Tag-arkiv: USA

Defaitisternes vagtparade

Af admin, den 13. august 2006. 22 svar

I går indledte Kastholm sin lørdagsklumme i Berlingeren på denne måde:

De pakistanske og britiske politi- og efterretningstjenesters afsløring af terrorplanerne mod en række fly på ruten mellem USA og Storbritannien er endnu så frisk, at hele den sædvanlige bølge af selvbebrejdelser endnu ikke har taget fart, men tro mig, den vil komme.

Han kom ikke til at vente længe, for i dagens søndagsudgave kan vi læse endnu en langstrakt artikel fra avisens USA-korrespondent om, hvordan krigen mod terror er slået helt fejl, hvilket naturligvis er vores egen skyld og især Bush og hans onde neo-cons, der lovede en hurtig sejr over terroristerne, og se nu bare, hvordan det går, og ih, hvor det forfærdeligt.

Det er svært at vurdere, om holdningen skyldes en misforstået loyalitet mod ledelsens ulykkelige kærlighedserklæring til John Kerry i dem amerikanske valgkamps sidste dage, eller er et udslag af det i Pilestræde så udbredte Olav Hergel-syndrom ("jeg vil hellere arbejde for Politiken"). Men det virker lidt ejendommeligt, at analyser fra en passioneret socialdemokrat som Karen Jespersen bedre er i stand til at ramme de holdninger, som ledelsen nu står ved, og som formodentlig dækker et flertal af avisens abonnenter, end avisens egne medarbejdere.

Lad os se lidt nærmere på artiklen og dens præmisser.

Vi kan starte med lidt elementær kildekritik og se, om det virkelig var rigtigt, at Bush lovede en hurtig sejr i kampen mod terror?

Her er, hvad han sagde kun ni dage efter terrorangrebet 11. september 2001:

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion.  It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.

Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes.  Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen.

Og her er, hvad han sagde efter afslutningen på den militære kampagne mod Irak, der som lovet af Cheney blev afsluttet på nogle få uger og ikke, som frygtet af nogle, trak ud i måneder og år:

The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.

Uuups, ikke så godt klaret. Men at kildebrug ikke er deres stærke side, vidste vi jo godt fra dækningen af Plame-sagen.

Så lad os se på præmisserne. Er verden virkelig blevet værre for os og bedre for al-Qaeda siden 11. september 2001?

Indledningsvis må vi have noget at sammenligne med. Det må være verden før terrorangrebet, hvor "realisterne" stod for udenrigspolitikken i MØ, og hvor man i generationer havde ment, at det blot gjaldt om at støtte de lokale diktatorer, som så kunne undertrykke eventuelle ballademagere.

Hvad førte denne politik til, som nogle nu ønsker os tilbage til?

Vi fik ødelagt vores status som forkæmpere for demokrati og menneskerettigheder langt mere, end Abu Ghraib m.v. nogen sinde kan gøre.

Vi fastholdt MØ i et middelalderligt mørke, der eksporterede en formørket version af islam og kugleskøre udvandrede opfyldt ikke bare af jødehad, men også et ubændigt had mod "Vesten". Folk, der kun er rigtig gode til en ting: at dø. Folk, der brændende ønsker at smide den gudsgave væk, som livet er. Mange tak til Saudi-Arabien og de pakistanske madrasser.

Vi skabte ved vores ufatteligt naive og afstumpede politk grobunden og rekruteringsgrundlaget for tusinder af terrorister, som angreb os igen og igen, til sidst med så stor effekt den 11. september 2001, at vi måtte tage problemet alvorligt. Det er dybt forvrøvlet nonsens, at krigen i Afghanistan og Irak skaber terroristerne. Havde vi ikke befriet disse lande – og jo, et massivt flertal af den muslimske befolkning i disse to lande opfatter krigen som en befrielse – havde terroristerne blot fundet noget andet at hænge deres had op på. Kasmir, Tjetjenien eller Palæstina, you name it, der er altid et eller andet at dø for, når man er skør nok. Den sidst afslørede terrrorplan minder om skobombemandens plan, som han forsøgte at udføre i december 2001 – før der overhovedet var krig i Afghanistan og Irak.

Skal vi virkelig tilbage til den tid? Skal Irak, hvor demokrati og en moderne forfatning er indført med massiv folkelig opbakning, udråbes til en fejl, mens Dafur, hvor vi ignorerer folkemord, skal betragtes som den rigtige måde at håndtere problemer på? Er der virkelig nogle som tror, at vi kan nøjes med at bekæmpe terroristerne ved indtjekningsportene i lufthavnen? Jeez…

Vores tidligere politik før 9/11 stinker. Men hvad har vi så opnået i de sidste snart fem år?

Ikke bare har vi befriet millioner af muslimer i Afghanistan og Irak, hvilket har gjort demokrati muligt, hvor der før kun var borgerkrig og massiv undertrykkelse, vi har også fjernet al-Qaedas mulighed for at operere uforstyret i deres eget land. Ja, bin Laden lever stadigvæk, men han må gemme sig i huler, og hans folk bliver nakket jævnligt.

En række regimer er blevet presset til at tage de første nølende skridt mod demokrati, og vi har set, at hvis ikke presset opretholdes, så ruller de hurtigt diktaturet frem igen. Mon det betyder, at vi skal lette presset og gå over til lidt dialog og samtale med den lokale diktator? Nej vel.

Syrien er presset ud af Libanon, og deres proxy-arme, Hizbollah, har lidt svære tab i kampen mod Israel. USA og Frankrig er gået sammen om en resolution, og selvom Frankrig er svag over for Iran, er de rimeligt kolde over for Syrien, så der er håb om, at resolutionen faktisk opnår den passivering af Hizbollah, som en tidligere FN-resolution krævede. Og er resolutionen for svag, vil Hizbollah utvivlsomt angribe Israel igen, når de har fået regrupperet sig, og man kan da håbe, at de venstreorienterede medier vil være mindre naive i deres vurdering af Hizbollahs hensigter, og dermed mindre lette at narre i deres brug af fotos fra hjælpsomme lokale medarbejdere. Og i mens kan vi i Europa notere os de tosser, der har afsløret deres velskjulte jødehad i øjeblikkets ophidselse. Så er vi blevet så meget klogere, selvom der sjældent er overraskelser, for profet-sagen klarlagde allerede de fleste brudflader.

Ja, der er fortsat terrorister, og ja, de hader os fortsat. Men kan vi med rimelighed forvente, at vi nogensinde helt slipper for den slags? Og er det overhovedet rimeligt at spørge, hvorfor unge mænd og kvinder bliver muslimske terrorister? Vi har jo set andre mænd og kvinder, der også hadede vores liberale demokrati og søgte at drunkne det i blod, Rote Arme F., og vores hjemlige Blekingegadebande. Hvor velintegrerede var disse "hvide" lystmordere? Religion er formodentlig blot en undskyldning på lige fod med marxisme og lignende vrøvl for at hade det samfund, man ikke forstår og ikke føler sig en del af.

Ingen lovede os, at kampen mod det åbne samfunds fjender skulle blive let. Lad os blot drøfte, hvordan vi bekæmper dem bedst muligt, og lad os tage kritik, når det kan hjælpe os i kampen. Men det er for dumt at ville opgive kampen, bare fordi vi ikke vinder stort, hurtigt o
g ubesværet.

To versioner af amerikansk udlændingepolitik: Den Kjærsgaardske og den amerikanske

Af Jacob Mchangama, den 2. august 2006. 30 svar

Mandag den 22. maj 2006 skrev Dansk Folkepartis leder Pia Kjærsgaard en artikel under overskriften "Myten om den fri indvandring begraves i det liberale USA" i sit ugebrev.

Som så ofte i Pia Kjærsgaards ugebreve består ovennævnte artikel af en blanding af svulstigt sprog og en lang række løsrevne forhold, som Pia Kjærsgaard forsøger at præsentere som sammenhængende. Jeg skal dog her alene forholde mig til de af Pia Kjærsgaards udtalelser der specifikt omhandler U.S.A. I ugebrevet hedder det bl.a.:

Selv i USA, der bygger på ideen om, at alle i princippet skal kunne komme dertil og skabe sig en helt ny tilværelse, blot de klarer sig selv, er den sydlige grænse mod Mexico ved at blive massivt forstærket.

Præsident Bush har udkommanderet 6000 soldater til at stå vagt ved grænsen sammen med de mange tusinde grænsevagter, der i forvejen er udstationerede dernede. Et nyt sikkerhedshegn til 15 milliarder kroner er nu i udbud, som et led i forstærkningen af USA's grænse til den tredje verden.

Almindelige amerikanske borgere har dannet gruppen Minuteman. Denne gruppe består af frivillige amerikanere, som i frustration over den massive illegale indvandring fra Latinamerika, har sat sig for at stoppe grænseoverløbere i deres fritid.

[…]

USA er kendt som det liberale paradis på jord med lave mindstelønninger og sociale ydelser og til gengæld høje fængselsstraffe. Men ikke engang dér kan det politiske system i længden forsvare en naiv og uholdbar politik med fri indvandring. Nu lukker de hermetisk grænserne i Guds eget land, og tilbage står vi så tilbage i Danmark og i hele Europa og diskuterer i ramme alvor, om vi skal stramme eller slække på grænsekontrollen, alt imens kravet om indførelse af Sharia i mange europæiske ghettoer stiger.

Den 1. august i år holdt USA's Commerce Secretary Carlos M. Gutierrez en tale med efterfølgende debat hos CATO Institute vedrørende immigration (første del omhandler Cuba og kan derfor springes over). Gutierrez' tale giver et noget andet billede af den nuværende amerikanske administrations udlændingepolitik end den Pia Kjærsgaardske version, der søger at sammenligne den situation USA befinder sig i med den situation VK regeringen arvede ved regeringsskiftet i 2001.

For hvor Gutierrez' tale rigtig nok nævner vigtigheden af at sikre USAs grænser og løse spørgsmålet om illegale indvandrere, er det gennemgående tema, hvorledes indvandring er afgørende for USAs økonomi og en fordel for landet, som det har været igennem hele nationens historie. Nedenfor følger lidt brudstykker vedrørende de fordele Gutierrez og den amerikanske regering ser ved indvandring:

I believe immigration is the domestic social issue of our time — and a key to our future economic health.

America has dealt with difficult immigration issues in the past. There have been large waves of immigrants from Asia, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe, throughout our history.

In fact, proportionately, we have fewer foreign-born people living in the United States today than we did in 1890. In 1890, 14.8 percent of our population was foreign-born. In 2004, 12 percent was foreign born.

So, the challenges of immigration are not new for America, and I believe they create tremendous opportunities.

[…] what separates us from other nations is our ability to assimilate immigrants and incorporate them into our workforce.

From 2000 to 2004, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that total U.S. population grew by more than 12 million. Forty four percent of the growth resulted from immigration.

We have an incredible advantage. We can stand out from the pack by using our well-honed skills from 230 years of assimilating immigrants.

But to address the challenges of illegal immigration, take advantage of the opportunities, and strengthen our country for the rest of the century, we must show leadership. We must face reality. We must deal with immigration as it is, not as we wish it were. We must thoughtfully work through the issues, and avoid letting emotion take over the debate.

I am encouraged that we are starting to reach some consensus: Recently, more than 500 of our nation's top economists, including five Nobel Laureates, sent a letter to President Bush and all members of Congress. These economists (with diverse political views) stated unequivocally that immigration has been a net gain for American citizens.

[…]The other reality we must confront is that we have 12 million people who are in the country illegally. This issue will not be resolved by ignoring it, or waiting longer to confront it.

[..]Think about the task of deporting 12 millions individuals. Is that something we are going to do as a country? The President has said it wouldn't be wise, practical, or humane.

It would require separating parents from their 3 million American-born children. Some say the children could decide if they go with their parents or stay. Can you imagine that?

Mass deportation is an extreme position, and it's not realistic.

[…]The President's proposal upholds our values. We are both a nation of laws and a nation of immigrants.

Det er svært at genkende Pia Kjærsgaards beskrivelse af U.S.A's "hermetisk" lukkede grænser i ovennævnte tale. Det er også svært at genkende Pia Kjærsgaards beskrivelse af USA's hidtidige udlændingepolitik som "naiv", al den stund, at indvandring har bidraget til, at USA er verdens eneste supermagt. Der er ikke så lidt ironi i, at homogene Danmarks frihed i mange år har været garanteret af det multietniske indvandringsland USA.

Pia Kjærsgaards ærinde er dog forståelig nok. Hvis Dansk Folkeparti kan overbevise befolkningen om, at selv indvandrerlande som USA (og Australien og Canada) oplever de samme problemer, som vi jo unægteligt gør i Danmark og Europa, så har Dansk Folkeparti effektivt fået skudt borgerlig kritik og alternativer til den nuværende regerings udlændingepolitik ned som utopi. Tilbage ville så alene stå venstrefløjen og visse dele af det radikale venstres kritik og alternativer til udlændingepolitikken, og dem kan Dansk Folkeparti og VK besejre i søvne. At Pia Kjærsgaards forhold til fakta i denne sag er noget anstrengt er så mindre væsentligt i forhold til hendes mål.

Men Dansk Folkeparti behøver ikke få søvnløse nætter af den grund. I realiteten er der kun et ganske lille (borgerligt) mindretal i Danmark, der er interesserede i at få belyst udlændingedebatten med amerikanske erfaringer. For den venstreorienterede del af det politiske spektrum ville det jo være ensbetydende med at sætte velfærdssamfundet på anklagebænken, og samtidig en hvidvaskning af den "amerikanske drøm", som alle jo godt ved er en myte. For de mere national-konservative ville det være ensbetydende med accept af, at indvandrere rent faktisk kan medføre nettogevinster for et samfund, og det er jo i lodret modstrid med de i disse kredse herskende tanker.

