wonder what other sections of the survey should be ignored.

With so few cluster points, it is highly unlikely the Johns Hopkins survey is representative of the population in Iraq. However, there is a definitive method of establishing if it is. Recording the gender, age, education and other demographic characteristics of the respondents allows a researcher to compare his survey results to a known demographic instrument, such as a census.

Dr. Roberts said that his team's surveyors did not ask demographic questions. I was so surprised to hear this that I emailed him later in the day to ask a second time if his team asked demographic questions and compared the results to the 1997 Iraqi census. Dr. Roberts replied that he had not even looked at the Iraqi census.

And so, while the gender and the age of the deceased were recorded in the 2006 Johns Hopkins study, nobody, according to Dr. Roberts, recorded demographic information for the living survey respondents. This would be the first survey I have looked at in my 15 years of looking that did not ask demographic questions of its respondents. But don't take my word for it–try using Google to find a survey that does not ask demographic questions.

Without demographic information to assure a representative sample, there is no way anyone can prove–or disprove–that the Johns Hopkins estimate of Iraqi civilian deaths is accurate.

Public-policy decisions based on this survey will impact millions of Iraqis and hundreds of thousands of Americans. It's important that voters and policy makers have accurate information. When the question matters this much, it is worth taking the time to get the answer right.

Mr. Moore, a political consultant with Gorton Moore International, trained Iraqi researchers for the International Republican Institute from 2003 to 2004 and conducted survey research for the Coalition Forces from 2005 to 2006.

Selv hvis antallet af døde kun er en brøkdel af, hvad forskerne hævder, må tallet mane til eftertanke hos dem, der endnu ikke er skeptiske overfor Irak-krigens omkostninger.  Men det friholder ingen fra at forholde sig kritisk til slige påstande, som dem Johns Hopkins forskerne fremfører.

 

PS. Der er andre, der når det gælder at kende sine egne begrænsninger ikke er helt så ydmyge som denne Punditokrat.  F.eks. Villy Søvndal, der om undersøgelsen skrev 11.X.: Den

"lever op til de samme videnskabelige standarder som når vi bruger estimater for folkedrab i Afrika eller ofre for orkaner eller tsunamier."

Ja, men hvis du siger det, Villy …

Anker hos Kim

I en tid, hvor Pyongyangs paranoide og despotiske styre rasler med den atomare sabel, er det velgørende at komme i hu, at ledende danske politikere heldigvis ikke udelukkende har sunget i de fordømmendes kor. Dobbeltpolitikken – medlemskabet af Vestens sikkerhedspolitiske inkarnation, NATO, og samtidig afspændingspolitik overfor Warszawa-pagten – blev heldigvis også praktiseret overfor det nordkoreanske diktatur. Således i maj 1984 da den tidligere statsleder Anker Jørgensen var på visit hos “den store leder” Kim Il-Sung. Samtidig i Bruxelles måtte den danske regering overfor “den gale hund”, Ronald Reagan, forsvare den danske tilbageholdelse af infrastrukturmidler til de mellemdistanceraketter, hvis fornemste opgave det var at fremtidssikre den amerikanske sikkerhedsgaranti til Vesteuropa.

Det var artige erklæringer, der blev udvekslet under den socialdemokratiske formands besøg hos kammerat Kim. Og midt i al hurlumhejen om Nordkorea er det ganske enkelt for fristende en anledning: Her kommer den så i uddrag – Ankers tale til “den kære leder”.

Vi forstår, at De, præsident Kim Il Sung, har været en fremragende leder af en meget lang og hård kamp for Deres lands uafhængighed. Jeg forstår, at Deres folk ønsker at være fri af enhver dominans fra store lande. En af de store opgaver for det koreanske folk er at fremme genforeningen af Korea. Jeg forstår meget vel at ét folk ønsker at bo i ét land, så jeg støtter fuldt ud Deres kamp for at nå dette mål… Jeg ved, hvor meget De, præsident Kim Il Sung, med al Deres hengivenhed har arbejdet for dette vidunderlige lands uafhængighed og for Deres folks lykke…

Anker sammenlignede derefter den nordkoreanske kamp med Danmarks under besættelsen:

Jeg har nogle erfaringer på dette område. Under Anden Verdenskrig var Danmark fra 1940 til 1945 besat af tyske tropper, og vi kæmpede mod besættelsesstyrkerne. Jeg mener, vores kamp var hård. Men jeg er sikker på, at vi ikke kan sammenligne den med alle de frygtindgydende begivenheder, som De og Deres land har været udsat for.

Herefter fulgte en rosende omtale af det nordkoreanske folk og den høje levestandard:

Folket fører et godt og sundt liv… Denne udvikling er meget fantastisk… Jeg vil også sige, at det er skønt at se Deres lykkelige folk. Alle har job, alle kan lide at arbejde og ser glade og tilfredse ud. Børn og skoleelever i blå og hvide uniformer er optimistiske, og denne unge generation er Deres lands håb og fremtid… Det har været muligt, fordi De, præsident Kim Il Sung, har vist Deres folk den vej, der skal følges, fordi Deres folk står bag dets leder, men også fordi Deres folk virkelig ønskede at bygge landet fint op igen… Deres folks villighed og disciplin ligger på et meget højt niveau.

Enhver form for kommentar er vist overflødig.

Hvad er ejendomsrettens værdi i København?

Det såkaldte 'Ungdomshus' på Jagtvej i København har længe været en plet på området. For lad os bare sige det lige ud: Stedet er tilhold for en kerne af den autonome bevægelse, der mildt sagt ikke har overvældende respekt for samfundets almindelige spilleregler. Gruppen har derfor de facto holdt huset besat i en årrække. Det har Fogedretten forleden besluttet skal have en ende efter at ejeren, frikirken Faderhuset, har anmodet retten om at tvangsfuldbyrde Landsrettens dom fra tidligere i år. Klokken 9 den 14. december skal de unge være ude af huset, og hvis ikke bør politiet fjerne dem med magt.

 

 

Så langt, så godt – eller det skulle man da tro. For Politiken skriver i dag, at S, R, SF og Enhedslistens medlemmer af den københavnske Borgerrepræsentation vil forsøge at udarbejde en lokalplan, der skal tvinge ejeren til at sælge huset til Fonden Jagtvej 69, som efterfølgende vil 'overdrage' huset til de unge, der holder det besat. Jesper Christensen (S) ekesemplificerer tankegangen godt ved at udtale til Politiken, at "Vi kan ikke pålægge dem, der ejer huset, at drive Ungdomshuset, som vi kender det i dag. Men vi kan sige, hvilke aktiviteter, der skal være i huset".

Dagens store spørgsmål er derfor, hvad ejendomsretten egentlig er værd i København, når de flinke folkevalgte på Rådhuspladsen vil tvinge den retmæssige ejer af en på sigt ganske attraktiv ejendom et valg mellem: 1) at sælge ejendommen, som man ikke frivilligt ønsker at afhænde; eller 2) at acceptere, at man reelt ikke har brugsret over sin egen ejendom, men må se passivt til, mens en gruppe identitetssvage bøller ødelægger huset.

Dagens store spørgsmål er derfor, hvad ejendomsretten egentlig er værd i København, når de flinke folkevalgte på Rådhuspladsen vil tvinge den retmæssige ejer af en på sigt ganske attraktiv ejendom et valg mellem: 1) at sælge ejendommen, som man ikke frivilligt ønsker at afhænde; eller 2) at acceptere, at man reelt ikke har brugsret over sin egen ejendom, men må se passivt til, mens en gruppe identitetssvage bøller ødelægger huset.

 

Nok må vi i Danmark acceptere en i forvejen tung offentlig regulering af samfundet, men dagens eksempel er langt ud over den famøse dråbe, der får bægeret… Grundlovens paragraf 73, stykke 1 siger klart at "Ejendomsretten er ukrænkelig. Ingen kan tilpligtes at afstå sin ejendom, uden hvor almenvellet kræver det. Det kan kun ske ifølge lov og mod fuldstændig erstatning." Man kan vel ikke ligefrem påstå, at de autonome bz'ere på Jagtvej repræsenterer 'almenvellet', kan man? De københavnske politikere er ude på grundlovsmæssigt meget tynd is!

De andres liv

STASI var en fæl, fæl institution, der undertrykte borgerne i det østlige Tyskland. På det punkt er der nok konsensus (i dag). Selv pæne venstreorienterede kan trygt gå i Dagmar og se filmen “De andres liv” af instruktøren Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck. Måske kan de pæne venstreorienterede også bilde sig ind, at STASI blot var en perversion af de gode kommunistiske idealer.

Så hør her, hvad Donnersmarck udtaler i Weekendavisen den 29. september, om de mennesker, der treode, at de kæmpede for en bedre (socialistisk) verden:

Vel gjorde de ej. Hvis man påstår, at målet helliger midlet, så er man ude på en virkelig glidebane. Et mål kan være meget teoretisk. Det lyder smukt på papiret at sige, at man vil have, at alle skal have lige meget, som er kommunismens grundtese. Det duer bare ikke, for til syvende og sidst er ejendomsretten… Altså i går aftes så jeg Terence Maliks film om »Den nye Verden«. Colin Farell har en lang monolog om de vidunderlige indianere, der ikke kender til grådighed, jalousi, vrede… Come on! Sådan en gang totalt pladder, det passer simpelthen ikke! Ikke at jeg har forstand på indianere, men de er jo mennesker som alle os andre, ikke engle, og så længe der findes mennesker, vil der også være besiddertrang: det er min kone, min mad og så videre. Kommer nogen forbi for at fordele »goderne« ligeligt, så bliver der krig og ødelæggelse.
Jeg tror fuldt og fast på, at man skal overlade det enkelte menneske så meget frihed som overhovedet muligt. Jo mere stat, man hælder i den cocktail jo værre. I den forstand er jeg lidt af en anarkist.