Bush, basen og bæstet II

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 28. juli 2006. 3 svar

Der bliver i denne tid skruet for volume-knappen blandt kritikerne af præsident George W. Bush–altså vel at mærke fra prominente amerikanske konservative.  Blot indenfor den forgangne uge har tre meldt sig på banen med ny kritik, heriblandt den amerikanske højrefløjs Grand Old Man, "Mr. Conservative" himself, William F. Buckley, Jr.  Det er–som vi tidligere har bemærket–ikke noget helt nyt fænomen, men det er som om, at bunden er gået ud af baglandets opbakning.

TV-interviewet med Buckley fandt sted på CBS Evening News og fik overskriften "Buckley: Bush Not A True Conservative".  I den trykte udgave hedder det bl.a.:

"Buckley finds himself parting ways with President Bush, whom he praises as a decisive leader but admonishes for having strayed from true conservative principles in his foreign policy.

In particular, Buckley views the three-and-a-half-year Iraq War as a failure.

"If you had a European prime minister who experienced what we've experienced it would be expected that he would retire or resign," Buckley says.

…

"I think Mr. Bush faces a singular problem best defined, I think, as the absence of effective conservative ideology — with the result that he ended up being very extravagant in domestic spending, extremely tolerant of excesses by Congress," Buckley says. "And in respect of foreign policy, incapable of bringing together such forces as apparently were necessary to conclude the Iraq challenge."

Asked what President Bush's foreign policy legacy will be to his successor, Buckley says "There will be no legacy for Mr. Bush. I don't believe his successor would re-enunciate the words he used in his second inaugural address because they were too ambitious. So therefore I think his legacy is indecipherable"

Lignende toner kommer i et interview i Saint Louis Today med Richard Viguerie, som et halvt århundrede har været en fremtrædende Republikansk aktivist, forretningsmand og "bagmand".  Han har skrevet en ny bog, der udkommer om få uger, med titlen "Conservatives Betrayed: How George W. Bush and Other Big Government Republicans Hijacked the Conservative Cause":

What is your major complaint with the president?

I guess it's the spending thing. He said he was a conservative, but government has just grown out of sight. It's so frustrating. He's the only president in  200 years not to veto a single bill [before last week's stem-cell veto], which means he approves of all of it. Early on I was impressed with him. I thought he started out strong in 2001, 2002, but when the budget kept getting bigger, I
started getting disillusioned. Then came the largest farm subsidy bill, amnesty for Hispanic immigrants, No Child Left Behind.

What's your view of the war in Iraq?

We're not into nation building, and he ran against it in 2000, said we don't do it. That was music to conservatives' ears. But he was able to make a nexus between Iraq and the war on terrorism, playing the national security card. There's a certain amount of demagoguery there. Reagan wanted to change a lot of societies, but we didn't put American soldiers on the front lines.

What's the reaction of other conservatives to your views?

Most conservatives don't oppose a Republican president in public. But when Bush nominated Harriet Myers (to the Supreme Court), that was a wake-up call for conservatives. The conservative movement engaged him in battle, went toe to toe with him, and won. The next morning, the sun came up. I don't know three or
four conservatives that are satisfied with this president. It's almost
universal, the disappointment with the president. Some are disillusioned, some are dissatisfied, but half are downright angry. It is just palatable; you can cut it with a knife.

Now that's not true of Wall Street, big business. They're very happy with this president. He's been carrying their water. There's almost like a 'conservatives need not apply' sign in front of the White House. Since November 2004, the president has had lots of appointments. It's been all the big business wing of the party, the corporate wing. Big business gets the action; we get lip service. He has given two of them to the conservatives, and we are not a wing
of the party, we are the party."

Peggy Noonans ugentlig klumme i WSJ er som sædvanlig lidt mere tænksom og lidt mere velformuleret:

"Republicans hearken back to Reagan for two big reasons. The first is that they agreed with what he did. The second is that they believe he was a very fine man. This is not now how they feel about Mr. Bush, at least if my interactions with strangers and party members the past year are a judge. They think Mr. Bush is a good man–that he's got guts and resolve, that he can take a lickin' and keep on tickin'. But they are no longer confident about what he does. They're no longer fully comfortable in their judgment of his policies and actions, or the root thoughts behind them. It gives Reagan an even rosier glow, for he was the last national political figure to fully win their minds and hearts.

William F. Buckley this week said words that, if you follow his columns, were not surprising. And yet coming from the man who co-fathered the modern conservative movement, carrying the intellectual heft as Reagan carried the political heft, the observation that President Bush is not, philosophically, a conservative, had the power to make one sit up and take notice.

I have had reservations in this area since Mr. Bush's stunning inaugural speech last year, but Mr. Buckley's comments, in a television interview last weekend, had the sting of the definitional. I agree with Mr. Buckley's judgments but would add they raise the question of what Bush's political philosophy is–I mean what he thinks it is. It's not "everyone should be free." Everyone in America thinks everyone should be free, what we argue over is specific definitions of freedom and specific paths to the goal. He doesn't believe in smaller government. Or maybe he "believes" in small government but believes us to be in an era in which it is, with the current threat, unrealistic and unachievable? He believes in lower taxes. What else? I continually wonder, and have wondered for two years, what his philosophy is–what drives his actions.

Does he know? Is it a philosophy or a series of impulses held together by a particular personality? Can he say? It would be good if he did. People are not going to start feeling safe in the world tomorrow, but they feel safer with a sense that their leaders have aims that are intellectually coherent. It would be good for the president to demonstrate that his leadership is not just a situational hodgepodge, seemingly driven and yet essentially an inbox presidency, with a quirky tilt to the box. Sometimes words just can't help. But sometimes, especially in regard to the establishment or at least assertion of coherence, they can. And it'
s never too late. History
doesn't hold a stopwatch, not on things like this."

Friedman & Friedman

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 24. juli 2006. 5 svar

Punditokraternes absolutte favorit-pensionistpar, Milton & Rose Friedman, blev lørdag portrætteret i Wall Street Journal i et interessant, underholdende og på nogle punkter overraskende interview, "The Romance of Economics", skrevet af Tunku Varadarajan.  Her er nogle klip:

"[…] Milton Friedman is everyone's idea of an American oracle, an American sage. Sages, of course, have their oddities, and the interview last week–at Mr. Friedman's surprisingly petite office at the Hoover Institution, on the campus of Stanford University–got off to a surreal beginning. By his desk hangs a map of Belize–one of those stylized souvenirs made of cloth, embroidered to catch the eye. Why, I asked him, did he have a map of Belize on his wall? Mr. Friedman turned, looked at the object, and said: "I don't know. I really don't know." Not a good start to the interview, some might say …"

Jeg har selv for nogle år siden interviewet Friedman, og han må have fået det Belize-kort siden–eller også var jeg simpelthen for nervøs og "awe-struck" til at bemærke det.  Da jeg mødte ham, havde jeg iøvrigt på en varm juli dag dresset mig op i pæneste jakkesæt og Adam Smith slips.  Milton derimod var superafslappet i shorts og t-shirt, men han sagde da "Nice tie … I've got one like it myself …".  Nå, tilbage til WSJ-interviewet.

 

"… I made a reflexive apology for not being an economist myself. "You mean you're not a trained economist," was Mr. Friedman's comeback. "I have found, over a long time, that some people are natural economists. They don't take a course, but they understand–the principles seem obvious to them. Other people may have Ph.D.s in economics, but they're not economists. They don't think like an economist. Strange, but true." "

Det kan man jo kun nikke til.  Så hvem synes Friedman var "naturlige økonomer"?  Her kan nogle læsere nok få sig en overraskelse–især dem, der kun har deres viden om Keynesianisme vs. Monetarisme fra danske universiteters 1. dels undervisning:

""Was Keynes a "natural economist"?

"Oh, yes, sure! Keynes was a great economist. In every discipline, progress comes from people who make hypotheses, most of which turn out to be wrong, but all of which ultimately point to the right answer. Now Keynes, in 'The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,' set forth a hypothesis which was a beautiful one, and it really altered the shape of economics. But it turned out that it was a wrong hypothesis. That doesn't mean that he wasn't a great man!"

It cannot be said of too many economists that they "altered the shape of economics." Would Mr. Friedman say–modesty aside–that he was one of them? A long silence ensued–modesty, clearly, was hard to put aside–before he mumbled, as if squeezing words out of himself, "Er . . . very hard to say . . ." And then he was saved by the belle: The door opened, and in walked Rose, his wife, bringing a waft of panache into the drab office, her impact enhanced by a beautiful mink coat …

Mrs. Friedman settled herself in a chair, her eyes twinkling, and my questioning resumed. If they were to throw a small dinner party–indoors!–for Mr. Friedman's favorite economists (dead or alive), who'd be invited? Gone was his tonguetied-ness of a moment ago, as he reeled off this answer: "Dead or alive, it's clear that Adam Smith would be No. 1. Alfred Marshall would be No. 2. John Maynard Keynes would be No. 3. And George Stigler would be No. 4. George was one of our closest friends." (Here, Mrs. Friedman, also an economist of distinction, noted sorrowfully that "it's hard to believe that George is dead.")"

Og så nogle af de mere uortodokse spørgsmål:

"Had it helped their marriage–now in its 68th year–that they are both economists? Rose (nodding affirmatively): "Uh-unh. But I don't argue with him . . . very much." Milton (guffawing): Don't believe her! She does her share of arguing . . ." Rose (interrupting): ". . . and I'm not competitive, so I haven't tried to compete with you." Milton (uxoriously): "She's been very helpful in all of my work. There's nothing I've written that she hasn't gone over first."

The spark between the Friedmans is clear, and rather touching. So I'm tempted to ask whether there is a romantic side to economics, in the way there is to history, or to philosophy. "Is there a romantic side to economics?" Mr. Friedman repeats after me, sounding incredulous, and then chuckling. "No, I don't think so. There's a romantic side to economics in the same way there's a romantic side to physics. Fundamentally, economics is a science, like physics, like chemistry. . . . It's a science about how human beings organize their cooperative activities. … In that sense, it's not particularly romantic."

 

Og så til de kontroversielle spørgsmål, såsom indvandring, hvor Friedman har et noget mere "pragmatisk" syn på regulering af dette område end mange andre liberale og et mindre indvandrerfjendsk syn end mange konservative:

"Is immigration, I asked–especially illegal immigration–good for the economy, or bad? "It's neither one nor the other," Mr. Friedman replied. "But it's good for freedom. In principle, you ought to have completely open immigration. But with the welfare state it's really not possible to do that. . . . She's an immigrant," he added, pointing to his wife. "She came in just before World War I." (Rose–smiling gently: "I was two years old.") "If there were no welfare state," he continued, "you could have open immigration, because everybody would be responsible for himself." Was he suggesting that one can't have immigration reform without welfare reform? "No, you can have immigration reform, but you can't have open immigration without largely the elimination of welfare.

"At the moment I oppose unlimited immigration. I think much of the opposition to immigration is of that kind–because it's a fundamental tenet of the American view that immigration is good, that there would be no United States if there had not been immigration. Of course, there are many things that are easier now for immigrants than there used to be. . . ."

Did he mean there was much less pressure to integrate now than there used to be? Milton: "I'm not sure that's true . . ." Rose (speaking simultaneously): "That's the unfortunate thing . . ." Milton: "But I don't think it's true . . ." Rose: "Oh, I think it is! That's one of the problems, when immigrants come across and want to remain Mexican." Milton: "Oh, but they came in the past and wanted to be Italian, and be Jewish&#160
;. . ." Rose: "No they didn't. The ones that did went back."

Og så til Bush, Republikanerne og Irak-krigen, hvor der for en sjælden gangs skyld er uenighed mellem de kendte ægtefæller (hvoraf det er alment kendt, at det faktisk er Rose Friedman, der som regel er den mere liberale, og at hun og broderen, Aaron Director, i sin tid fik nogle af den unge Miltons mindre liberale ideer ud af hovedet på ham).

"Mr. Friedman explains "the story of the postwar period" in the U.S. "In 1945-46, intellectual opinion was almost entirely collectivist. But practice was free market. Government was spending something like 20%-25% of national income. But the ideas of people were all for more government. And so from 1945 to 1980 you had a period of galloping socialism. Government started expanding and expanding and expanding." Mr. Friedman stopped, as if deciding whether to use the word "expanding" a fourth time, before continuing: "And government spending went from 20% to 40% of national income.

But what was happening in the economy was producing a reverse movement in opinion. Now people could see, as government started to regulate more, the bad effects of government involvement. And intellectual opinion began to move away from socialism toward capitalism. That, in my view, was why Ronald Reagan was able to get elected in 1980." I noted, here, that Mr. Friedman, too, had some role to play in this shift in opinion. He was, characteristically, reluctant to take any credit. "I think we have a tendency to attribute much too much importance to our own words. People saw what was happening. They wouldn't have read my Newsweek columns and books if the facts on the ground hadn't been the way they were." (Rose: "Oh, don't be so modest!")

Does it disappoint Mr. Friedman that the Bush administration hasn't been able to roll back spending? "Yes," he said. "But let's go back a moment. During the 1990s, you had the combination that is best for holding down spending. A Democrat in the White House and Republicans controlling Congress. That's what produced the surpluses at the end of the Clinton era, and during the whole of that era there was a trend for spending to come down. Then the Republicans come in, and they've been in the desert, and so you have a burst of spending in the first Bush term. And he refuses to veto anything, so he doesn't exercise any real influence on cutting down spending. In 2008, you may very well get a Democratic president"–(Rose, interjecting: "God forbid!")–"and if you can keep a Republican House and Senate, you'll get back to a combination that will reduce spending."