Og Donnersmarck fortsætter med en kritik af statslig støtte til kunst:

Min film er statsfinansieret, fordi nogle politikere fandt ud af at, okay, vi giver ham her penge. Det er ikke godt. På et eller andet niveau begrænser det den kunstneriske frihed, også selvom det ikke virker sådan, og de gør sig alverdens anstrengelser for at lave uafhængige udvalg, der skal beslutte, hvem pengene skal gives til. Til syvende og sidst er der tale om politiske valg. I Amerika har de de mest utrolige koncert- og operahuse – privatfinansierede. Og du kan finde ALLE former for film inden for den amerikanske filmbranche – kommercielle, art-film, independent-film osv.. . Alt sammen privatfinansieret. Alt er muligt i et frit system, og det er det ikke i et statsligt domineret system

Klokkerne ringer … II

Som omtalt flere gange her på stedet (senest her), så går det ikke rigtigt godt for Republikanerne–hverken med politikken eller med meningsmålingerne.  Den klassisk-liberale superblogger Andrew Sullivan var i sidste uge ude med sin nyeste bog, "The Conservative Soul: How We Lost It, How To Get It Back".  Det er næppe alle amerikanske konservative, der vil være enige med den britiske, åbent homoseksuelle Hayekianer i, hvad der er sand konservatisme, men dét, vi har hørt herfra, lyder altså i det store hele ganske godt.  Her er hans dagsaktuelle opsummering af, hvad der er gået galt for Republikanerne under Bush, "The Selling of the Conservative Soul":

"Alongside a 38 percent increase in government spending in five years came the inevitable corruption. When vast increases in spending are at stake, they act like a homing signal for every sleazeball and lobbyist in the country. The number of registered lobbyists in Washington doubled under five years of Bush Republicanism, according to reporter Jeffrey Birnbaum. His explanation? "In the 1990s, lobbying was largely reactive. Corporations had to fend off proposals that would have restricted them or cost them money. But with pro-business officials running the executive and legislative branches, companies are also hiring well-placed lobbyists to go on the offensive and find ways to profit from the many tax breaks, loosened regulations and other government goodies that increasingly are available. … It has been a free-for-all at the trough of your tax-payer dollars. And we're supposed to believe that this is conservatism?"

Iøvrigt er en af artiklerne i dagens Wall Street Journal tæt på samme vinkling af den igangværende midtvejsvalgkamp.  Her skriver debatredaktionens Washington-korrespondent Kimberley Strassel:

"In the Ohio governor's race, Ken Blackwell is trailing his Democratic competitor, Ted Strickland, by double digits. Save a last-minute miracle, Mr. Blackwell will lose the governor's mansion, and so end 16 years of GOP dominance.

In the Florida governor's race, Charlie Crist is leading his Democratic competitor, Jim Davis, by double digits. Save a last-minute misstep, Mr. Crist is set to give the state GOP a third term in the governor's mansion, overseeing a strong Republican legislative majority.

Their respective failure and success is not ideological: Messrs. Blackwell and Crist are both running on the same agenda of tax cuts, fiscal responsibility and broad government reform. This, instead, is a story of the state parties behind them. In Florida, Republicans have spent the past eight years keeping their promises to voters; in Ohio the GOP forgot what "promise" meant somewhere in the '90s. The tale of these two GOPs offers broader lessons for congressional Republicans, who are facing a rout this fall.

That this election is a referendum on the entire Republican philosophy is the standard line so far this year. Democrats from Nancy Pelosi to Chuck Schumer argue that voters who vote blue are sending a message that they are tired of Republicans' "extreme" views on national security, taxes or social policy.

Quite the opposite, really. If voters are unhappy with Republicans, it's because the party hasn't lived up to its own principles. In the Capitol, in Ohio, and in plenty of places between and beyond, the party that promised to reform government has become the party of government.

But now look to Florida. Jeb Bush came to office in 1999 touting a sweeping reform agenda of the sort that gives Ms. Pelosi the "extremist" fits. More to the point, the governor, with the support of a Republican legislature, has instituted most of it.

Florida Republicans have passed tax cuts every year of the eight Mr. Bush has held office–a whopping $19 billion, including the elimination of the infamous "intangibles" tax, levied on investments. While Florida's budget has grown at a rapid clip, Mr. Bush vetoed more than $2.1 billion in wasteful spending, earning him the nickname "Veto Corleone" among frustrated state lobbyists. He's trimmed 11,000 state jobs.

Tort reform? Did it. Overhauling the child welfare system? Done. Florida has led the way in greater education accountability and school voucher programs; test scores, especially among minorities, are on the rise. The state won federal permission for the most dramatic Medicaid reforms in the country, the first to inject private competition into the system.