Mr. Friedman here shifted focus. "What's really killed the Republican Party isn't spending, it's Iraq. As it happens, I was opposed to going into Iraq from the beginning. I think it was a mistake, for the simple reason that I do not believe the United States of America ought to be involved in aggression." Mrs. Friedman–listening to her husband with an ear cocked–was now muttering darkly.

Milton: "Huh? What?" Rose: "This was not aggression!" Milton (exasperatedly): "It was aggression. Of course it was!" Rose: "You count it as aggression if it's against the people, not against the monster who's ruling them. We don't agree. This is the first thing to come along in our lives, of the deep things, that we don't agree on. We have disagreed on little things, obviously–such as, I don't want to go out to dinner, he wants to go out–but big issues, this is the first one!" Milton: "But, having said that, once we went in to Iraq, it seems to me very important that we make a success of it." Rose: "And we will!"

Mrs. Friedman, you will note, had the last word."

Dead case walking – Plame igen

Af admin, den 14. juli 2006. 1 svar

Ferien lukker og jeg lukker, så får I også fred for Plame-sagen så længe. Men først må det med, at hr. og fru Wilson nu har anlagt et civilt søgsmål mod Cheney, Rove og et par andre i regeringen for at have lækket Valerie Wilson (nee: Plame) status som undercover agent i CIA.

Det synes at være et desperat forsøg på at holde historien i live efter, at Fitzgerald har afvist at retsforfølge Rove eller andre i regeringen end Libby, der ikke tiltales for lækagen, men for at have hindret efterforskningen af lækagen. Se Tom Maguire for mere.

Hvis det er formålet, så er det lykkedes rimeligt godt — i hvert fald i første omgang. De sædvanlige dele af MSM viste, at de stadig ikke kan finde ud af alm. kildebrug, herunder Internettet og lidt let googling.

Kufferten skal pakkes, så det bliver et (relativt) kort resume for de kildekritisk udfordrede. (for andre med bedre tid: tryk på Plame i tagslinjen ovf.):

1) Wilson skrev efter Irak-krigen en kronik om, at han var blevet udsendt til Niger forud for krigen for at undersøge, om Saddam havde købt uran dér. Hans konklusion var, at det var usandsynligt, at et salg havde fundet sted. I sin tale til nationen lige før krigen havde Bush nævnt britiske underretninger om, at Saddam forsøgte at købe uran i Afrika, og Wilson undrede sig nu over, om hans rapport om Niger var kendt af Bushs regering. Senere gik Wilson aktivt ind i Kerry’s præsidentkampagne og skruede op for sin kritik af Bush med påstand om, at Bush bevidst havde løjet om Saddams interesse i uran.

ad 1) I Senatets rapport fra juli 2004 om efterretninger inden Irak-krigen blev det fastslået, at Wilsons rapport ikke havde indeholdt noget nyt, og den var derfor ikke gået videre opad i CIA. Endvidere blev det nævnt, at Wilson faktisk havde bekræftet, at Irak havde forsøgt at skaffe uran fra Niger. Det var temmelig pinligt for Wilson, og han forsvandt herefter fra Kerry’s kampagne, der på det tidspunkt var i slutspurten og ikke havde brug for yderligere belastning.

2) I Butler-rapporten, der også udkom i juli 2004, blev det fastslået, at den britiske efterretningstjeneste havde god grund til at tro, at Saddam søgte at skaffe uran fra Niger. Disse efterretninger var ikke påvirket af den efterfølgende afsløring af falske dokumenter vedr. Niger, og vurderingen fastholdes derfor. Rapporten gik så langt, at den udtrykkeligt citerede Bush’s tale til nationen og opretholdt den som well founded. Wilson havde nu yderligere grund til at dukke hovedet.

3) Før disse rapporter underkendte både Wilson’s mere beherskede beskyldning og især de mere ubeherskede beskyldninger, havde den ansete journalist Robert Novak skrevet, at Wilson var blevet sendt afsted til Niger af sin kone, der arbejdede i CIA. Det viste sig, at konen ikke bare arbejdede for CIA, men havde arbejdet undercover og stadig havde denne status på tidspunktet for Novaks artikel. Ifølge en på det tidspunkt ikke videre kendt lov er det strafbart bevidst at afsløre en undercover agent.

Der er to forklaringer på Novaks afsløring: Enten var det et nedrigt forsøg på at skade Wilson ved at skade hans kone. Eller det var et yderst relevant forsøg på at fremhæve, Wilson ikke var en neutral kritiker af Bush, men en del af den interne magtkamp i CIA, hvor man på det tidspunkt sloges om ansvaret for de fejlagtige efterretninger om Saddams WMD. De kredse i CIA, der havde tvivlet på WMD, var rasende over, at chefen Tennet havde troet mere på de kilder, der bekræftede formodningen, mens Tennet-fløjen pegede på, at de kritiske kredse generelt havde undervurderet spredningen af WMD blandt diktaturstater, og at det derfor havde været berettiget at lægge større vægt på andre kilder, som underbyggede formodningen. En interessant debat, som Senats rapporten kun delvist afslører.

4) Fitzgerald blev sat til at efterforske, om afsløringen af Valerie Plame var strafbar. Han har nu afsluttet sin efterforskning og konstateret, at der ikke er nogen at tiltale. Det må betyde, at de, der oplyste om Plames tilknytning til CIA, ikke beviseligt kendte hendes status som undercover. Han har derimod tiltalt Libby for at hindre efterforskningen. Den sag kommer for til efteråret.

5) Novak har for nyligt oplyst, at han fik oplysningerne om Plames tilknytning til CIA fra flere, bl.a. Karl Rove, og at Rove skulle have bekræftet konens tilknytning under et længere interview, hvor Novak havde spurgt om tilknytningen, som han havde hørt om fra en anden. Rove skulle efterfølgende have oplyst via tredjemand over for Novak, at han ikke var bekendt med Plames status som undercover. Rove har tidligere afvist at have outed Plame. Igen er der to forklaringer: Enten at Rove lyver, eller at Rove ikke har outed Plame, dels fordi han ikke vidste, at Plame var en hemmelig agent som kunne outes, dels fordi han ikke gjorde andet end at bekræfte en oplysning, som adskillige journalister på det tidspunkt kendte.

6) Under hele sagen har MSM søgt at fremstille det som om, at sagen angik afsløring af Bush-regeringens løgn, eller i hvert fald vildledning, om Saddams interesse for uran. Både Senatets og Butler-kommissionens rapporter afviser dette. Tværtimod har regeringen tilladt offentliggørelse fra diverse fortrolige efterretningsrapporter netop for at bevise, at de havde dækning for deres opfattelse af truslen. Kort sagt: Bush løj ikke i sin tale til nationen. Wilsons første anklager viste sig ubegrundet, fordi hans rapport ikke var gået videre, og hans senere anklager var selv løgnagtige. Den egentlige historie handler mere om den magtkamp internt i CIA, som Wilson var en del af. Den – i sig selv ret interessante – historie fik og får vi bare ikke, i hvert fald ikke i MSM.

Her står sagen. Og her bliver den stående for vores vedkommende. God ferie.

Liberalisme på amerikansk

Af admin, den 13. juli 2006. 16 svar

Det er sommer, det er solskin, det er sløøø-øvt…

Her er en lille udfordring til de, der endnu ikke er gået helt i varmekoma.

Kampen for liberalisme og konservatisme bliver ikke lettere af, at der er tvivl om, hvad det egentlig er, vi taler om. Hvor går grænsen mellem liberalisme og konservatisme, og hvad er indholdet i dem?

Vi har en regering, der ledes af et liberalt parti, men hvis støtteparti har som erklæret mål at bekæmpe liberalismen. Vi har et Europa, hvor liberalisme ofte er ilde set.

Og så har vi USA, hvor liberalisme stadig betyder venstreorienteret, men hvor indholdet ikke altid lige er det, vi tillægger det i Europa.

Markos Zúniga fra DailyKos har for nyligt gjort noget højst usædvanligt for den del af "venstrefløjen", både i USA og herhjemme: nemlig formuleret sig positivt om det, han går ind for. Normalt vil de helst kun tale om det, de er imod. Men her er for en gangs skyld en modig udmelding.

Den står her.

Værs'go' at læse og gerne diskutere.

Plame og pressemoral

Af admin, den 12. juli 2006. 1 svar

I den døende Plame-sag er det nu bekræftet, at Robert Novak bl.a. fik oplysninger om Plame fra Karl Rove. Novak skal have oplyst efterforskningslederen Fitzgerald om det forholdsvis tidligt i efterforskningen. Der synes ikke at være begået noget strafbart ved offentliggørelsen, formodentlig fordi Plames status som undercover i CIA var ukendt for de, der nævnte hendes tilknytning til CIA. Som allerede nævnt her, bliver Rove ikke tiltalt, lige som Novak heller ikke er blevet det. At den manglende strafbarhed blev indset forholdsvist tidligt i efterforskningen kan forklare, hvorfor efterforskningen hovedsageligt har angået, om medlemmer af regeringen har søgt at hindre efterforskningen, hvorimod selve lækagen, som efterforskningen oprindeligt angik, hurtigt synes at være blevet af mindre betydning.

… Jep, det lyder som referatet af en soap afsnit 26.451, som ingen fornuftige personer gider følge længere, og hvis persongalleri alle har glemt. (et hint: hvis man virkelig ikke har bedre at lave, så tryk på Plame i tagslinjen øverst).

Det eneste interessante ved sagen er efterhånden det indblik i journalisters selvforståelse, som den giver. Det er til gengæld også værd at beskæftige sig med.

I søndags bragte hele fem dekaner fra ansete amerikanske journalistskoler en fælles kronik i WaPo, hvor de forsøger at håndtere det vanskelige spørgsmål om, hvad pressen bør offentliggøre i kampen mod terror. Meget sigende, og efter denne punditokrats opfattelse meget korrekt, lyder overskriften: When in doubt, publish.

Desværre viser kronikken, at deres forståelse for pressens rolle er noget, ahem, begrænset.

I deres i øvrigt sobre, men også ganske forudsigelige og reelt intetsigende opregning af, hvordan pressen må søge at afveje fordelen ved oplysning (at borgerne normalt har ret til at vide, hvad magtfulde aktører laver) med ulempen (man kan hjælpe fjenden, forbrydere osv.), føler dekanerne, at de har brug for et eksempel på et tilfælde, hvor pressen nok ikke burde have offentliggjort.

Her kunne dekanerne have valgt at kritisere NYT m.fl. offentliggørelse af SWIFT-programmet, der iflg. aviserne selv ikke var ulovligt efter amerikansk ret. Men bare det at forholde sig kritisk til selveste NYT, ligger de pæne herrer fjernt. Tværtimod fremtræder kronikken som et forsøg på at komme NYT til undsætning i netop den svære sag. Men er det så, fordi de ubetinget støtter retten til at offentliggøre, også selvom der ikke var nogen trussel mod samfundet, som i SWIFT-sagen? Næ.

I stedet vælger de fantastiske fem at pege på Plame-sagen, hvilket gøres rent en passant og uden yderligere begrundelse.

Så her har vi altså efter de fem dekaners opfattelse et tilfælde, hvor Novak ikke burde have oplyst folket om, at Joe Wilson, der var i gang med at rette alvorlige anklager mod regeringen for at have vildledt om efterretningerne om Saddams WMD, var gift med en ansat i CIA, der på det tidspunkt førte en intens kamp med regeringen om ansvaret for de forkerte efterretninger, og som personligt var involveret i spørgsmålet. Hva’ba?

Tom Maguire opfordrer journaliststuderende til at efterprøve dette eksempel på fordele og ulemper, formodentlig i den tro, at der stadig findes selvstændigt tænkende journalister ved de fem institutioner. Christopher Hitchens er mindre venlig ved dekanernes accept af, at lækager kan være forbudte, hvilket jo var NYT og ligestillede dele af MSM’s eneste tilbageværende påstand i Plame-sagen efter, at Joe Wilsons anklager blev skudt ned som uberettigede. Man behøver ikke være så radikal som Hitch for at se, at forargelsen over lækagen harmonerer dårligt med pressens både principielle og kommercielle interesse i at sætte tærsklen højt i sager om åbenhed.

Dekanernes kronik viser en del om, hvordan eliten i MSM tænker, eller rettere: hvordan man ikke tænker særlig dybt over tingene. Man betragter NYT som hævet over enhver kritik. Hvis red Bill Keller siger, at det var nødvendigt at offentliggøre, så er den sag ikke længere. Denne næsegrus respekt udleves på trods af, at avisen i dag er præget af ensidig venstredrejet journalistik, hvor kilder vinkles, udelades eller fordrejes til at passe et på forhånd givent journalistisk mål. F.eks. har både WaPo og NYT oplevet den uhørte skam at blive hængt til tørre på det Hvide Hus’ hjemmeside med faktuelle fejltagelser, der ville være pinlige selv for en gratisavis (se her og her). Man begynder at forstå niveauet i MSM, også herhjemme, når det bliver klart, at NYT og WaPo stadig betragtes som højdepunktet af journalistik — blandt journalister, altså. Samtidig tager dekanerne Plame-sagen, og frem for at diskutere den, så smider man den blot ud nærmest i forventning om en pavlovsk accept fra læserne. Man er tydeligvis hverken vant til (selv-)kritik eller kritik fra andre.

Gad vide, hvordan Plame-sagen tager sig ud i danske MSM. Stilheden er foruroligende.

Fourth of July

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 4. juli 2006. 12 svar

Jeg skriver p.t. en serie kronikker til Berlingske Tidende over temaet "1776-2006", og i dag handlede det så meget passende om "Liv, frihed og den amerikanske drøm", d.v.s. om Thomas Jefferson og den amerikanske uafhængighedserklæring. (Note til de læsere, der har gennemgået en dansk folkeskoleuddannelse i de seneste årtier: I dag er "Fourth of July", hvilket ikke er en rap-gruppe men den amerikanske nationaldag, som markerer uafhængighedserklæringen i 1776, d.v.s. et tidspunkt dér et sted mellem stenalderen og noget andet kedeligt.  Og ja, Jefferson det er ganske rigtigt ham den væmmelige promiskuøse slavemishandler, I hørte om, da I havde gruppearbejde om slavers leveforhold under den tidlige kapitalisme …)

De næste to kronikker i serien bliver om henholdsvis Adam Smith og David Hume.

Retten til at gøre det respektløse

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 30. juni 2006. 13 svar

Som en del af vore læsere vil være klar over, har jeg mere end blot en svag interesse for USA; jeg er faktisk meget begejstret for landet og dets indbyggere (om end, i sagens natur, ikke for alt eller alle).  Som det vil være noget færre bekendt har jeg også en lidt … excentrisk? fjollet? … interesse for brugen af symboler og studiet heraf, altså f.eks. heraldik og vexillologi.  Enkelte vil også vide, at jeg under de rette omstændigheder kan blive godt gammeldags fjollet halvflæbende over visse nationale traditioner og værdier.  Så alt i alt skulle man tro, at jeg ikke just bryder mig om, at man f.eks. brænder Stars and Stripes eller Dannebrog af.  Og ja, min holdning er grundlæggende, at mennesker, der brænder flag af, dermed utvetydigt placerer sig selv i den mere moralsk og åndeligt udfordrede del af gadens parlament–for nu at sige det pænt.

Hvorfor nu dette navlepilleri? Jo, fordi jeg ikke desto mindre frydede mig kosteligt forleden, da det endnu engang mislykkedes for Republikanerne i USA's kongres at få samlet de nødvendige stemmer for det krævede kvalificerede flertal til at få forbudt afbrænding af USA's nationale flag.  Afstemningen i USA's senat forleden var ganske vist tættere på end nogensinde før–der var faktisk kun én stemme, der manglede for, at grundlovstilføjelsen (som allerede har samlet nok stemmer i Repræsentanternes Hus) ville have fået flertal i Senatet.  Dét, som i slutningen af 1980erne begyndte som et mindre og urealistisk forsøg fra Republikansk side på at få ført lidt "værdikamp" ind i Bush Sr.s valgkamp, er efter flere mislykkede forsøg (bl.a. en vedtaget lov, som blev underkendt af US Supreme Court som et indgreb i ytringsfriheden) nu, efter 11/9, meget tæt på at komme igennem.  Men selv hvis det sker, f.eks. i en ny kongres, så er slaget ikke nødvendigvis afgjort: Grundlovstilføjelsen skal i givet fald ratificeres af et kvalificeret flertal af de amerikanske delstater og indenfor en tidsfrist (som regel syv år), og selvom mange af delstaterne sikkert vil støtte forslaget, er det langt fra sikkert, at alle vil kunne gøre inden fristens udløb.

Når jeg frydede mig over forslagets fald, er det–som antydet–ikke fordi jeg er begejstret for flagafbrænding–det nærmeste jeg er kommet på at skænde nationale flag er (mig bekendt) at have et par boxer-shorts med Stars and Stripes og så den som barn traditionsrige afbrænding af papir-Dannebrog til børnefødselsdage o.l.

Men for mig at se er retten til at gøre med ens egen ejendom, hvad man vil, så længe det ikke har direkte negative konsekvenser for andre, et naturligt udgangspunkt.  At afbrænde et flag er måske usmageligt, stødende, skændigt, fordummende, o.s.v., men hvis det alene var et kriterie for at forbyde noget, burde Ekstra Bladet og TV2 Nyhederne have været forbudt for mange år siden.  At brænde et flag (eller en dukke af en politiker, man ikke kan lide, o.s.v.) er jo trods alt noget nær den mest fredelige form for politisk protest, man kan kaste sig ud i–på mange punkter mere fredeligt end et borgermøde eller en folkeafstemning.  Og fremfor alt må det være en målestok for et frit samfund, at man tillader selv de dumme og usmagelige at opføre sig på måder, man synes er utiltalende.  Og om noget er det netop tilfældet–eller bør være–i et land, der er grundlagt på forestillingen om "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness".  Som den "left-liberal" Hendrik Hertzberg fra det glimrende magasin The New Yorker har skrevet fornylig om netop denne debat:

"The American flag is an abstraction, an idea expressed in a certain arrangement of colors and shapes. Any particular flag is merely a representation of that idea; and the idea of the flag, in turn, is a symbol of something else. That something else is certainly not the government of the day; nor is it, at bottom, the land or the nation, or even the people. It is, again, an idea—the idea of liberty, made real by institutional arrangements that protect the freedom of citizens to think and speak as they will. Liberty, which is a big idea, protects itself by protecting the expression (though not, of course, guaranteeing the triumph) of other, smaller ideas, good and bad. And the idea of liberty is embodied in the Constitution."

Eller sagt endnu bedre i 1990 af Harvard jura-professoren Charles Fried, som var Ronald Reagans Solicitor General (d.v.s. en slags statsadvokat på ministerniveau), der sagde, at et forslag om at forbyde flagafbrænding vil være som at tegne "a moustache on the Mona Lisa of our liberties. … It would be 'a piece of vandalism whose mark will be with us forever."

Det pudsige ved debatten om flagafbrænding er, at mange af de borgerlige/konservative, både i Danmark og i USA, som vil mene, at flagafbrænding ikke bare er skændigt men noget, der bør være strafbart, sikkert også var blandt dem, der var på den rette side af Muhammed-debatten–altså blandt dem, der mener, at retten til frihed prima facie trumfer det meste andet og ikke bør begrænses af, at andre mennesker føler sig stødt på manchetterne.  Hvordan et parti som Dansk Folkeparti indenfor samme måneder meningsfuldt kan både forfægte ytringsfriheden i Muhammed-sagen og foreslå, at afbrænding af Dannebrog skal gøres strafbart, er lidt svært at forstå–med mindre man skal kaste sig ud i motivforskning (og det er vi ikke så store tilhængere af her på stedet).

Det er da heller ikke alle, som ikke er post-moderne føle-føle tolerantistas, der mener, at forbud mod flagafbrænding er en god idé.  Wall Street Journals skribenter er imod.  Cato Institute har været imod forslaget i flere omgange, både i 1995 og 2001.  Liberty & Power bloggen er det naturligvis. Her kommer lidt fra denne uges Wall Street Journal-klumme af Peggy Noonan, som fortsat er blandt mine mest yndede amerikanske kommentatorer, og som generelt opfattes som "så konservativ, at det gør noget" (og bl.a. var taleskriver for Reagan og forfatter til A Heart, a Cross and a Flag: America Today, og derfor næppe kan opfattes som "upatriotisk"):

"The flag burning amendment is a bad idea, and will not prove, in the end, politically wise or fruitful to any significant degree. Three reasons. One is that the American people can sense, whether they support a constitutional ban or not, that they're being manipulated. They know supporters are playing with their essential patriotism for political profit. They know opponents are, by and large, taking their stand for equally political reasons. They can sense when everyone's posturing. It's not good, in the long term, when people sense you're playing with their deepest emotions, such as their love of co
untry.

Second, nobod
y thinks America is overrun with people burning flags, so the amendment does not seem even to be an exotic response to a real problem. There are a lot of pressing issues before the Congress, and no one thinks this is one of them. Voters know it's hard to do a risky thing like define marriage as a legal entity that can take place only between an adult human male and an adult human female. That actually would take some guts. It's easy–almost embarrassingly so–to make speeches about how much you love the flag.

Third, Americans don't always say this or even notice it, but they love their Constitution. They revere it. They don't want it used as a plaything. They want the Constitution treated as a hallowed document that is amended rarely, and only for deep reasons of societal or governmental need. A flag burning amendment is too small bore for such a big thing. I don't think it will come up as a big issue every even numbered year. I think it's going to go away. There's too much else that's really needed."

Eller som Cato Institute skrev for et årti siden:

"Another threat to free speech is the continuing campaign to outlaw the desecration of the American flag. As outrageous as flag burning is, the test of our commitment to freedom of speech is our willingness to tolerate offensive speech. The Founders put freedom of speech in the Constitution because they knew that we would all be tempted at one time or another to ban some kind of speech or expression, so it's best that everyone be unable to do so. It's interesting to speculate whether the flag-bedecked ties, hats, and other paraphernalia sported by Pat Buchanan and the delegates at the Republican National Convention would be legal under the flag-desecration amendment they favor.

Prevented by the courts from banning flag burning by statute, some members of Congress want a constitutional amendment to forbid desecration. Some advocates of campaign finance regulation likewise understand that such restrictions fall afoul of the First Amendment and want a new amendment to bring about their preferred exception. Maybe those new amendments should be numbered Amendment I(a), Amendment I(b), and so on, to keep all the exceptions in close proximity to the original First Amendment."

PS. I denne forbindelse kan det iøvrigt være lidt illustrativt at betragte (via Wall Street Journals OpinionJournal.com), hvilke lande, der har hvilken lovgivning på området:

  • U.S.A., Australien, Canada og Storbritannien, d.v.s. de lande, der om nogen udgør kernen i den vestlige frihedstradition, har ingen lovgivning, der forbyder afbrænding eller anden skænding af det nationale flag.
  • Det samme kan ikke siges om en anden gruppe lande: Østrig, Kina, Egypten, Frankrig, Tyskland, Ungarn, Iran, Irak, Italien, det Palæstinensiske hjemmestyreområde, Portugal, Saudi Arabien, Taiwan og Tyrkiet har derimod alle sådanne love.  I Østrigs tilfælde stammer lovgivningen direkte fra Det Tredje Riges lovgivning (mens noget lignende ihvertfald indirekte formodentlig er tilfældet med Tysklands lovgivning).
  • Danmark, Japan, Norge og Sverige har lovgivning, der beskytter andre nationers flag.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

Af admin, den 29. juni 2006. 8 svar

US Supreme Court har i dag afsagt dom i ovennævnte sag. Dommen underkender den version af militære kommissioner, som Bush regeringen har oprettet til at dømme fanger på Guantanamobasen.

Medierne vil formodentlig fokusere på, at Bush led nederlag i denne henseende og derudover formodentlig blande de forskellige involverede spørgsmål grundigt sammen.

For at antyde kompleksiteten af de involverede retlige spørgsmål kan det nævnes, at den amerikanske højesteret (angiveligt, har ikke set referatet endnu) fastholdt, at Hamdan, der er kendt som bin Ladens chauffør (han var vist mere end det), kan tilbageholdes "for the duration of active hostilities".

Hvis man vil have en mere sober gennemgang, henviser vi — på ny — til SCOTUSblog.

Update: Her er et link til dommen.

Den libertære Bush II

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 15. juni 2006. 1 svar

Vores med-punditokrat Mchangamas post om "den libertære Bush"–som altså ikke er en af præsidenterne af dette navn, men Floridas guvernør John Ellis "Jeb" Bush–har meget, eller ihvertfald noget, der taler for sig.

Selv oplevede jeg det allerede for nogle år siden, i slutningen af 1990erne, hvor jeg som svagt mere end gennemsnitligt interesseret i amerikansk politik bemærkede, at hvor "W." talte om "compassionate conservatism" og tydeligt fremhævede sin evangelsk-protestantiske baggrund, virkede Jeb–trods sine katolske forbindelser og vælgere–lidt mere sekulær og tydeligt mere libertær, ihvertfald i en Reagansk tradition.  I 2000 nævnte jeg det "en passant" overfor en tysk-amerikansk fagfælle, der næsten bogstaveligt var vokset op for fødderne af F.A. Hayek, og som bestemt selv er klassisk-liberal–og som på det tidspunkt netop var flyttet til Florida.  Jeg husker ikke hans eksakte ord, men det var noget i retning af, "Hvad i alverden taler du om …?".  Men da jeg for et år siden bragte forskellene mellem de to brødre op igen, var min tysk-amerikanske ven svunget helt rundt og var, efter at have levet i Florida nogle år, blevet en overvejende ganske begejstret Jeb-fan.  "Der er en markant politisk forskel på de to", sagde han.  "Det skulle have været ham i 2000."

Det har andre også bemærket, i kølvandet på Weekly Standards artikler (bl.a. denne)–og, kender man journalister ret, sikkert kraftigt inspireret heraf.  Det gælder bl.a. britiske The Telegraph, som 11.VI. havde en lang artikel med titlen "Curse of big brother stalks Jeb Bush".  Heri hed det bl.a.:

"He is a popular governor of a pivotal southern state, who has impressed with his leadership of hurricane relief efforts, is a charismatic speaker and a renowned policy expert – and is steeped in political campaigning.

Normally, such attributes and qualifications, along with his small government, libertarian brand of conservatism, would make him a front runner for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008.

But the governor of Florida, who has a popularity rating of 63 per cent in his home state, has one disadvantage that overshadows everything else – his surname is Bush."

Selvsamme dag havde en anden britisk avis, London's Sunday Times, en artikel om nøjagtigt samme emne.

Det er et generelt anerkendt postulat, at det var Jeb, som var udset til at være familiens politiske håb.  Havde han vundet guvernør-valget i Florida, da han stillede op første gang, var det givetvis ham, som havde været kandidaten i 2000.  Ét spørgsmål er så, hvor stor en forskel det ville have gjort?  Et andet er, om han nu nogensinde får chancen?

PS. Til sidstnævnte spørgsmål kan det bemærkes, at den helt hotte "sladder" p.t. er, at der har været et møde mellem John McCain og Jeb Bush, og at spekulationen går på en aftale–eller ihvertfald en "føler"–m.h.t. McCain som præsidentkandidat og Bush som vicepræsidentkandidat … 

PPS. Kommentatoren E.J. Dionne, som næppe kunne finde på at stemme på en sådan "ticket" (med mindre alternativet var George W. Bush), havde en kommentar om dette emne i Washington Post … for nøjagtigt et år siden!  New York Times/International Herald Tribune havde en artikel for to uger siden.