Florida today has the highest rate of job creation in the country, and an unemployment rate of 3.3%. It's bond rating hit triple A. Revenue is pumping into the state coffers, giving Florida $6.4 billion in reserves. Gov. Bush's approval rating stands at 55%. Even the House Democratic leader, Dan Gelber, admitted his chief nemesis was a "rock star."

Mr. Crist, the state attorney general, promises more of the same, and voters have no reason to doubt him. He's already demonstrated reform bona fides as the state education commissioner who helped push through the governor's school reforms. He's promised further tax cuts, and is zeroing in on voter anger over double-digit property tax hikes. Mr. Crist has been blowing past Mr. Davis in fundraising and in opinion polls.

If congressional Republicans are facing a rout come November, it's in no small part because they've been headed down the Ohio highway. A few Supreme Court appointments and tax cuts aside, Republicans have largely abandoned the reform agenda that swept them to power in 1994. Their zeal has instead been directed at retaining power, which explains the earmarking epidemic and the Abramoff corruption that followed. Reform of Medicare and Social Security, the death tax, immigration, health care–all fell off the map.

Democrats would certainly call this agenda extreme, but it was never the existence of the platform that angered voters. It was Republicans' failure to act on it."

Johan Norberg on the Devil's Advocate

Shameless self-promotion but – I hope – of interest to both Danish and international readers of this blog:

The Devil's Advocate is back with another English edition of our show (available here). The show was recorded in Stockholm, where the Devil's Advocate met with Swedish author Johan Norberg for a most interesting discussion.

The discussion focused on the following issues: the effects of globalization, how to explain the success of the Nordic welfare states and how these compare to the US, whether the role of the state in the economic development of the Asian tigers challenges the widely held belief that economic liberalism and political and individual freedom are inseparable. Finally we touch on Johan Norberg's vision of the good society and how to achieve it in a world where even right wing governments are at home with the notion of a big state.

Quotes from the debate:
"It is correct that the wealth of the world is very unevenly distributed… the reason why it is unevenly distributed is that there is an uneven distribution of capitalism [..] The problem of the world today is too little globalization and too little capitalism."

"The bureaucracy in the Nordic countries defied many of the liberal suspicions of how they would act but at the same time they did it because they were born under a completely different system and in the long run I think it [the size of the public sectors] creates problems".

"There is an inherent problem of combining authoritarian government with economic liberalism. The problem is that you create new power structures you create other groups that are not as dependent on the government as they were before and then they can begin to challenge the old things."

"My moral ground for this is based on the idea that individuals are actually quite smart they are quite creative. That's why I think freedom is a good idea basically, because I think people can create wonders and that's what I think history has taught us. In the last 100 years of relative freedom we have created more than in the 100.000 years of oppression, slavery and feudalism before that."

"We don't see those strong classical liberal or libertarian influences in the big centre right parties that we saw 15 years ago or something like that. Partly I think it is because if you have power you begin to like it. That's what you can see with people like Bush who when suddenly he has power he wants to do all manners of different things to institute his ideas."

"It is time for a bit of a change in attitude from people like my self when we speak for changes. I think it is more important to create reforms that have consequences that follow later on rather than try to run straight into the system and getting a nose bleed. We should instead look at those reforms which might expand people's freedom and increase the demand for more freedom."

Åslund om Putin

I forlængelse af vores gæstebloggers Rachlins smukke og smertelige posting ndf. om mordet på Anna Politkovskaya er her et indlæg fra Ruslandskenderen Anders Åslund om Putin med den sigende titel: Putin gets away with murder.

IN RUSSIA, gangsters have the macabre custom of making a birthday present of a murder. On Vladimir Putin's 54th birthday, one of his fiercest domestic critics, the journalist Anna Politkovskaya, was shot to death in her apartment building in central Moscow. She worked for the weekly Novaya Gazeta, Russia's last independent newspaper. Its deputy editor was murdered a couple of years ago, and the killer was never found. Although Politkovskaya had been tailed by the FSB for years and her murderer was captured on film, he got away. The Kremlin has made no comment. The prosecutor general claims to have personally taken charge of the investigation, but such investigations seldom result in an arrest.

Western policy toward Russia has been an unmitigated failure since Vladimir Putin became president on New Year's Eve 1999. Every year since then, the Russian government has moved further away from both the United States and the European Union, and Western influence over Russia has waned.

Læs resten her.

To Kill a Journalist: Guest comment by Samuel Rachlin

For the benefit of both our Danish and our foreign readers, we are proud to bring a guest commentary on the death of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya. Our guest commentator today is one of the most distinguished and respected Danish journalists, Samuel Rachlin.

By Samuel Rachlin

COPENHAGEN Anna, Anna, I did not get to call you last time I was in Moscow, and now no cell phone can reach you. I am looking at your phone numbers and e-mail address in my PDA and think of all the occasions in the past when I called you to ask for your advice or ask you to let me interview you on camera. I am not deleting your name or numbers and will keep you alive digitally like, I assume, hundreds of your other colleagues and friends around the world, to stay connected with you and preserve the illusion about you as an active contact, source or colleague – beyond our reach.