PPPS. Hvad siger tallene?  Ikke så meget p.t.  Ser man på meningsmålingerne, der parrer Hillary Clinton vs. John McCain, har sidstnævnte generelt en føring og ofte én, der er statistisk signifikant.  Det samme kan ikke siges i tilfældet med Jeb Bush, som omvendt taber til H.R.C., hvilket nok snarere skal ses som utilfredshed med storebroder end som voldsom kritik af lillebror.  Til gengæld er Jeb Bush måske bedre end McCain til at bringe konservative kernevælgere af huse.  Men hvor gerne vil McCain have én som Jeb som sin nr. 2 …?

Det gode imperium

Af Mikael Jalving, den 13. juni 2006. 17 svar

Der går næsten ikke en dag, uden at et nyhedsmedie fortæller os, at supermagten USA er i knibe i Irak eller Afghanistan. Vi er langsomt ved at vænne os til det: Supermagten er ikke Superman. Imperiet er ikke imperialt.

Men nu tager den indisk-amerikanske professor i udviklingsstudier ved UCLA i Californien, Deepak Lal, imperiet i forsvar i sin insisterende bog In Paise of Empires: Globalization and Order.

Ifølge Deepak Lal har imperiet været reglen og ikke undtagelsen i hele den menneskelige historie. Lige fra Mesopotamien ca. 4000 f. Kr. over de egyptiske, kinesiske og indiske riger til perserne, grækerne og romerne – og frem til det ottomanske, det østrig-ungarnske og det britiske imperium. Der har været mange af slagsen, og flere af dem bestod i mere end 1000 år. Det britiske imperium, som måske er det mest kendte, hører til de kortvarige med ca. 190 år. Til gengæld var det meget succesrigt, hvilket bl.a. inderne har gavn af den dag i dag.

MEN imperierne blev afløst af nationalstaterne. Langsomt fik de overtaget, fordi de i kraft af deres lidenhed kunne opbygge et mere effektivt kommunikationssystem via veje og broer og indføre et officielt sprog til bureaukratiet. På den anden side skaber nationalstater ifølge forfatteren uorden og krig, hvor nationalstaternes blodige 20. århundrede er hans stærkeste kort. Det, imperiet kan, hvis man skal tro nærværende udlægning, er at beskytte os mod nationalisternes kaos.

Det sidste skyldes først og fremmest, at imperier – modsat hvad mange hævder – fremmer globaliseringen, som hos Deepak Lal ikke anses for at være et nyt fænomen. For hvor der har været imperier, har der også været globalisering i betydningen et fælles økonomisk samkvem og en bevægelse af varer, kapital og arbejde. Imperiet er meget bedre end sit rygte. Især det britiske imperium, der også var det første globale imperium, hjulpet frem af dampkraften, jernbaner og telegrafen. Men også det østrig-ungarnske imperium og det ottomanske imperium, hvis styrke var deres multikulturelle karakter.

DEEPAK Lal slår ned på fredsslutningen på Versailles-slottet i 1919 efter Første Verdenskrig. Den fred skulle vise sig at blive skæbnesvanger. Siden indgåelsen af Den Westfalske Fred i 1648 efter Trediveårskrigen, der gjorde det af med næsten en tredjedel af Europas befolkning, havde der i Europa hersket en vis balance mellem de førende magter. Magtbalancen holdt i ca. 250 år. Så fulgte Første Verdenskrig. Og derpå freden i 1919, hvor den amerikanske præsident Woodrow Wilson i Deepak Lals vurdering smadrede imperiets lange æra og gav grønt lys for nationernes æra.Hvis amerikanerne i stedet for at indlede nationernes æra havde hjulpet briterne med at bistå imperiet, det britiske gentlemanimperium, kunne de formentlig have forhindret mange af det 20. århundredes uhyrligheder, mener forfatteren, selv om det er svært at spå, især om fortiden.

Forfatteren er nådesløs overfor, hvad han kalder præsident Wilsons utopi: At begrave friheden i Folkeforbundet og dernæst FN og gøre disse organisationer til et fællesskab af nationalstater, hvor de stærke og svage har samme rettigheder. Det var mere naivt, end man har lov at være som præsident for verdens allerede dengang stærkeste og rigeste magt.

Utopien førte ifølge Deepak Lal til både fascismen og kommunismen. Frem voksede en ny moralsk nationalisme i stedet for den kritiserede imperialisme. Frihed blev fejlagtigt opfattet som nationalstatens tvilling, mens amerikanerne trak sig tilbage i ophøjet isolation. Resultatet blev et magtvakuum og det 20. århundrede, som vi kender det.

I MODSÆTNING til nationernes anarki skaber det gode imperium fred og velstand. Det kan kun lade sig gøre, hvis det undlader at gøre trosspørgsmål til afgørende spørgsmål. Bliver troen det vigtigste, så venter barbariet.

Deepak Lal låner her to begreber fra den britiske politiske filosof Michael Oakeshott (1901-90), som er relativt ukendt i Danmark, men et stort navn i den angelsaksiske verden. Oakeshott skelnede mellem stater som enten “civil association” eller “enterprise association”.

“Civil association” går tilbage til antikken, hvor målet netop ikke var at indfri diverse abstrakte begreber, såsom f.eks. demokrati eller menneskerettigheder, men at skabe orden. “Enterprise association” går derimod tilbage til den jødisk-kristne tradition, hvor staten skal lovgive moralsk. Denne moralisme frembringer også de dårlige imperier.

Forfatteren skriver det ikke direkte, men med dårlige imperier kommer man uvilkårligt til at tænke på det sovjetiske imperium (1917-89) eller Det Tredje Rige (1933-45), hvis fascinationskraft og morderiske potentiale netop lå i at ville dirigere alt samfundsliv og styre moralsk. Intet af dette var naturligvis kristent eller jødisk, men det afgørende var troen på perfektion gennem lovgivning og en fatal mangel på tvivl.

MED Oakeshotts “civil association” som pejlemærke skal dagens amerikanske imperium bestræbe sig på at gøre briterne kunsten efter og fremme en globalisering, der fører til modernisering, ikke amerikanisering. Imperiet skal stræbe efter en international liberal økonomisk orden.

Hvor briterne tidligere stræbte efter en international liberal økonomisk orden, så har amerikanerne typisk stræbt efter multi- eller bilaterale aftaler gennem GATT, WTO, IMF og Verdensbanken. Amerikanerne har aldrig forstået, hvad frihandel er – og kræver. Og det kan i længden vise sig at være USA’s akilleshæl, ikke mindst fordi underskuddet på det amerikanske budget vokser faretruende.

Præsident Bush’s problem er således, at han ikke vil indrømme, at han står i spidsen for et imperium. Han står med et imperium, men har ikke forstået dets rolle.

DEN tætpakkede bog er et angreb på al idealisme. Både den idealisme, der udgår fra menneskerettighedsindustrien i FN, herunder de associerede NGO’er. Og den idealisme, der udgår fra Bush-administrationen og den såkaldt neo-konservative indflydelse i amerikansk udenrigspolitik.

Begge dele udtrykker en politisk aktivisme i globalt format, hvor målet er en international moralsk orden. Men “verdenssamfundet” eksisterer ikke; det er en illusion. FN er alene et forum for de svage, hvor de kan forene sig imod den store Guliver. FN lider af en slags demokratisme eller selvforblindelse. Og Amerika vil gerne være populær. Men hvorfor skal den stærke gøre sig svag for at tækkes de svage, spørger Deepak Lal.

Når han følgelig priser imperiet, priser han indirekte realismen, og det er faktisk den, der er hans vigtigste ærinde. Han vil have politik tilbage til det, politik handler om: magt, ikke popularitet; resultater, ikke PR; indhold, ikke spin. Og han vil have økonomi tilbage til det, økonomi handler om: velstand, ikke omfordeling; frihandel, ikke monopoler; kapitalisme, ikke socialisme.

TILBAGE står naturligvis det store spørgsmål om islam. Men det er overvurderet, mener Deepak Lal.

Islam er i virkeligheden gået tilbage siden tyrkernes mislykkede belejring af Wien i 1683. Mest af alt, fordi der i den muslimske del af verden – fraset det moderne Tyrkiet – intet skel er mellem moske og stat. Derfor refereres der altid til Guds stat, ligesom der henvises til Guds hær.

I Mellemøsten bliver spørgsmålet “Hvad laver militæret i politik?” end ikke rejst, skriver Deepak Lal, for sådan har det været siden Muhammed. Men islam kan ikke ryste det amerikanske imperium, hvis amerikanerne vel at mærke anerkender, at de står i spidsen for et imperium.

Det er især på spørgsmålet om islams betydning for det 21. århundredes politik og moral, at den professorale nonchalance hos Deepak Lal trænger mest igennem. Han argumenter overbevisende for risikoen ved at eksportere den vestlige verdens politiske korrekthed – både gennem FN og idealistisk, amerikansk udenrigspolitik – men han undervurderer truslen fra den islamiske fundamentalisme, som meget vel kan vise sig at blive imperiets værste f
jende.

Hvis der er n
oget, vi lærer i disse år, så er det, at magten tilhører dem, der griber den.

Deepak Lal: In Paise of Empires: Globalization and Order, 270 sider, Palgrave, $27.

BBC i USA

Af admin, den 7. juni 2006. Skriv et svar

For at fejre medieforliget i går, der udstrakte kop-skatten (licensen) til også at omfatte pc’ere (Se Rohdes strengt logiske forsvar for denne udvidelse af beskatningen her), men som dog opretter en public service-fond, som med tiden måske — måske ikke — kan få aflivet den nationalromantiske forestilling om statsopdragelse af masserne, bringer vi her et link til et lille indlæg om DRs åndelige og statsunderstøttede britiske tvilling BBC, der nu åbner i USA. Man mener åbenbart, at MSM i USA ikke er tilstrækkeligt venstresnoet.

Artiklen er af Gerard Baker, og her er et par smagsprøver:

A few years ago the former boss of the BBC attacked American television news for too slavishly following the government line. Instead the BBC now says in its publicity, it will offer “both sides of the story”.

Roughly translated this means the BBC thinks that, while the vast majority of Americans are morons who are perfectly content to swallow right-wing rubbish from their political and media masters, there is an educated and sophisticated elite on the coasts that feels somehow its worldview is underrepresented by the current giants of the mainstream media in the US.

This might come as surprise to Americans casually familiar with the output of CNN, CBS, NBC or ABC but the BBC is happy anyway to add its own little three-lettered logo to the vast and steaming alphabet soup of liberal bias. …

BBC News is produced by a very large team of ideological confreres, who, with a very few exceptions subscribe to the smart London set’s view of the modern world.

This thinks, roughly, that capitalism is some sort of conspiracy by evil men against the ordinary working stiff and that big government and higher taxes are the only route to a fair society.

Bakers pointe er ikke at jamre sig over den politiske ensretning i BBC’s nyhedsformidling, men den ekstreme konkurrenceforvridning, der følger af deres (dårligt kamuflerede) skatteopkrævning. Også på det punkt ligner situationen noget, vi kender hjemmefra.

Læs selv hele artiklen her.

Den libertære Bush

Af Jacob Mchangama, den 5. juni 2006. 4 svar

Weekly Standard har i sin seneste udgave en artikel, der skamroser Bush. Nej, det drejer sig ikke om præsidenten George, men derimod dennes broder Jeb, der er guvernør i Florida. I artiklen præsenteres Jeb Bush som intet mindre end USA's bedste guvernør. Man skal selvfølgelig have i mente, at Weekly Standard er særdeles pro-republikansk og at der en udpræget mangel på feel-good historier fra den republikanske lejr i disse tider. Alligevel må Jeb Bush' resultater siges at være imponerende og man kan godt ærgre sig over, at det ikke er Jeb men George, der sidder i huset på 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Jeb Bush, der ifølge ham selv besidder et "libertarian gene" kan se tilbage på en række bemærkelsesværdige politiske resultater, som bør opmuntre desillusionerede borgerlig-liberale, der har mistet troen på, at det er muligt for borgerlige politikere at føre borgerlig-liberal politik:  

In a state with a surging population, Bush has presided over a booming economy with the highest rate of job creation in the country and an unemployment rate of 3.0 percent (the national average is 4.6 percent). Florida has no state income tax, but Bush has nonetheless found a way to cut taxes every year of the eight he's been in office. Meanwhile, he's trimmed the state employment rolls by 11,000.

[…]

He's the first governor to impose stringent testing and accountability on Florida elementary and secondary schools, along with three voucher programs, the most ambitious of which was struck down this year by the (liberal and majority Democratic) state supreme court. This achievement went beyond the No Child Left Behind program of his brother, President Bush, who dropped vouchers in a compromise with Democrats in 2001.

On health care, no governor has attacked Medicaid, whose costs are swamping state budgets, more boldly than Bush. He wangled a breathtakingly broad waiver from the federal Department of Health and Human Services to privatize Medicaid in two populous counties, Duval (Jacksonville) and Broward (Fort Lauderdale). The new program, affecting more than 200,000 Medicaid recipients, goes into effect July 1.

Hvordan er Jeb så forskellig fra George?:

Friends of Jeb compare him favorably with his brother, but they're wary of doing it on the record. One former Republican governor insisted that Jeb Bush "is far more gifted than his brother or his father," the elder President Bush. A consultant who knows both Jeb and George says, "Jeb is excellent and George is above average."
The conventional wisdom is that Jeb is the smart one who thinks through issues, and George is merely savvy and acts on instinct. That's a media myth. Both think alot before they act. And they agree on many things. JebBush has visited Iraq and backs the policy there. He agrees with his brother on immigration and taxes and soon.