You were always busy with your next story or your family and you could come across as absentminded and stressed when you guided us through the piles of papers and books piled everywhere in the usual chaos of your typical Moscow apartment. But you always were ready to share your time and knowledge and advice with a smile and a mixture of amazement and patience when you were confronted with a foreign correspondent’s naiveté or lack of understanding for the realities of your country.

I have to confess that where we practice our professional duties it is difficult to relate to a reality where you kill a journalist, gun her down like a snitch because you don’t like her work or perhaps fear what her revelations can lead to. There is a long distance between the reality of one of our popular TV shows, “Crazy with Dance”, and the reality of a Russian journalist who can pay with her life for her word.

I don’t know if you were crazy with dance, I don’t even know if you knew this entertainment program at all. But I know that you were crazy with truth. You wanted to get to the very core of it without any compromise and at any price – even the highest. You got to pay that price last Saturday when you met your fate in that elevator and your killer finished your most important story – your life. Probably, you did not see him because he shot you in the back with three shots and one to your head, the control shot as they say in Russian, to make sure that you would die.

That’s how your narrative ended, Anna, and I think it’s fair to say that you were not surprised. You had often told your friends that you had received death threats, that you felt you were in danger and that somebody was trying to get you killed. The best known case was the attempt at your life when you were poisoned on board the plane en route to Beslan to cover the hostage drama. You never made it to Beslan and doctors had to do their utmost to save your life.

That did not make you change you workings habits or style. You did not give it a thought that you could move to another country and take advantage of the fact that you were so famous now that there would be no lack of job offers. But you wanted to pursue what you had set out to do – to tell the world about the state’s crimes in Chechnya, the violation of human rights all over Russia, abuse of power in the Kremlin and the rampant corruption in all layers and corners of the society,. You were not driven by any death wish. You loved life and admitted readily that you were afraid. But there was no alternative for you. You knew better than most what Putin’s Russia has to offer journalists who do not follow directions and keep challenging the system and the authorities.

Freedom of expression has been constrained all over Russia in the past six years and the media are, like in Soviet times, increasingly being used as an instrument or a weapon in the service of government. Like in Orwell’s “1984” prison is freedom, darkness is light, lying is truth. Your life is at stake when you choose reporter as your profession in Russia.

A Russian poet, Osip Mandelstam, said in the 30’ies that nowhere are poets as important as in Russia. Only in Russia poets are being killed. And yes, Mandelstam was killed. Today you can say that nowhere are journalists as important as in Russia. Only in Russia, journalists are being killed. 12 journalists have been killed in Russia under Putin. You became the 13th.

Anna, you knew, of course, which powers you were challenging when you said that Chechny’a young prime minister, Ramzan Kadyrov is “a state level bandit” and that his appointment was one of  President Putin’s most tragic mistakes. When you met your killer last Saturday you were working on a story about how Kadyrov and his men use torture, abductions and killings against unwanted people in Chechnya. You said you had pictures to document your charges. Your article was to be published last Monday. Instead, your paper published your obituary.

Moscow is awash with rumors and speculation about who took out a contract on you. There is the Chechen trace, assumptions about the Kremlin’s interest in getting rid of you, suspicion of some Neo-Nazi connection and all kinds of other theories. The fact of the matter is that, like in all the preceding killings of this kind, it will never be established who killed you.

The journalist who would be the best to investigate and establish who, what and why would, of course, have been you. Your paper has started its own investigation, but I am sure that it all will be in vain. Even if a Russian court some day will sentence someone as the killer the truth will never surface. You can catch and jail someone, but how do you catch and sentence a system that has made it possible to hire a killer to eliminate a journalist.

Today’s Russia is basking in its oil money and the sense that its great power dreams are within reach again. For the Kremlin, the killing of a journalist is a deplorable even tragic act. But it does not call for a quick reaction. It took President Putin three days to condemn your killing, Anna. But he added that your influence on the political life was insignificant and that your killing was far more damaging to the Kremlin than any of your articles.

More interestingly, Putin said that he knew there were forces that want to exploit your killing to damage Russia’s interests in the world. I can hear how you laugh at this suggestion and how you will cut to the bone withy this analysis: “Putin never could use me for anything when I was alive, but now he will use my death to tighten the screws even more and do away with what is left of freedom of expression in Russia. Just wait and see.”

Anna, the problem for us and all your Russian colleagues now is who is going to tell the Kremlin that Putin and his men with all their financial prowess and power must understand that there is one loss which the new Russia cannot afford: you and your courage, tall, slim, upright Anna.

Berlingskes dækning af USA

Det er længe siden, at vi her på bloggen bemærkede, at Berlingskes korrespondenter i USA had gone native og fuldt ud opførte sig som indfødte blandt de Bush-bashende MSM, de omgås. Det mærkes især nu, hvor kampens hede under midtvejsvalget stiger og nuancerne droppes.

Poul Høi bidrager i dag med en artikel om de undersøgelser, som Bush må frygte, hvis Nancy Pelosi og hendes demokrater får magten i Repræsentanternes Hus.

Høi indleder bl.a. med denne bemærkning, der måske, måske ikke, er mere spidsfindig, end man umiddelbart tror:

Hvis et parti har flertallet i et af Kongressens kamre, kontrollerer det også dagsordenen i samtlige udvalg, og et udvalg kan til enhver tid tvinge f.eks. forsvarsminister Donald Rumsfeld til at møde op som vidne og under ed svare på spørgsmål, som han ikke har lyst til at svare på.

Nogle af de helt store øjeblikke i amerikansk politik har været sådanne undersøgelser, fra Titanic-undersøgelsen i 1912 over McCarthy-høringerne 40 år senere og til hele regimentet af -gates, Watergate, Iran-Contragate og Monicagate.

Men præsident Bush og hans regering har ikke været udsat for den slags pinagtige undersøgelser af den simple grund, at Republikanerne – med en kortvarig undtagelse – har haft magten i Kongressen i hans embedsperiode.

Dernæst omtaler han Irak på denne måde:

Undersøgelsen over alle undersøgelser. Blev efterretningerne op til krigen bevidst pustet op, og hvem gjorde det? Hvorfor sad vicepræsident Cheney (foto) i CIAs hovedkvarter og sorterede i efterretningerne, og hvorfor oprettede han og Pentagon deres alternative efterretningstjeneste? Hvorfor blev besættelsen af Irak så forplumret, og hvem gjorde det? Hvorfor blev kun olieministeriet bevogtet, og hvorfor blev den irakiske administration opløst? »Plus korruptionen«, skriver den demokratiske kommentator Joseph Palmero. »Det vil være vores pligt at undersøge, hvem i Det Hvide Hus som forgyldte virksomheder som Haliburton med meget gavmilde kontrakter i Irak«.

Læsere af denne blog, og folk, der følger bare en lille smule med, vil vide, at netop spørgsmålet om politisk pres på efterretningerne om Saddams regime er blevet genstand for adskillige uafhængige undersøgelser. Fra UK kan især nævnes Hutton-rapporten og Butler-rapporten. Fra USA kan især nævnes Senates første rapport fra 2004 og Robb-Silberman kommissionen. Som bekendt afviser de alle, at der blev løjet, og at efterretningstjenesterne havde produceret deres skøn efter politisk pres. Ud over links til de pågældende rapporter er her et link fra det Hvide Hus, hvor man hænger New York Times til tørre, fordi de heller ikke havde gjort sig den ulejlighed at læse rapporterne, før de skrev deres ledere.

Det er naturligvis altid muligt for konspirationstilhængere at hævde, at disse rapporter enten er en del af sammensværgelsen eller ikke stiller de rigtige spørgsmål og derfor må efterfølges af yderligere undersøgelser. Men det burde være umuligt at hævde, at de rejste spørgsmål ikke har været undersøgt.

Skal man være venlig mod Poul Høi, og det vil vi gerne være, da han ikke er så slem som mange andre danske USA-kyndige journalister, har han muligvis tilsigtet en sondring mellem de undersøgelser, som Kongressens politikere kan lave på eget initiativ i diverse udvalg, og så de her nævnte store uafhængige undersøgelser. Men så burde han i det mindste have nævnt, at disse undersøgelser har været afholdt. Som teksten er skrevet nu, er det direkte vildledende for den forudsætningsløse læser.

Desværre fortsætter Poul Høi med at nævne …. åh nej, siger I sikkert, ikke det …. Jo, netop: Plame-sagen.

Hvem besluttede sig for at lække navnet på en hemmelig agent – for at underminere en rapport, som hendes mand, en tidligere ambassadør, havde skrevet? Medierne har været på sagen, og en særlig undersøgelsesdommer er på sagen og har tiltalt vicepræsident Cheneys stabschef, men hvem er ellers involveret i en affære, der ikke blot handler om afsløringen af en hemmelig agent, men også om den måde, som Bushs spinmaskine opererer på. Demokraterne vil nyde at få tilsagt Bushs chefstrateg, Karl Rove, som vidne og udspørge ham under ed.