But there are significant differences, so many that conservative activist Grover Norquist says, "Jeb Bush is adopted." There's no "genetic mix" with his father or his brother, according to Norquist. He is joking, of course, to highlight the ideological gap between Jeb and the Bush family. Jeb Bush is a small government conservative. He was feted in Washington in 2003 by the libertarian Cato Institute and talks about having a "libertarian gene." President Bush has no such gene. He's what I call a strong government conservative and others refer to as a big government conservative. True, President Bush is closer ideologically to President Reagan than to his father, a moderate. But Jeb Bush is closer to Reagan than his brother is.
But there are significant differences, so many that conservative activist Grover Norquist says, "Jeb Bush is adopted." There's no "genetic mix" with his father or his brother, according to Norquist. He is joking, of course, to highlight the ideological gap between Jeb and the Bush family. Jeb Bush is a small government conservative. He was feted in Washington in 2003 by the libertarian Cato Institute and talks about having a "libertarian gene." President Bush has no such gene. He's what I call a strong government conservative and others refer to as a big government conservative. True, President Bush is closer ideologically to President Reagan than to his father, a moderate. But Jeb Bush is closer to Reagan than his brother is.But there are significant differences, so many that conservative activist Grover Norquist says, "Jeb Bush is adopted." There's no "genetic mix" with his father or his brother, according to Norquist. He is joking, of course, to highlight the ideological gap between Jeb and the Bush family. Jeb Bush is a small government conservative. He was feted in Washington in 2003 by the libertarian Cato Institute and talks about having a "libertarian gene." President Bush has no such gene. He's what I call a strong government conservative and others refer to as a big government conservative. True, President Bush is closer ideologically to President Reagan than to his father, a moderate. But Jeb Bush is closer to Reagan than his brother is.

Jeb has vetoed hundreds of spending measures. His friends are not immune to his veto knife. Bush and Mel Martinez were good friends in 1999 when Martinez, then an Orange County (Orlando) official and now a U.S. senator, got the legislature to approve funding for a transportation project. Bush "vetoed the damn thing," Martinez says. "He's legendary for that. He does it to his best friends." In contrast, President Bush is legendary for not vetoing a single spending bill.

Nedenfor følger en mere detaljeret opgørelse over Jeb Bush's resultater: 

* Political leadership: Florida was a weak-governor state when Bush arrived. No more. It had cabinet government with six elected state officials besides the governor. Now the cabinet has been reduced to three members plus Bush, and power is not shared equally. Bush rules. He removed the bar association from a role in naming judges and now controls the selection process. He also eliminated the state board of regents, took control of the board of every public university, and gained the right to name the state education commissioner. And he's changed the policy debate from how much government can do to how much it should leave to the people and the free market. "That's his greatest effect," says Robert McClure of the Bush-friendly James Madison Institute in Tallahassee.

* The economy: It's bursting at the seams. Florida is no longer totally reliant on tourism, agriculture, and the retiree industry. Under Bush, Florida has become the fourth largest high-tech state. Its bond rating has been hiked to Triple A. The economy, in Bush's words, was "knocked for a jolt" by 9/11. He "went out to shamelessly promote" tourism, and state construction projects were accelerated. It worked. He stubbornly fought a high-speed train connecting Miami, Orlando, and Tampa. It was approved in a 2000 referendum, only to be rejected in 2004 at Bush's urging.

* Taxes: Bush has slashed $20 billion in taxes over eight years and enjoys the heartburn this gives the media and liberals. "I do love it," he says. "Prior to my arrival, there may have been a tax cut or two, but normally the way to solve problems was to raise taxes." This y
ear, the legislature kille
d what Bush calls "the evil, insidious intangibles tax" on stocks and bonds. His tax cuts are all the more shocking in a state with no income tax but with a balanced budget requirement.

* Education: Bush's education reforms have been vindicated by scholarly studies. Jay Greene and Marcus Winters of the Manhattan Institute found testing to end social promotion in Florida schools had led to "substantial academic gains for low-performing schools." A Harvard study concluded the stigma of poor student performance and the threat of vouchers caused schools to improve. The test scores of African-American and poor students rose significantly. One example: The percentage of African-American fourth graders reading at grade level doubled to 56 percent from 1999 to 2005.

* Medicaid: Bush's bold experiment, due to begin in less than a month, has important national implications. In Broward and Duval counties, Medicaid recipients will choose among 19 insurance plans. The program provides incentives to change behavior by quitting smoking, seeking preventive care, and getting dental exams. The aim is not to cut the cost of Medicaid but to slow its staggering growth: Florida's Medicaid budget jumped from $7 billion in 1999 to $16 billion in 2006. If the Florida test succeeds, other states will follow.

* Medicaid: Bush's bold experiment, due to begin in less than a month, has important national implications. In Broward and Duval counties, Medicaid recipients will choose among 19 insurance plans. The program provides incentives to change behavior by quitting smoking, seeking preventive care, and getting dental exams. The aim is not to cut the cost of Medicaid but to slow its staggering growth: Florida's Medicaid budget jumped from $7 billion in 1999 to $16 billion in 2006. If the Florida test succeeds, other states will follow.

Må man foreslå d'herrer Fogh og Hjorth Frederiksen en studietur til Florida? En sådan ville være en sjældent gavnlig udnyttelse af borgernes skattepenge. 

E-mail to Dick Cheney: Guest commentary by Samuel Rachlin

Af Redaktionen, den 29. maj 2006. 9 svar

Punditokraterne er glade for igen at kunne bringe en gæstekommentar af Samuel Rachlin (den første var denne):

E-mail to Dick Cheney

Right after Vice President Dick Cheney’s trip to Europe and Central Asia, I wrote him an e-mail:

Dear Dick,

It’s fine with me that you give President Putin a lecture and tell him what democracy is about, and that he should not use the oil weapon against his neighbours.  I think it’s appropriate that you tell him that the Russian government has “unfairly and improperly restricts the rights of her people.” and that Moscow should not use oil and gas as a tool of “intimidation and blackmail”. I also find it OK when you tell new East European and Baltic democracies in Vilnius that they are on the right track and they have the full support of the U.S.

But I have a problem when you, after that meting, move on to Kazakhstan to visit President Nursultan Nazarbaev – a mix between Ghengis Khan and a Soviet Politbureau Member without any tolerance of opposition or respect of human right, but with great patience with corruption and abuse of power. He is a leader of the same mold as Azerbaidzhan’s President Ilham Aliyev who recently was received by your boss in the White House.

It’s problem for me because it creates a lot of confusion and uncertainty about the American message. Nazarbayev and Aliyev are by no means on the right track to democracy and are even more undemocratic and despotic than President Putin and his crowd in the Kremlin. It’s obvious that this weakens the message to Moscow and causes confusion among the East European leaders you met with in Vilnius.

Nazarbayev and Aliyev both control significant oil wealth, and you have to understand that this could lead some people to think that the U.S. applies different criteria and values for who’s in and who’s out, and who should be lectured on what’s wrong and what’s right. That’s what we call double standards. When you and your boss cultivate relationships with people like Nazabayev and Aliyev one could get the impression that you distinguish between those who have and those who don’t have oil. The new breed of haves and haves not.

Some people could draw the conclusion that if you have oil it does not matter that much that you violate the rules of democracy and suppress basic human rights. The problem becomes even more conspicuous because everybody knows how close you and your boss are to the American oil industry. The relationship with Saudi Arabia – one of the most important providers of oil to the U.S. – has never suffered under the lack of democracy in the Arab kingdom.

You have to understand that there is not a very big jump from these observations to raising the question about the real motives behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Was it primarily a question of freedom and democracy or was it Iraq’s oil wealth that led the U.S. into the war? It’s obvious to anyone that your and President Bush’s credibility has suffered considerable damage. After Abu Graihb and Guantanamo, your lecturing about democracy and human right begins to sound hollow. After more than three years of warfare in Iraq no one can claim that the U.S. has been defeated, but the lack of results, not to speak of victories, is a defeat in its own right. That has not only undermined your status as a hyper power, but also weakened your ability to speak out about democracy and freedom on behalf of the free world – at least with the same authority as in the past.

You wound up your trip in Croatia, and in a speech to regional leaders in Dubrovnik, you again spoke about freedom and democracy. That’s a problem for me, too, because you welcomed the new countries to the EU. Listen, Dick, on whose behalf did you do that? Who gave you that mandate? Are you out of your mind, as you Americans say.  Don’t you think that we have problems enough already in the EU with the timeout for the constitution debate, with our European identity and our direction.

We don’t need any good advice. We have more than enough of our own good ideas. What we need is determination and action, but right now we are confused and enervated by all the changes we have gone through with integration, expansion and one treaty after the other. We have gone into rethinking mode, and no one really knows when we will come out. Untimely interference can only make things even worse.

And don’t you actually think that you and President Bush have problems enough on your own? The Iraq war more and more looks like a dead end. The oil price in the U.S. is still half of what it is in Europe, but your voters are so angry that they are ready to start a new revolution. The trade and budget deficits look like a Hollywood horror movie. The President’s support is at a historic low, and your own ratings are lower than Michael Jackson’s. How do you feel it’s going for you, as we say in Denmark?  I understand you need a breather, but I would suggest that next time you feel like getting out of there you should go back to Texas for some old fashioned hunting with your buddies.

Sincerely yours,
Samuel

It did not take long before I got an answer from Dick Cheney:

Dear Samuel,

The hunting season in Texas has not started yet, and after that deplorable episode at  my latest hunting trip, I have to go abroad to test my markmanship before I try to renew my license. Quite frankly, I think things are going just fine. It was a great trip – one of my best in a long time,

Sincerely yours,
Dick

Bush, basen og bæstet

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 24. maj 2006. 1 svar

Skyerne er i den grad ved at samle sig over præsident Bushs hoved.  Her tænker jeg ikke så meget på Al Gores nye miljø-"dokumentarfilm", der ganske forudsigeligt har fået stor omtale i Danmark og ledt til spekulation om Gores mulige politiske come-back.  Jeg tænker heller ikke på, at Bush fortsat er inderligt afskyet af den amerikanske venstrefløj eller det meste af det politiske billede i Europa, og ej heller på at hans popularitet blandt amerikanske midtervælgere falder i takt med stigninger i benzinpriserne.

Næ, problemet er snarere, at de dele af den amerikanske højrefløj, som i nogle år har holdt sig for næsen og på måtten m.h.t. at kritisere Bush, nu er ved at sige "enough is enough".  Nogle, som i forvejen var kritiske (f.eks. den liberalistiske tænketank Cato Institute) har skruet op for lydstyrken; andre, solide konservative, er ved at smide håndklædet i ringen–eller noget tungere efter Bush-administrationen og det Republikanske flertal i kongressen.  Konsekvensen af denne kritik er efter alt at dømme en kraftigt medvirkende årsag til, at Bushs "approval ratings" nu er så rekordlave, som de er: Svækkelsen siden sommeren 2005 er ikke sket blandt venstrefløjsvælgerne, men i Bushs eget bagland.  Ifølge en Washington Post/ABC News meningsmåling fra denne uge er det konservative baglands utilfredshed med Bush på blot én måned steget fra 16 pct. til 20 pct., altimens konservative Heritage Foundation kan berette, at man ikke i 12 år har hørt på så megen kritik af det Republikanske Parti fra egne rækker, som man gør nu.

Her er et "round up" af nogle smagsprøver i mere eller mindre tilfældig rækkefølge:

  • Cato Institute offentliggjorde for få uger siden et større studie af Gene Healy og Timothy Lynch , "Power Surge: The Constitutional Record of George W. Bush", som stykke for stykke, punkt for punkt, afdækker, hvorledes Bush-administrationen over de seneste fem år har flyttet stadigt mere magt til den udøvende magt og på en række områder fundamentalt har rykket ved den magtdelingsfilosofi, som forfatningsfædrene ønskede.  Her er deres sammendrag:

"[Far] from defending the Constitution, President Bush has repeatedly sought to strip out the limits the document places on federal power. In its official legal briefs and public actions, the Bush administration has advanced a view of federal power that is astonishingly broad, a view that includes

      • a federal government empowered to regulate core political speech—and restrict it greatly when it counts the most: in the days before a federal election;
      • a president who cannot be restrained, through validly enacted statutes, from pursuing any tactic he believes to be effective in the war on terror;
      • a president who has the inherent constitutional authority to designate American citizens suspected of terrorist activity as "enemy combatants," strip them of any constitutional protection, and lock them up without charges for the duration of the war on terror— in other words, perhaps forever; and
      • a federal government with the power to supervise virtually every aspect of American life, from kindergarten, to marriage, to the grave.

President Bush's constitutional vision is, in short, sharply at odds with the text, history, and structure of our Constitution, which authorizes a government of limited powers."

  • Samme organisations Chairman, William A. Niskanen, der er en af grundlæggerne af public choice skolen og var formand for Council of Economic Advisors under Ronald Reagan, er interviewet som hovedhistorien, "Stoking the Beast", i juni-nummeret af det aldeles fremragende Atlantic Monthly (som jeg ved en senere lejlighed vil skrive en længere anbefaling af).  I interviewet gør Niskanen op med selve kernen i Reagan-Bush "starve the beast" supply-side økonomien, d.v.s., at man ved at sænke skatterne nu i stedet for at forsøge at skære udgifterne, dels stimulerer økonomien og dels "udhungrer bæstet" således, at man efterfølgende vil blive nødt til at skære i udgifterne.  Niskanen har studeret tallene 1980-2005 og konstaterer, at alt tyder på den modsatte effekt: At denne strategi faktisk leder til højere offentlige udgifter, formodentlig fordi det skjuler de faktiske udgifter ved en stor offentlig sektor:

"[Until Reagan], the conservative movement had been at odds with itself. Libertarians in the Goldwater tradition wanted to reduce spending in order to shrink Big Government. Supply-siders derided that idea as a political loser, "root-canal economics." Instead, they demanded large tax cuts that would grow the economy. Traditional business conservatives, however, believed in balanced budgets, and they held tax cuts hostage to spending cuts that never happened. The movement was gridlocked.