Ved Poul Høi virkelig ikke, at det ER afsløret, hvem der lækkede navnet på Ms Wilson (født Plame), nemlig Richard Armitage? Ved han ikke, at Armitage ikke er ven med hverken Cheney eller Rove, og derfor næppe har afsløret navnet for at skade Wilson? Ved han ikke, at det ikke var nødvendigt at underminere Mr Wilsons rapport, fordi den jo udtrykkeligt bekræftede, at Saddams regime var interesseret i uran fra Niger? Ved han ikke, at det eneste Wilson afslørede, var sig selv? Ved han ikke, at Fitzgerald har opgivet at tiltale andre end den pågældende medarbejder, og det alene for forhold, som knytter sig til efterforskningen, ikke til afsløringen af Plame? Selvfølgelig gør han det. Men hvorfor dælen skriver han så, som han gør? Det kan kun forklares med gone native-syndromet, hvor man kun ser sagen fra sine omgivelsers vinkel. I de kredse handler Plame-sagen om den onde Rove, der knuste en stakkels mor til et par dejlige krølhårede tvillinger, fordi hendes mand tappert havde afsløret Den Store Løgn, og ingen virkelighed skal komme og ændre på det.

Endelig har Poul Høi så en lille vignet på samme side (desværre ingen links). Under overskriften “Dagens giftigste kommentar” omtales en republikaner, der irriteret over, at hans demokratiske modpart på en og samme gang angreb sex-skandalen om Foley og roste Teddy Kennedy, skulle have sagt: Jeg ved, at Dennis Hastert ikke kørte over en bro og efterlod en ung person i vandet. Dennis Hastert slog ikke nogen ihjel”. Hvortil Høi meget nænsomt forklarer:

Kommentaren var en henvisning til en ulykke i 1969, hvor Kennedy kørte i vandet, og en ung medarbejder druknede.

En ung medarbejder?! Det var hans elskerinde, og skandalen var, at Teddy reddede sig selv, tog hjem, og først flere timer efter fortalte myndighederne, at hun stadig lå i bilen på bunden af søen. Kan det tænkes, at Høi ikke kender Chappaquiddick-skandalen? Helt utænkeligt. Men hvorfor så denne hensynsfuldhed?

Nå, denne omgang Berlingske Bashing bør ikke afsluttes uden at rose omtalen i samme sektion af den britiske general Dannatts udtalelser om situationen i Irak. Personligt mener jeg (naturligvis), at man lægger mere i Dannatts udtalelser, end de kan bære. En tilsvarende vurdering har The Times leder i dag, og Dannatts efterfølgende “præciseringer” kan tolkes på samme måde (eller som følgagtighed), men dækningen er i det mindste nuanceret, bl.a. får vi for en sjælden gangs skyld lov at høre fra de danske soldater i Irak. De giver udtryk for deres frustration over den manglende opbakning fra hjemlige politikere, og den manglende anerkendelse af deres indsats.

Berlingske kan altså godt lave dækkende og nuanceret analyse, hvorfor skal vi så have en så lav standard på USA-stoffet?

Nobels fredspris: Lån i stedet for hjælp

Nobels fredspris er, som princip, en meget fin ting, men den er alt for mange gange gået til de forkerte. Værst er måske eksemplet fra 1994, da  Arafat, Rabin og Peres (rettet, tak for korrektionen) delte prisen for at have sat Palæstina på en 'bæredygtig' vej til fred. Når man tænker tilbage på, hvor fremsynet dén pris var, kan man vel kun udbryde Yeah Right! Heldigvis er 2006-prisen anderledes. Den går nemlig til Mohammad Yunus og Grameen Bank i fællesskab for deres arbejde med at afhjælpe dyb fattigdom gennem såkaldt 'mikrokredit'. At man måske så skal udvide fredsbegrebet lidt for at få den til at passe, ser vi stort på i dag.

Og hvis nogen af vores læsere ikke ved, hvem det er, kommer forklaringen her. Yunus startede i 1976 Grameen Bank ud fra en meget simpel devise om, at med lidt kreativitet kan man skaffe fattige adgang til basal finansielle service. Et af de anerkendte problemer med at udrydde fattigdom er nemlig – hvis man ikke lige tror på marxistisk afhængighedsteori eller lignende nonsens – at fattige ofte ikke sparer op, og dermed heller ikke investerer. Yunus' indsigt var, at de fattige i Bangladesh ikke sparer op, fordi de ikke kan, men fordi de ikke har adgang til det, man kan kalde 'opsparingsteknologi': En bankkonto eller lignende. Problemet er, at fattige ofte vil indbetale og hæve meget små beløb, men stadig tager den samme tid som andre kunder, der har langt større transaktioner. Det kan derfor ikke betale sig at have dem som kunder i traditionelle banker.

Yunus indså altså, at fattige ikke bare er stakler uden ressourcer, men derimod stakler der ikke kunne udnytte de ressourcer, de faktisk har! I en udviklingsøkonomisk sammenhæng var det ikke blot revolutionerende, men også stærkt provokerende. Hvis de fattige kan selv, hvad skal vi så med Danida og alle de andre aktører i hjælpeindustrien? For ikke nok er Grameen bygget op omkring idéen at fattige tager lån, de skal også betale dem tilbage.