Reagan and his supply-side vanguard saw a way to break the jam—or, more precisely, two ways. First, some argued that tax cuts would so energize the economy as to pay for themselves. That claim was widely controversial, even among Republicans (Reagan's then-rival George H. W. Bush called it "voodoo economics"), and it proved mostly wrong. Less controversial, but in the end more important, was the claim Reagan lobbed at Anderson. Often called the Starve the Beast hypothesis, it held that tax cuts shrink the federal Leviathan by starving it of funds. Tax cuts need not await spending cuts because they would cause spending cuts.

For modern conservatism and the country, the importance of Starve the Beast is impossible to overstate. Suddenly Republicans could offer both lower taxes and smaller government without any need for fiscal dentistry. Suddenly it was the Democrats who were trapped. From then to now, tax cutting has been the lodestar of conservatism, rising to its apogee under the current President Bush. But there have always been dissenting voices, of which perhaps the most prominent speaks from within the conservative movement.

When Diogenes searches Washington, D.C., for an honest man, he could do worse than carry his lantern to the office of William A. Niskanen, the chairman of the libertarian Cato Institute. Niskanen's wall displays portraits of Isaac Newton, Adam Smith, and Charles Darwin, each captioned ORDER WITHOUT DIRECTION. …  In the Reagan administration, he served as acting chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Blunt-spoken and seemingly impervious to partisanship, he was passed over for the permanent chairmanship after telling senior politicos, in Reagan's presence, that one of their pet tax proposals would have made Walter Mondale proud.

Even during the Reagan years, Niskanen was suspicious of Starve the Beast. He thought it more likely that tax cuts, when unmatched with spending cuts, would reduce the apparent cost of government, thus stimulating rather than stunting Washington's growth. "You make government look cheaper than it would otherwise be," he said recently. …

To the naked eye, Starve the Beast looks suspiciously counterproductive. After all, spe
nding (as a share of the g
ross domestic product, the standard way to measure it) went up, not down, after Reagan cut taxes in the early 1980s; it went down, not up, after the first President Bush and President Clinton raised taxes in the early 1990s; and it went up, not down, following the Bush tax cuts early in this decade.

Niskanen recently analyzed data from 1981 to 2005 and found his hunch strongly confirmed. When he performed a statistical regression that controlled for unemployment (which independently influences spending and taxes), he found, he says, "no sign that deficits have ever acted as a constraint on spending." To the contrary: judging by the last twenty-five years (plenty of time for a fair test), a tax cut of 1 percent of the GDP increases the rate of spending growth by about 0.15 percent of the GDP a year. A comparable tax hike reduces spending growth by the same amount. …

Thanks to the Bush tax cuts, revenues have been well below 19 percent since 2002 (17.8 percent last year). Perhaps not surprisingly, government spending has risen under Bush."

  • Richard Viguerie, som spillede en stor rolle i Reagans sejr i 1980 og Bushs i 2000, skrev søndag i et langt essay i Washington Post, hvori han direkte opfordrede amerikanske konservative til at holde op med at støtte det Republikanske Parti og dets forskellige organisationer.  Viguerie gik så langt som til at foreslå, at man ikke støtter Republikanerne ved midtvejsvalget i år og til næste præsidentvalg, i 2008, arbejder på at skabe en ny bevægelse.

"As a candidate in 2000, George W. Bush was a Rorschach test. Country Club Republicans saw him as another George H.W. Bush; some conservatives, thinking wishfully, saw him as another Ronald Reagan. He called himself a "compassionate conservative," which meant whatever one wanted it to mean. Experts from across the party's spectrum were flown to Austin to brief Bush and reported back: "He's one of us. Republicans were desperate to retake the White House, conservatives were desperate to get the Clinton liberals out and there was no direct heir to Reagan running for president. So most conservatives supported Bush as the strongest candidate — some enthusiastically and some, like me, reluctantly. After the disastrous presidency of his father, our support for the son was a triumph of hope over experience. Once he took office, conservatives were willing to grant this Bush a honeymoon. … Then came the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and conservatives came to see support for the president as an act of patriotism.

Conservatives tolerated the No Child Left Behind Act, an extensive intrusion into state and local education, and the budget-busting Medicare prescription drug benefit. They tolerated the greatest increase in spending since Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society. They tolerated Bush's failure to veto a single bill, and his refusal to enforce immigration laws. They even tolerated his signing of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance overhaul, even though Bush's opposition to that measure was a key reason they backed him over Sen. John McCain (Ariz.) in the 2000 primaries.

In 2004, Republican leaders pleaded with conservatives … to register people to vote and help them turn out on Election Day. Those efforts strengthened Republicans in Congress and probably saved the Bush presidency. We were told: Just wait till the second term. Then, the president, freed of concern over reelection and backed by a Republican Congress, would take off the gloves and fight for the conservative agenda. Just wait.

We're still waiting.

Sixty-five months into Bush's presidency, conservatives feel betrayed. …

If onservatives accept the idea that we must support Republicans no matter what they do, we give up our bargaining position and any chance at getting things done … Sometimes it is better to stand on principle and suffer a temporary defeat." (Hele essayet "Bush's base betrayal" er her.)

  • Peggy Noonan, taleskriver for Reagan og Bush den Ældre (og, som læserne vil vide, en af mine favoritskribenter), opfordrede i sin Wall Street Journal-klumme i forrige uge ligeledes til den konklusion, at et nederlag for Republikanerne ved det kommende midtvejsvalg kan være det bedste for sagen på længere sigt: 

"Power is distancing.

When you've been in Congress for a while, or the White House for a while, you both forget too many things and learn too many things.

You forget why they sent you. You forget it's not that you're charming and wonderful. You forget it's not you. You become immersed in a Washington conversation, a political conversation, that is, by definition, unlike the normal human conversation back home. To survive and thrive, national politicians have to speak two languages, Here and Home. Actually it's more than two languages, it's two cultures. It's hard to straddle cultures.

But even as you forget a lot, you learn a lot. You get crammed into your head the political realities on the ground around you–how big the minority Democratic bloc in the House really is, how many votes the other team has in what committee, where to go for legal money, how the press will react to any given decision or statement.

In time you know a lot of things the people who sent you to Washington don't know. And you come to forget what they do know. It used to be easy for you to remember that, because it's what you knew too. …

[The] administration and the Congress are losing their base, and it isn't because of the media. Republicans on the ground love to defy the MSM. When the media dislike their guy, they take it as proof their guy is good.

Of all the bad poll numbers for the Republicans, I think the worst is the right track/wrong track numbers, which continue to trend downward. A majority of the American people think we're on the wrong track. How can this be when the American economy is in a boom? When the Dow Jones Industrial Average is approaching its all-time high, when annual growth is almost 5%, when unemployment is low, and so is inflation? (People don't talk much about inflation anymore, but in the 1970s and early '80s it was the thief in the night that kept America sleepless. They could almost feel the worth of their savings going down with each tick of the clock. It was more disruptive, more damaging to a sense of security, than street crime. It is an unnoticed achievement that it has been so low so long.)

There are many reasons for the current unease. Not everything comes down to politics, not by a long shot. But part of it is politics.

It has long been the American way to believe political problems can be solved or eased through political action. Were tax rates in certain areas of the economy too high from 1940 to 1980, and were they injurious to our economy and to individuals? Yes. So Americans pushed back, pamphleteered and backed leaders who promised to lower them. In time the taxes came down.

Name the political problem, we could answer it, or work toward answering it, with political solutions.

But faith in political action has been damaged the past few years, not by outside forces but by the two major political parties themselves.

If you are a normal person with the normal amount of political awareness, you might see it this way:

Th

e Republicans talk about cutting spending, but they increase it–a lot. They stand for making government smaller, but they keep making it bigger. They say they're concerned about our borders, but they're not securing them. And they seem to think we're slobs for worrying. Republicans used to be sober and tough about foreign policy, but now they're sort of romantic and full of emotionalism. They talk about cutting taxes, and they have, but the cuts are provisional, temporary. Beyond that, there's something creepy about increasing spending so much and not paying the price right away but instead rolling it over and on to our kids, and their kids.

So, the normal voter might think, maybe the Democrats. But Democrats are big spenders, Democrats are big government, Democrats will roll the cost onto our kids, and on foreign affairs they're–what? Cynical? Confused? In a constant daily cringe about how their own base will portray them? All of the above. …

Congressional Republicans right now seem just like the liberal Republicans of the great Losing Era of Republican history, circa 1960-80. All the Republican congressmen in those days had good beliefs, and shared them at the Rotary luncheon back home. The government was getting too big and taxes were too high. Then they'd go back to Washington and vote for higher spending and higher taxes. But not as high as the Democrats, they'd point out. Their job was to stand athwart history and cry, "Please slow down just a little bit!"

Republicans on the ground back home got mad. Eventually they threw the old guys out and sent to Washington in 1980 a guy who meant it when he said he'd cut and contain. …

Party leaders are showing a belief in process as opposed to a belief in, say, belief. But belief drives politics. It certainly drives each party's base.

One gets the impression party leaders, deep in their hearts, believe the base is . . . base. Unsophisticated. Primitive. Obsessed with its little issues. They're trying to educate the base. But if history is a guide, the base is about to teach them a lesson instead."

"George W. Bush was never a small government conservative, but we were willing to put up with the bad because it was outweighed by the good he was doing against terrorists. Our habit of cutting Mr. Bush a lot of slack was eroding under the burdens of hundreds of billions in pork and the lack of productive congressional action. It ended abruptly with his announcement of the Harriett Miers nomination to the Supreme Court. It took us less time to figure out why Miers was awful than it did the bloggers to determine that Dan Rather's Texas Air National Guard documents were forgeries."

Og dét var så, hvad vennerne sagde …

Den idealistiske kapitalist

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 10. maj 2006. 2 svar

Vores med-Punditokrat Foss havde forleden en for givetvis 99,9 pct. af læserne kryptisk reference til "The Kochtopus".  Dette begreb, som i sin tid blev lanceret af økonomen Murray Rothbard, er da også for længst faldet ud af daglig brug i de dele af det amerikanske højrefløjsmiljø, hvor det ellers var meget brugt i 1980erne–som en reference til det netværk af liberalistiske organisationer, der var sat i værk og delvist finansieret af de to idealistiske og velbelæste multi-milliardærer, Charles G. Koch og David H. Koch fra Koch Industries.  Blandt disse er først og fremmest f.eks. Cato Institute, Mercatus Center, og Institute for Humane Studies, samt i sin tid Libertarian Party (som i 1980 opstillede David Koch som vicepræsidentkandidat).

Egentlig havde jeg gladeligt ladet Foss' reference passere, men da Wall Street Journal forleden havde en portræt artikel om netop Charles Koch (skrevet af Stephen Moore, der selv tidligere har været ansat hos Cato Institute og har ledet Club for Growth), var der måske en lejlighed til at præsentere en type virksomhedsejere, som der ikke findes mange af i Danmark.

På venstrefløjen og Rådhuspladsen tror man ganske vist, at dansk erhvervsliv er mere end villigt til at finansiere pro-kapitalistiske ideologiske projekter med store checks, men de af os, der har været tættere eller lettere involveret i projekter som f.eks. CEPOS, ved, at det forholder sig ganske anderledes–at det faktisk er ekstremt svært at få penge fra den kreds af mennesker, der ellers burde synes som den gruppe med den mest åbenlyse forståelse for nødvendigheden af at sprede ideer og indsigter om privat ejendomsret, fri markedsøkonomi, retssikkerhed, o.s.v.  Mens venstrefløjen–udover million-store tilskud på fast basis til f.eks. AER–fra tid til anden fra fagbevægelsen har kunnet få f.eks. 180 mio. kr. til at vælte en borgerlig regering med, er det mildt sagt svært at få penge ud af det private erhvervsliv.

En del af årsagen er givetvis berøringsangst og frygt for politiske repressalier–det er ihvertfald et argument, der undertiden høres.  En anden årsag er sikkert, at den første årsag spiller en særligt tungtvejende rolle i et land, der er så lille og intellektuelt underudviklet som Danmark, og hvor Janteloven omvendt stortrives: Her er kapitalister nød til at gå stille med dørene og evt. lide af en god gang selvbebrejdelse.  En tredje væsentlig årsag er givetvis, at mange af de "managers", der er hyret til at lede erhvervsvirksomheder slet ikke er det mindste borgerlige.  (Jeg er f.eks. konstant forbløffet over, at det igen og igen lykkes medierne af præsentere SF'eren Lars Goldschmidt som en typisk repræsentant for det borgerlige erhvervsliv, når han hverken er det ene eller det andet af disse.)

Som vi tidligere har refereret til, er det selv i USA overraskende svært at rejse penge fra erhvervslivet til pro-frimarkedsøkonomiske projekter, om end det kan lade sig gøre.  Blandt dem, som har været villige til at gå længst med at kaste egne penge efter politiske projekter (andet end lobbyisme) er altså netop Koch-brødrene.  Og de har penge: De arvede en del, men har ovenpå formået at opbygge en virksomhed, som er USA's 5. største virksomhed, og som er landets største rent privatejede virksomhed (d.v.s. ikke er børsnoteret).  Her er uddrag af WSJ's portræt af Charles Koch:

"Meet Charles Koch. Philosopher, engineer, self-trained economist, libertarian activist, philanthropist — and the CEO of Koch Industries, a $60 billion, 80,000-employee empire, which just recently became the largest and most profitable privately held company in America.

But you've probably never heard of it.

Neither Charles Koch nor his firm are household names. Mr. Koch (pronounced "coke") has managed to live in relative obscurity despite being one of the richest men on the planet, with a net worth estimated at $14 billion. He is a man of modesty who craves none of the fame or public adulation that seems to preoccupy other members of the billionaires' club. …

Back in 1967, when Mr. Koch was in his early 30s, he became the reluctant president of the family business, then a $177 million, medium-sized oil firm. He recalls: "My father threatened that he was going to sell the company if I wouldn't come back home to Kansas from the East Coast and run it."

Nearly four decades later, that family company is a global conglomerate with net annual sales that exceed the GDP of many small nations, and it includes a diverse range of businesses supplying everything from jet fuel to plastic, asphalt to beef, toilet paper to lumber. It owns many familiar brand names such as Dixie cups, Stainmaster carpet and Brawny paper towels. The firm's financial performance numbers have been positively gaudy, with a rate of return on investment that has outpaced the Standard & Poor's 500 at least tenfold under Mr. Koch's stewardship. …

[Charles Koch] is immersed in the ideas of liberty and free markets. Whereas the bookshelves of most of America's leading CEOs are stocked with pop corporate management and "how to succeed" books, Mr. Koch's office is a wall-to-wall shrine to writings in classical economics, or, as he calls it, "the science of liberty." The authors who have had the most profound influence on his own political philosophy include F.A. Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Joseph Schumpeter, Julian Simon, Paul Johnson and Charles Murray. Mr. Koch says that he experienced an intellectual epiphany in the early 1960s, when he attended a conference on free-market capitalism hosted by the late, great Leonard Reed.

Mr. Koch is by training a scientist, with master's degrees from MIT in nuclear and chemical engineering. Despite his business success, he has no MBA or formal management training. Mr. Koch sees that as an advantage. "Being an engineer, I realized there's an objective reality that helps one understand the rules and conditions that improve the human condition," he says. "Laws and principles that facilitate the advancement of peace, prosperity and social progress are as immutable as the laws that work in science. … Politicians often come up with misguided policy solutions," he continues, "because they suffer from Hayek's 'fatal conceit' and believe they can violate basic laws of economics. They are just as misguided as the man who jumps out the 14th floor of a building convinced that he can repeal the law of gravity."

As we continue, Mr. Koch becomes increasingly animated. He discusses another seminal work in his collection, F.A. Harper's 1957 "Why Wages Rise." The book demonstrates "that wages rise not because of unions or government action, but because of marginal productivity gains — people get more money when they produce more value for other people." Then he confides, "I was so thrilled by this revelation that I had what Maslow called a 'peak experience.'" …

"Long-term success entails con
stantly discovering new wa
ys to create value for customers and building new capabilities to capture new opportunities," he instructs. "In this sense, maintaining a business is, in reality, liquidating a business." Mr. Koch likens the cycle to Schumpeter's "creative destruction" — where the old and inefficient are ruthlessly swept away by the new.

What we have here are the theories of supply-side economics operating on the micro-level of the firm. Incentives matter; competition fosters innovation; property rights must be firmly established. Koch Industries gives big financial bonuses for entrepreneurial behavior by employees, whether it's a project head or a janitor. The idea is to reward all activities that add to the bottom-line profitability of the firm. "We want our employees to act like owners," Mr. Koch explains. Similarly, employees earn "decision rights" for past successes. "Just as central planning is a failure in running government, so it is at the level of the firm," he says, repeating one of his favorite operating tenets. …

Charles Koch — no surprise — disdains government and the political class. He has invested tens of millions of dollars into free-market think-tanks and political activist groups (including several founded by this author). He's disgusted with the runaway federal budget under the Republicans, and he proposes that "every new law should be subject to the question: Will it strengthen the culture of prosperity?" Won't about 90% of the laws fail that test? "Yes, that's exactly what I mean," he replies. "But the problem isn't the people in government, it's the system — the incentives are perverse."

Mr. Koch's latest crusade to spread the ideas of liberty has been his sponsorship of a twice-yearly conference that gathers together many of the most successful American entrepreneurs, from T. Boone Pickens to former Circuit City CEO Rick Sharp. The objective is to encourage these captains of industry to help fund free-market groups devoted to protecting the fragile infrastructure of liberty. That task seems especially critical given that so many of the global superrich, like George Soros and Warren Buffett, finance institutions that undermine the very system of capitalism that made their success possible. Isn't this just the usual rich liberal guilt, I ask. "No," he says, "I think they simply haven't been sufficiently exposed to the ideas of liberty."

Sounds as though Messrs. Soros and Buffett would benefit more from sitting down with Charles Koch than I would. For my part, after listening to this natural-born teacher exalt the superiority of free markets and the boundless wealth that they can create, I feel as though I'm about to experience one of Maslow's "peak experiences" myself. But our time is up, and if Mr. Koch has learned nothing else from his spiritual mentors, it's the concept of opportunity cost. Time is money, and it's time to get back to his greatest passion of all: building the profitability of his world-class company."

Kunne vi ikke godt bruge bare tre eller ti af den type i Danmark?  Problemet er såmænd blot, at dét nok netop er årsagen til, at vi næppe får dem.

Hvordan afbrænder man en sendefrekvens?

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 14. april 2006. 14 svar

Den politisk korrekte selvcensur (til forskel fra den selvcensur, der blot er udtryk for almindelig anstændighed og gode manerer) har netop i disse påskedage nået nye højder i det USA, som nærværende punditokrat holder meget af, men som også lider af de mere gakkede versioner af autoritær venstrefløjstænkning.

Og nej, jeg tænker her ikke på, at New York University for nylig har forbudt en gruppe Ayn Rand begejstrede studerende at holde et åbent møde om Jyllands-Postens Muhammed-tegninger, hvor disse udover at blive diskuteret også ville blive fremvist. (Læs om den groteske historie bl.a. her, samt her og her.)

Næ, jeg tænker såmænd på dagens historie fra CNN og Jyllands-Posten om den respektløse TV-tegnefilmserie South Park fra den normalt ganske grænseafprøvende TV-kanal Comedy Central.  (Se også den fremragende jurist-blog, Volokh Conspiracy, her og her og her.) Skaberne af serien (som Mikael Bonde Nielsen tidligere har omtalt her på bloggen) har i et afsnit villet tegne Muhammed, men det har TV-selskabet nægtet at lade passere; i stedet har man så–for at "prove a point" om hykleri–i netop denne påske-uges afsnit tegnet Jesus, som "forretter sin nødtørft" på George W. Bush og "Stars and Stripes"-flaget.  Dét havde TV-selskabets politisk korrekte ledelse omvendt ingen problemer med!

Well, well, måske ikke den mest smagfulde måde at demonstrere ens pointe på, men netop pointen er dog her åbenlys: At al talen om ikke at "krænke" nogens følelser har mindre at gøre med handlingens kategoriske karakter end, hvem det er, der bliver stødt på manchetterne.  Kunne man mon forestille sig reaktionen, hvis historien havde været vendt 180 grader rundt …?

Det er iøvrigt værd at bemærke argumentationen fra Comedy Central: Man har ikke villet acceptere Muhammed-gengivelsen på grund af "sikkerhedshensyn".  Hvilke budskaber sender det?  At religiøse fanatikere bare skal gå mest muligt amok–det virker!  God påske.

Ugens citat: Fund om paniske højrefløjspolitikere

Af Redaktionen, den 10. april 2006. 1 svar

Wall Street Journals meget indsigtsfulde (og generelt klassisk-liberalt lænende) politiske redaktør John Fund har mandag en syrlig kommentar til, hvorledes Republikanerne klarer sig p.t., og som vel bedst kan sammenfattes med det farverige og rammende udtryk, af man er ved at “snatch defeat out of the jaws of victory”.  Her er et uddrag af Funds klumme:

“It is becoming increasingly clear that the GOP majority is losing its team spirit, and many in Congress are going their own way as they eye a tough re-election climate. Back in 1994, that kind of behavior over a crime bill that failed to garner enough Democratic votes to pass on the floor was an early indicator that Democrats were in serious political trouble. They wound up losing control of both houses of Congress that year.

No one quite expects a tsunami of those proportions this year. Incumbent-protection devices and gerrymandered districts are likely to minimize GOP losses. But Republican strategists are now openly talking about the parallels between 1994 and 2006. …

Panicked politicians are not a pretty sight,” says GOP pollster Whit Ayres. “They usually run in the wrong direction”.

So far that’s exactly the direction that Republican have chosen to run in the last year as their national numbers and President Bush’s approval ratings have softened. From their scramble to ram through a national legislative solution to Terri Schiavo’s plight, to their overreaction to Hurricane Katrina, to their failure to recognize the public’s disgust with pork-barrel projects, to the Dubai Ports deal, Republicans have appeared to the world to be as unprincipled and rudderless as the politicians they campaigned against back in 1994. Unless they change course dramatically in the seven months between now and Election Day, they may well find themselves facing the same fate as the Democratic political dinosaurs of that year that they replaced.”

Er Cheney en diskursiv "girly-man"?

Af Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, den 6. april 2006. 7 svar

Vicepræsident Richard B. Cheney var 2004-valgets mest intellektuelt veltalende af de fire topkandidater.  Og så lyder han positiv, ungdommelig, og–ikke mindst–præsidentiel, ærlig og mandig!  Som Schwarzenegger ville sige: He ain’t no girly-man!

Nej, dette er ikke et uddrag fra en pressemeddelelse fra Eisenhower Executive Office Building.  Heller ikke et forsøg fra Republican National Committee på at snige Cheney ind som surprise-kandidaten til 2008-valget.

Der er såmænd blot tale om forskningsresultater fra en kommende tidsskriftsartikel af Richard B. Slatcher m.fl., “Winning words: Individual differences in linguistic style among US presidential and vice presidential candidates” i Journal of Research in Personality, hvori en gruppe amerikanske psykologer har analyseret time efter time af optagelser med de fire hovedpersoner i USA’s præsidentvalg 2004: Republikanerne Bush og Cheney og Demokraterne John Kerry og John Edwards.  Og kender man amerikanske psykologer–selv dem fra Texas–så er de næppe tyngede af forkærlighed for Republikanerne eller Cheney.  Faktisk er det vel et rimeligt godt (omend dybt usagligt) gæt, hvis man mistænker dem for at valgt netop dén vinkel og dét valg med et vist blik for, at George W. Bush som bekendt–med egne ord–er noget “misunderestimated” … Så meget desto mere interessante er resultaterne.

Konkret har forskerne brugt et computer-baseret tekstanalyse-program til at “afkode”, hvorledes kandidaterne udtrykte sig i.f.t. seks kategorier af udtryk, som andre studier har vist, at vælgerne lægger vægt på: Kognitiv kompleksitet (sofistikerede sætninger, brug af svære ord, o.s.v.); “feminimitet” (ord og sætningsstrukturer foretrukket af kvinder); depressivitet (ord, der forekommer pessimistiske og selvmordsrelaterede); alder (ord, der bruges af henholdsvis unge og ældre); “præsidentialitet” (ord og sætningsstrukturer, der forekommer i præsidenttaler siden Roosevelt); ærlighed (sammenligning med sætninger, der er sande/falske).  I stedet for kandidaternes præ-fabrikerede “stump speeches” fra valgkampsmøder, har man anvendt mere uformelle sammenhænge, f.eks. interviews, pressemøder, debatter o.l. (N = 271).  Dem har man så kodet og fodret computerprogrammet med og kørte forskellige typer af statistiske tests på.

Resultaterne er interessante–og lidt sjove.

  • Kognitiv kompleksitet: Her var Cheney suverænt i toppen, Kerry i midten (men tættere på bunden), og Bush og (særligt) Edwards i bunden.  Der var ingen systematisk forskel på kandidaterne anskuet efter partifarve.
  • Feminimitet: Edwards var den mest “feminine” i sit ordvalg, mens Cheney var den mindst.  Igen betød partifarven ikke noget.
  • Depressivitet: Kerry lød mest markant som en “deprimeret” person, mens Bush lød mindst deprimeret, og de to vicepræsidentkandidater lød mest som deres nr. 1’ere–og her slog partifarven igennem, altså således at Demokraterne var deprimerede og Republikanerne positive.  Det er måske ikke så overraskende, at Bush lød mere up-beat end Kerry, givet hvordan sidstnævntes kampagne udfoldede sig, men her aner man givetvis et mere “strukturelt” træk: At udfordrerne skal fortælle, hvor skidt alt går, mens det parti med magten skal fortælle, hvor godt det går.
  • Alder: Bush lød i sit ordvalg som en ældre herre, mens der ikke var signifikante forskelle mellem de tre øvrige, der alle lød “yngre”.  Her betød partifarven intet.
  • “Præsidentialitet”: Under valgkampen fokuserede medierne meget på, at Kerry fremstod mere “statsmandsagtig” end Bush.  Men ifølge forskerne var det rent verbalt Cheney, som suverænt lød mest som en statsmand, tæt fulgt af Bush, mens den “nuttede” Edwards lå helt i bunden.  Her var Republikanerne markant mere “præsidentielle” end Demokraterne.
  • Ærlighed: Når det gjaldt valg af ord, fremstod Cheney som den markant mest ærlige fulgt af Edwards, mens de to topkandidater, særligt Kerry, fremstod uærlige.  Her betød placeringen på stemmesedlen altså noget, mens partifarven igen ikke gjorde.

Til gengæld finder analysen stort set ikke nogen sammenhæng mellem kandidaternes ordvalg og deres relative succes i meningsmålingerne.

PS. Det er i visse kredse velkendt, at nærværende punditokrat ikke har overmåde stor faglig respekt for dét, der indenfor moderne samfundsvidenskab kaldes “diskursanalyse”, så hvorfor promovere et sådant studie?  Fordi det generelt er alt dét, som såkaldte diskursanalyser generelt ikke er.