Her ligger den egentlige innovation, og måske den som Nobelprisen i virkeligheden bliver givet til. Man havde prøvet at give subsidierede lån i offentlige statsstøttede projekter, men de havde fejlet helt forfærdeligt. I dele af Indien blev mindre end 20 % af lånene hos de offentlige projekter betalt tilbage. Ved at give meget små lån – nogle gange under 20 dollars, deraf navnet mikrokredit – til grupper på typisk fem kvinder, der hæfter fælles for hvert enkelt medlems lån, formår Yunus og hans banksystem at holde omkostningerne nede, så det rent faktisk kan betale sig at servicere de fattige. Og ikke nok med det, ved at man udnytter gruppepresset i kvindegrupperne, har Grameen Bank og de fleste andre mikrofinansinstitutioner rundt omkring i verden tilbagebetalingsrater et stykke over de 90 %. Pudsigt nok bliver de høje rater opretholdt netop fordi man typisk giver lånene til kvinder – mænd i mange ulande er nemlig dårligere betalere.

Nobels fredspris bliver derfor i år givet til en professor i økonomi og hans banksystem, fordi det demonstrerer, at man kan skabe udvikling ved at lade være med at give ensidig hjælp, men derimod stille krav til økonomisk ansvarlighed til nogen af verdens fattigste. Det har ført til en masse økonomisk fremgang, som nok ikke er så fotogent som store vestligt betalte udviklingsprojekter, men som er vedvarende. Historier som den om enken i Dhaka, der lånte 20 dollars hos Grameen i starten af 80'erne, og nu ejer en systue med samarbejde med Nike, er ikke usædvanlige. Det er også almindeligt at se kvinder i Bangladesh – der vel at mærke er overvejende muslimsk – blive ligestillet med manden i familien, når hendes første lån og investering har løftet familien det første stykke væk fra sult. Men for at få den slags udvikling i gang, må man slippe idéen om, at nogen grupper er svage og skal have ensidig, envejs offentlig hjælp. Kunne vi måske lære noget af det i Danmark?

Who is … Dagny Taggart?

Så skulle den vist være god nok: Efter årtiers mislykkede planer fra talrige sider, er en filmversion af Ayn Rands libertære, pro-kapitalistiske blockbuster-klassiker Atlas Shrugged nu undervejs som en trilogi.  Og det er ikke kun rygter.

Skuespillerinden til den kvindelige hovedrolle, Dagny Taggart, er “signed, sealed and delivered”, nemlig … [trommehvirvel] …

Angelina Jolie

Hmmmm.  På det rent æstetiske plan måske ikke helt ved siden af.  (Rands egne forslag var–så vidt jeg husker–Raquel Welch og Farrah Fawcett, men de er jo ligesom “over the top”.)  Men … Jolie som intellektuel, pro-kapitalistisk aktivist? Der er et eller andet, der gør mig nervøs for, hvordan resten af projektet vil komme til at se ud. Brad Pitt som John Galt? Colin Farrel som Hank Rearden? Leonardo Di Caprio som Francisco d’Anconia? Orlando Bloom som Ragnar Danneskjöld?  Og Rob Lowe, Al Franken, Tim Robbins, Susan Sarandon, Barbra Streisand, Cameron Diaz, samt Janeane Garofolo i mindre roller? (Hvis det lyder urealistisk, så tænk på Pitt i hovedrollen som Howard Roark i Rands The Fountainhead, instrueret af Oliver Stone!  Hvor slemt kunne dét ikke blive …? Auch.)  Jeg husker ikke, hvem der skrev det, og hvor det stod, men jeg mindes en titel på en artikel om de mangeårige filmatiseingsplaner: “Why It Would Never Make A Really Good Movie”.  Der er noget om dét.

Der står mere her hos Objectivist Center og hos Variety.  Og en gammel post hos Mises Blog.

Tillykke til Mr. Pundit!

Det er utroligt, men sandt: Idag for 40 år siden blev Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard født. Utroligt fordi han ikke virker så gammel – måske blot, som en af aviserne skrev igår, lidt gammelklog – men også utroligt fordi hvis man læste hans CV uden at kende hans alder, ville man regne med at møde en noget ældre person.

Uden at ville svælge i PKK’s præstationer, som Berlingske, Jyllandsposten og Politiken alle oplistede i deres omtaler igår, er han jo ikke mindst idemand og grundlægger af Punditokraterne. Han har også været en af bagmændende bag Libertas og CEPOS, og er en af de skæggeste kommentatorer i danske medier. Og nå ja, han er ekspert i heraldik, professor i statskundskab på Københavns Universitet, europæisk redaktør på et af hans forskningsområdes flagskibe, tidsskriftet Public Choice, med-redaktør på Advances in Austrian Economics, og siden eftåret også far.

Hvordan PKK når det hele overstiger min forstand. Herfra skal blot lyde et meget stort tillykke fra samtlige hans med-punditokrater. Vi håber at han for engangs skyld får en rolig dag sammen med dem, han helst vil dele den med!